The defendant appeals his premeditated first degree murder and abuse of a corpse convictions for which he received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and two years, respectively, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in not enforcing a plea agreement; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (3) hearsay evidence of the victim’s statements was erroneously admitted; (4) evidence obtained via wiretaps was erroneously admitted; (5) evidence regarding defendant’s alleged romantic relationship with a woman other than his wife was erroneously admitted; and (6) the trial court should have charged the jury regarding alibi. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I concur in all respects save one. I seriously question the conclusion that all of the victim’s statements to her mother were admissible as excited utterances. A declarant’s opinion about who caused an event would ordinarily not be admissible even if the declarant appeared and testified at a trial. Here, I do not believe that the victim’s opinion about who started the fire was admissible. However, given the location and timing of the fire, the inferences drawn by the victim as to the potential cause of it would be obvious to the jury in any event. Thus, I do not believe that the error affected the verdict.
The petitioner appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he alleged that his conviction should be set aside because the victim had recanted his testimony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief and the petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we affirm the court's order of denial.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Diana Noles v. Ameristeel Corporation W2001-00406-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for a detailed analysis of the evidence in the trial record. The trial court in this cause found that Plaintiff sustained a thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to the right and left arm. Defendant, Ameristeel Corporation, appeals and asserts that the trial court's award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to each arm is excessive and not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. From our review of the entire record and applicable law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed as Modified. L. TERRY LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined. John D. Burleson and L. Beth Williams, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ameristeel Corporation. Paul Todd Nicks, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Diana Noles. MEMORANDUM OPINION Diana Noles (Parker), age 43, a high school graduate, testified that she has a varied employment background since high school. Plaintiff has worked as an office employee as well as performing manual labor in factories. Prior to 1993, she lived in Addison, Illinois, and moved to Tennessee that year with her ex-husband.1 Prior to her employment with MRT and Defendant, who 1The Plaintiff was a single mother up and until her marriage three months prior to trial. took over MRT, Plaintiff worked for Johnson Controls in Lexington, Tennessee, testing seat tracks for cars. When Plaintiff went to work for MRT, she was a "B" operator. This work consisted of shoveling, squeegeeing off the floor, pulling samples, and driving a forklift and front end loader. She became an "A" operator in the control room, but when Defendant took over MRT, she was transferred back to a "B" operator. Plaintiff's primary work responsibility was to keep the seal pans clean, unload coal trucks, fill charge buckets, and shovel and hoe out the seal pans which would accumulate mud. Also, this cleaning process required the use of a three-inch vacuum hose. Twenty- five percent (25%) of her work consisted of this repetitive shoveling, hoeing and vacuuming of the seal pans. Prior to February of 1999, Plaintiff had no work-related injuries. In January 1999, she advised her supervisors that her right arm felt like dead weight and was numb. She saw her family doctor who advised her that she may have carpal tunnel and to advise her employer. The company sent her to see Dr. Kenneth Warren, who referred her to Dr. Ronald Bingham for carpal tunnel testing. As a result of the test, Dr. Warren referred Plaintiff to Dr. Claiborne Christian for carpal tunnel syndrome. Eventually, Dr. Christian performed surgery on her right arm on Friday, February 26, 1999. She returned to light duty the following Monday and remained on light duty for six weeks. During this six weeks, Plaintiff was still seeing Dr. Christian every couple of weeks until she was returned to full duty. Her shoulder pain and numbness went away after surgery. Plaintiff testified that in June 1999, she began developing numbness and pain in her left hand. The company referred her back to Dr. Christian. After seeing Dr. Christian a number of times and having another test, Dr. Christian performed surgery on her left hand. Plaintiff returned to full duty in April 2. Since both surgeries, Plaintiff testified that she has re-occurring numbness/tingling, more in the right hand than the left. The numbness has affected her work and home chores in that while performing shoveling or vacuuming, she must stop and rest. She has not complained to her supervisors, as she does not want to sound "whiny." On behalf of Defendant, Mr. Jimmy Sloop, plant superintendent, testified that Plaintiff is one of his best employees. She does a good job, does not complain and approximately twenty-five percent (25%) of her work is repetitive. He would be happy to recommend her for an "A" operator position, but there are no openings and none seem to be available in the immediate future. Mr. Sloop confirmed that Plaintiff worked a twelve-hour shift, three days a week and averaged 1.3 hours of overtime daily. MEDICAL EVIDENCE Plaintiff was seen, initially, by Dr. Warren on February 9, 1999, who referred her to Dr. Bingham for a nerve conduction test. As a result of the test indicating severe entrapment neuropathy of the median nerve in right wrist, Dr. Warren referred Plaintiff to Dr. Christian for possible carpal tunnel release. Dr. Christian, an orthopedic specialist, filed a C-32, Department of Labor Standard Form Medical Report for Industrial Injuries on October 16, 2. Utilizing the AMA Guidelines for evaluation of permanent impairment, Dr. Christian opined that Plaintiff sustained a two percent (2%) -2-
Carroll
Workers Compensation Panel
Chantal Eldridge v. Putnam County M2000-02963-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This is a case about the Open Records Act as applied to the telephone records of a Drug Task Force. After the Chancery Court of Putnam County ordered the County to produce the records, the County appealed, arguing that the records fit an exception to the Act or that the County should be able at the plaintiff's expense to redact the records to delete confidential information. We modify the chancellor's order to allow the County to redact the records at their own expense.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Christell Staggs v. William Sells, et al. M2000-03095-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
This case involves a claim of negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a home. The trial court found that Defendants' statements and actions constituted negligent misrepresentation of the condition of the property resulting in $25,000.00 in damages to Plaintiff. However, the trial court also found, applying principles of comparative fault, that Defendants were 60% at fault and Plaintiff was 40% at fault. A judgment of $15,000 was, thus, assessed against Defendants. Defendants appeal the court's finding of negligent misrepresentations, as well as the amount of damages determined by the court to be suffered by Plaintiff. We affirm.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Christell Staggs v. William Sells, et al. M2000-03095-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
This case involves a claim of negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a home. The trial court found that Defendants' statements and actions constituted negligent misrepresentation of the condition of the property resulting in $25,000.00 in damages to Plaintiff. However, the trial court also found, applying principles of comparative fault, that Defendants were 60% at fault and Plaintiff was 40% at fault. A judgment of $15,000 was, thus, assessed against Defendants. Defendants appeal the court's finding of negligent misrepresentations, as well as the amount of damages determined by the court to be suffered by Plaintiff. We affirm.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Michael Bruce Harris v. Magotteaux, Inc., et al M2000-03201-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Gayden, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals the trial court's calculation of the workers' compensation award of permanent partial disability benefits using the employee's total medical impairment rating, as opposed to using only the medical impairment rating arising from the most recent injury. In addition, the employer's previous insurance carrier challenges the trial court's finding that it is equally liable along with the current insurance carrier for the employee's most recent injury and the employee's future medical benefits. The Panel concludes the award should be modified in part and reversed in part. We modify the trial court's judgment, finding that the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits solely for his most recent injury and award a 12% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. An employee cannot combine a claim for a new injury with a claim for reconsideration of a pre-existing workers' compensation award when the employee sustains an additional injury. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding that Home Insurance Company, the previous insurance carrier, is not liable for benefits arising from the second injury. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified in Part and Reversed in Part. GAYDEN, SP. J., in which DROWOTA, J., and LOSER, SP. J., joined. Joseph W. Henry, Jr., Henry, Henry & Speer, Pulaski, Tennessee, for the appellant, Magotteaux, Inc. 1 Rankin P. Bennett, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Michael Bruce Harris William M. Billips, Ortale, Kelley, Herbert & Crawford, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Home Insurance Company and Home Indemnity Company MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee/appellee, Michael Bruce Harris, is a forty-year-old high school graduate, with no further schooling. He is married and has one child who is in the 12th grade. Since graduating from high school in 1978, the employee has held and performed jobs requiring a great deal of physical exertion. The employee worked at his first job at Torrington/ Fafnir from 1978 until 1988 as a material handler and equipment operator. In 1988, he started work for Magotteaux, Inc., the employer/appellant, as a field services technician. This job required the employee to drive a truck to various and distant locations throughout the country, erect equipment for the customer, and be on standby around the clock until the customer was satisfied. The employee would dismantle the machinery once the customer was finished and transport the equipment to the next location. The employee worked for the employer for 9_ years until his dismissal on January 11, 1999. Some time after the loss of his job, the employee and a friend borrowed $85, to open a retail package liquor store. The employee is presently working at this liquor store. While on the job working for the employer, the employee suffered two injuries to the same place in his back. No dispute exists as to whether the employee was on the job at the time of the injuries. Both injuries resulted in a ruptured disc on the right side at the L4/5 level of the spine and required laminectomies. The first injury occurred on June 13, 1994. Dr. Verne Allen, the neurosurgeon who performed the first laminectomy, assigned a 1% medical impairment rating in accordance with the Fourth Edition of the American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. After the first injury, the employee returned to his job at the same or greater pay. He received a workers' compensation award in the amount of 25% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court reached this number by multiplying the 1% medical impairment rating 2_ times, as allowed in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 241(a)(1)(2). The employee suffered his second injury on March 21, 1998, on a job site in Pennsylvania. Dr. Vaughan Allen, a neurosurgeon, performed the second laminectomy and assigned an additional 2% medical impairment rating in keeping with the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides. In his deposition, Dr. Allen agreed that the total physical impairment rating of these two laminectomies would be 12% medical impairment to the body as a whole. The employee returned to work, again at the same or greater pay. Dr. Vaughan Allen placed restrictions on the employee's physical activities; specifically, no lifting over thirty pounds on a repetitive basis, fifty pounds occasionally, no repetitive bending, and no driving a truck for two hours without getting out and moving around. Dr. Allen ordered the employee not to drive a truck in the capacity he had been doing before the second injury. The employee filed two complaints for workers' compensation following his second injury. 2
Giles
Workers Compensation Panel
State of Tennessee v. Ned Jackson W2000-02589-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft
The Defendant, Ned Jackson,1 was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that insufficient evidence of the Defendant’s identity as the culprit was presented to convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of theft and aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial judge sentenced him to 12 years incarceration as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) his custodial statement should have been suppressed; (3) a juror failed to respond to a voir dire question concerning prior involvement in the legal system, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial jury; (4) the trial court erroneously disallowed admission of a crime scene report; and (5) his sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt of aggravated robbery, I respectfully disagree with its conclusion that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Currently, members of this court are divided concerning the correct interpretation of the two-step process set forth by our supreme court in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 469 (Tenn. 1999), for determining if the evidence adduced at trial justifies jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., State v. Linnell Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, October 15, 2001). I am largely in agreement with the position expressed by Judge Smith in his opinion in Richmond, No. E2000-01545-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1222247, at *21 (concurring in part and dissenting in part)(footnote omitted), that [a] reading of the recent cases of [State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn. 2001), and State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 724-725 (Tenn. 2001),] leads one to the inescapable conclusion that our high court has mandated that lesser-included offense instructions be given anytime the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for these offenses. This means that anytime the proof is sufficient for a conviction of the indicted offense, the proof will a fortiori be sufficient for a conviction of the lesser-included offenses. . . . As a practical matter, this in turn means that it will almost always be error to fail to instruct the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of the indicted offense. Thus, the only real inquiry, in my opinion, in virtually all of the cases raising the lesser-included offense issue is whether the error in failing to instruct on the lesser offenses can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendants James Whitelow and Robert Robertson appeal their convictions for possession of cocaine in an amount over 26 grams with intent to deliver. Both argue the evidence was not sufficient to support their convictions. Whitelow also argues the forensic report was erroneously admitted into evidence, and the jury's verdict was the result of passion and prejudice caused by the prosecutor's statements regarding Whitelow's alias nickname. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This is an appeal by defendant, Michael Kingston Stevenson (Husband), from the trial court's award of alimony in solido, alimony in futuro, the amount of child support award, and the award of additional alimony in solido of $9,700.00 for plaintiff, Shelly Sue Douglas Stevenson's (Wife), attorney's fee.
The plaintiff counter-defendant, ShoLodge Franchise Systems, Inc. (hereafter "Sholodge") has appealed from a jury verdict of $327,272 in favor of the defendant counterplaintiff McKibbon Brothers, Inc. (hereafter McKibbon) for damages for breach of a franchise contract.
This is an appeal by petitioner, Johnny W. Raines, from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for certiorari from a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles (Board).
This is an appeal by plaintiffs/appellants, Richard and Kimberly King, from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants/appellees, W. D. Schock, Co. ("Schock"), South Central Bell Telephone Co. a/k/a Bell South Telecommunications, Inc. ("Bell South"), and Charles LaRue.
This appeal involves a dispute between Warren County, Tennessee and the Town of Morrison, a municipality located within Warren County, regarding the disposition of the revenue generated by the county local option sales tax. On March 21, 1988, plaintiff, Town of Morrison (hereinafter Morrison), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant, Warren County. The complaint alleges that under T.C.A. § 67-6-712 (Supp. 1995), a justiciable controversy exists between the parties concerning their respective rights to distribution of the county local option sales tax revenue. The complaint avers that the Warren County local option sales tax was adopted in 1969 and increased in 1976 and 1985. Morrison alleges that since 1969 the tax revenues have been collected by the Tennessee Department of Revenue and distributed to Warren County, but Warren County has refused to pay Morrison its share of the taxes as required by T.C.A. § 67-6-712 (2)(B). The complaint seeks a declaration of the rights of the parties to the sales tax revenues, and an accounting of, and a judgment for, Morrison's share of the local option sales tax.
In this case, we are presented with the issue of whether a private act is invalid as being in conflict with the general law addressing the same subject.Kentucky-Tennessee Clay Company, v. Joe H
The defendant was convicted of the premeditated first degree murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant was convicted in two indictments of aggravated child abuse and sentenced to concurrent nine-year sentences. He timely appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments, in permitting evidence as to other similar offenses, and in not properly instructing the jury as to various matters, including lesser-included offenses. We conclude that any errors in this regard were harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I concur in the result reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. However, I would hold that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on attempted aggravated child abuse under the evidence presented. As the majority opinion holds though, under State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1988), the failure to give the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant drove up behind a vehicle which had halted because of a driver's license roadblock near Knoxville. He then proceeded onto the right shoulder to get around that vehicle and was stopped by the Tennessee Highway Patrol officer conducting the roadblock. What next occurred was highly disputed, but the events culminated with the defendant's being sprayed with Freeze, some of which was deflected back onto the officer, partially incapacitating him also. The defendant was charged with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and failure to carry and display a driver's license on demand. The reckless driving charge was nolle prosequi and, following a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of resisting arrest but was convicted of the driver's license charge, sentenced to ten days confinement, which was suspended, and ordered to pay a $50 fine and court costs. He timely appealed the conviction, arguing that the roadblock was unconstitutional. Based upon our review, we conclude that the roadblock was unconstitutional and that the officers lacked probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
Kenneth McArthur Johnson v. State of Tennessee E2001-00068-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner
Aggrieved of his second degree murder conviction, the petitioner seeks post-conviction relief, which was denied by the lower court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
Hawkins
Court of Criminal Appeals
Daryl K. Collins v. Tower Automotive Products W2001-00480-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found Plaintiff suffered permanent impairment and awarded Plaintiff twenty-two percent (22%) permanent partial impairment to each upper extremity. Defendant asserts that the award of twenty- two percent (22%) was excessive and not supported by the evidence. From our review of the trial record, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed as Modified. L. TERRY LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, J., joined. Deana C. Seymour, Jackson, TN, for the appellant, Tower Automotive Products Company, Inc., d/b/a Tower Automotive. George L. Morrison, III, Jackson, TN, for the appellee, Daryl Collins. MEMORANDUM OPINION TRIAL TESTIMONY Daryl Collins, age 39, married with two sons, has been employed at Tower Automotive Company, Inc., d/b/a Tower Automotive, hereinafter Defendant, for the past 17 years. Plaintiff's education consists of a high school diploma and an associate's degree from Jackson State Community College. Plaintiff's duties were primarily welding heavy truck parts. In 1998, Plaintiff began suffering from pain in both his right and left wrists. Plaintiff advised Defendant in January of 1999, and underwent conservative treatment. Defendant furnished him with the names of three physicians and was seen by Dr. Lewis Murphy, who referred Plaintiff to Dr. Ronald Bingham for a nerve conduction examination. Dr. Bingham referred Plaintiff to Dr. Michael Cobb when the test indicated median neuropathy at both wrists, consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Cobb advised Plaintiff that carpal tunnel release may be necessary for both wrists. On January 2, 2, Dr. Cobb performed carpal tunnel release on the right wrist and then on February 8, 2, carpal tunnel release was performed on Plaintiff's left wrist. Plaintiff returned to restricted duty for six weeks before Dr. Cobb released him to regular duty as a welder. Although Plaintiff returned to regular duty, he stated that his hands still hurt every day, however surgery did correct the numbness. He advised the plant nurse, Debbie Bowlin, that his hands hurt occasionally while grinding parts. At home, Plaintiff stated that he had difficulty playing (wrestling) with his eight-year-old son. Due to vibration, he cannot use a weedeater for long periods of time because of numbness. When asked about his grip strength, Plaintiff responded, "As far as grip strength, I've lost quite a bit of grip strength. It's things that I just took for granted before." Plaintiff estimated that he lost thirty percent (3%) grip strength in his hands since the injury. During cross-examination, Plaintiff agreed that he had received a pay raise since his return to work and is now making a higher hourly rate. Also, Plaintiff acknowledged that he participated in little league activities, throwing a football with his son, and taking a family vacation to Disney World. In behalf of Defendant, co-workers of Plaintiff, Kenneth Gilbert, Jeff Lowery, and supervisor, Sam Luter, testified that Plaintiff was a welder in heavy truck building. All agreed that Plaintiff returned to work, did a fine job, never made any complaints and was a good worker. Luter stated that Plaintiff could do various jobs in the plant. Also, Luter agreed that he had come to work feeling bad, but never complained to his co-workers. MEDICAL EVIDENCE For the record, the C-32 form of Dr. Michael Cobb was made an exhibit. Dr. Cobb's report reflect that Plaintiff was referred to him by Dr. Ronald Bingham as the result of a nerve conduction examination. The examination indicated a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome on December 19, 1999. Dr. Cobb saw Plaintiff on January 12, 2, with a complaint of pain, numbness in both hands, with the right hand worse than the left. Dr. Cobb diagnosed Plaintiff with severe carpal tunnel syndrome, both hands, and recommended surgery for the best chance of a recovery. Otherwise, if decompression of the nerve is delayed, there is more chance that Plaintiff will have some permanent neuropathy. On January 2, 2, Dr. Cobb performed endoscopic carpal tunnel release on the right hand. On February 1, 2, Plaintiff's only complaint was soreness to the right hand following surgery. Plaintiff was ordered to commence grip exercises. Plaintiff agreed to undergo the same procedure on his left hand. On February 8, 2, Dr. Cobb performed endoscopic carpal tunnel release on the left hand. Dr. Cobb's report reflects that -2-
Madison
Workers Compensation Panel
Martha I. Johnson v. Knox Co. Board of Educ., E2000-02513-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled and further found the Knox County Board of Education liable for 6 percent of the award and the Second Injury Fund liable for 4 percent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Paul G. Summers, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant Second Injury Fund. Stephen E. Yeager, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees Knox County Board of Education and Tennessee School Boards Association. Thomas S. Scott, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee Martha I. Johnson. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Peace v. Easy Trucking Co., 38 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 21). Facts The plaintiff was 39 years of age at the time of trial. She did not complete high school and did not pass the GED exam. She completed nursing training and took courses in business technology through the Tennessee Technology Center. She is not married and has one child. The plaintiff had various medical conditions prior to the injury_sustained in 1998_at issue in this case, including dyslexia, epilepsy (which she had from birth), a back sprain sustained in 199 while working as a nurse's assistant, and a prior back injury suffered while working for the defendant School Board in 1993, and a stroke-like episode in 1996 caused by toxic levels of Dilantin in her system. In addition, the plaintiff suffers from choreoathetosis or truncal ataxia, a condition that causes her to have involuntary movements. When the plaintiff first went to work for the defendant School Board in December of 1991, she listed the previous back injury that she sustained while working for a nursing home. She also described her epileptic condition. The plaintiff did, however, in her application state that she suffered no disability resulting from the injury at the nursing home or from the epilepsy and that she could perform her duties as a custodian. As a result of the 1993 injury, the plaintiff received temporary total benefits and medical payments. She returned to work but did not claim any permanent disability benefits from this injury. In 1995 or 1996, the plaintiff suffered a toxic episode from a build-up of Dilantin in her system. The effect on the plaintiff was similar to a stroke. As a result of this episode, the plaintiff lost control over her left side, experienced a lack of feeling in her feet, and her left arm became drawn up. The plaintiff was hospitalized for this and was treated for a considerable time. After some recovery from the episode, the plaintiff wished to return to work. Her doctor released her to return to work, but placed restrictions in her written release. When the plaintiff presented her written medical release to William Anderson, III, the person who reviewed medical reports, he told the plaintiff she could not return to work with the restrictions. The plaintiff then persuaded her doctor to remove the restrictions and she returned to Mr. Anderson, who allowed her to return to work. Mr. Anderson testified "if the doctor sends a slip and says no restrictions, then I have to let them back to work." Mr. Anderson testified he knew the plaintiff was not able to do her work before the injury of 1998, which is the subject of this case. When asked if she was unable to do the job prior to the 1998 injury he responded, "no doubt about it." Mr. Anderson testified "the only reason I kind of buried my head to it [the disabilities of the plaintiff] was she had been a good employee." He went on to explain she needed to work and others helped her. All parties agree the School Board had a written policy of not allowing anyone with medical -2-
