State vs. Chalmers W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Chalmers W1997-00174-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Beauregard W1997-00060-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
In this appeal, we consider whether the constitutional principle of either double jeopardy or due process is violated and therefore bars separate convictions for both rape and incest when the offenses arise from a single act committed against the same victim. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions for rape and incest. After our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the separate convictions for rape and incest did not violate double jeopardy principles under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because the offenses require different elements, different evidence, and have different purposes. We also conclude that the convictions for rape and incest did not violate due process under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions because neither offense was "essentially incidental" to the other. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Hardeman
Supreme Court
W1999-02682-COA-R9-CV W1999-02682-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Lipscomb vs. Doe W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
Lipscomb vs. Doe W1997-00132-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
Shelby
Supreme Court
Troy C. Ledbetter v. Batesville Casket Company M1998-00670-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Franklin
Workers Compensation Panel
John J. Kobus v. Colonial Moving Company M1999-00034-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Putnam
Workers Compensation Panel
Shirley Dale Reeves v. Wal-Mart, Inc., M1998-00879-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Lewis
Workers Compensation Panel
Sammartano vs. Sammartano M1999-00415-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
In this divorce case, the defendant/wife appeals complaining of an inequitable division of marital assets, an inadequate award of rehabilitative alimony and the denial of attorney fees. As modified herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Marion Co. Bd. of Education vs. Marion Co. Education Assoc. M1999-00213-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffery Stewart
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment action on behalf of the Marion County School Board seeking a determination as to whether or not the decision by the director of schools to transfer a principal to a teaching position was subject to binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement in effect between the school board and the Marion County Education Association. A cross-claim was filed by the Association requesting an injunction to force the Board to arbitration, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Association's motion for summary judgment and mandated the Board to go to final and binding arbitration under the agreement. We reverse the decision of the trial court and hold that the statutory authority of the director of schools to hire and select principals may not be limited by a collective bargaining agreement and that such an agreement cannot authorize an arbitrator to determine who will be principal at a particular school.
Marion
Court of Appeals
Douglas DuBois vs. Rosemary DuBois M1999-00330-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
Plaintiff/Appellant, Douglas Robert DuBois, and Defendant/Appellee, Rosemary Ann DuBois, are parents of two minor children, Caitlin Michel DuBois and Thomas Jackson DuBois. The Decree of Divorce was entered on November 5, 1998, following two days of trial that occurred on the 8th and 9th of October 1998. Both parties filed T.R.C.P. Rule 59 motions to alter or amend the final decree which, in effect, sought a redetermination by the trial judge of almost everything in issue. All of these motions were heard on May 12, 1999, after which, on June 15, 1999, the trial judge entered an order determinative of these Rule 59 motions. From this order, Plaintiff, Douglas Robert DuBois, appeals. We affirm the trial judge.
Coffee
Court of Appeals
Estate of John Acuff, Sr., et al vs. Brenda O'Linger M1999-00680-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart
The singular dispositive question on this appeal is whether or not two deeds, purportedly executed by the late John E. Acuff, Sr., conveying certain property to Brenda O'Linger, bear the forged signature of John E. Acuff, Sr. An advisory chancery jury, acting under "preponderance of the evidence" instructions, held that the signatures were forged thereby voiding the two deeds. The chancellor adopted, without comment, the findings of the advisory jury and entered judgment for the plaintiffs voiding the two deeds. Defendant appeals and upon consideration of the record we reverse the chancellor.
Marion
Court of Appeals
Daniel White vs. State ex rel Brenda Armstrong M1999-00713-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Betty Adams Green
This appeal involves the State's liability to repay child support payments made by a man who had voluntarily legitimated a child he believed to be his own. After this court directed the Davidson County Juvenile Court to grant him prospective relief from the legitimation order in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(4), the man requested the juvenile court to order the State and the child's biological mother to reimburse him for the child support payments he had made following the entry of the legitimation order. The juvenile court denied the request on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the State to reimburse "overpaid child support." We have determined that the juvenile court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims and, therefore, affirm the juvenile court's order.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
William Fox vs. Marcella Fox M1999-01720-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart
In this divorce case ending an eighteen year marriage, the trial court awarded as separate property only the items owned by each party at the time of the marriage. The court awarded the marital home to both parties as tenants in common, allowing Wife to retain possession while the children were minors but requiring her to make the mortgage payments. Upon the sale of the property, the parties were to divide the proceeds of the sale, after costs and encumbrances were paid, with Wife receiving 60% and Husband receiving 40%. Wife appeals, contending that the court was required to classify the gifts during the marriage as separate property, and that the court's distribution of the marital property was not equitable. She also argues that the trial court violated federal law by awarding Husband a percentage of the real property and by ordering her to pay the mortgage, claiming the source of the equity in the property and of her income is her disability benefits, and those funds are exempt from "attachment, levy, or seizure." The evidence does not preponderate against the court's classification of property, and we find the division to be equitable. We find no violation of federal law in the award of the real property or in the requirement that Wife pay the mortgage so long as she occupies the premises.
Franklin
Court of Appeals
Thomas Joiner vs. Dora Taylor Joiner M1999-01721-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Burch
Wife appeals the conversion from a divorce from bed and board (now known as a "legal separation") to an absolute divorce, claiming the trial court was required to hold another evidentiary hearing concerning the support and property rights of the parties. The parties had ostensibly agreed to a final division of property at the time of the divorce from bed and board, and the trial court had held a later hearing regarding the fairness of the division and Wife's capacity to make such an agreement. Because we find that the trial court made "a final and complete adjudication of the support and property rights of the parties," as required by statute, when it incorporated the agreement of the parties at the time of the divorce from bed and board, we affirm the trial court.
Stewart
Court of Appeals
Charles Rooker v. Donal Campbell M1999-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction over his release eligibility date. Dissatisfied with the response to his petition for a declaratory order, the prisoner filed a petition for a declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, asserting that the extension of his release eligibility date violated the Department's policy regarding punishment for escape and the terms of his plea agreement. He also claimed that the Department had wrongfully deprived him of sentence reduction credits. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Keough W1997-00201-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty
Shelby
Supreme Court
State vs. Fitz W1997-00186-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
Tipton
Supreme Court
State vs. Blackstock E1994-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil
This appeal involves a suit to recover money advanced by a construction lender to a building supply company to pay for building supplies which the bank mistakenly thought had been delivered to the bank’s debtor. Plaintiff, Farmers & Merchants Bank (Bank) sued defendant, Midway Supply Company, Inc., (Midway) to recover the sums advanced after Midway failed to deliver the supplies and applied the advanced funds to pay other accounts of the Bank’s debtor. From the judgment of the Circuit Court awarding judgment to Bank for the advanced funds less certain credit, Midway has appealed.
The defendant/appellant, Gary Lamar McBride, appeals as of right from a conviction for murder second degree by a Davidson County jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court imposed a sentence of sixteen (16) years in the Department of Correction. The defendant presents three appellate issues:
1.Whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s statement to be read to the jury and not suppressing the same.
2.Whether the trial court erred in not finding that the proof adduced at trial by the State is in conflict with the physical facts rule applicable to criminal cases.
3.Whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder second degree.
A Davidson County jury convicted the appellant, Steven D. Pittman, of one (1) count of possession with the intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, one (1) count of felonious possession of a weapon and one (1) count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of eleven (11) years for possession with the intent to sell cocaine, two (2) years for felonious possession of a weapon and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for marijuana possession. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the appellant’s convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This extraordinary appeal involves an automobile collision. The driver of the automobile that was struck from behind and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the driver and record owner of the automobile that struck her. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the driver’s liability. The defendants applied for an extraordinary appeal after the trial court declined to grant them an interlocutory appeal. We have determined this is a proper case for an extraordinary appeal and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a partial summary judgment because of the existence of material factual disputes regarding liability. Accordingly, pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b),1 we reverse the partial summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
