Jackie Reynolds vs. Tammy Battles
W2002-00031-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
This is an appeal from on order denying a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,200,000. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Helen Hall vs. James Hall
W2002-00786-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
Plaintiff-wife sued defendant husband for a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. After a nonjury trial, a divorce was awarded to wife and she was awarded alimony in futuro and part of her attorney fees. Husband has appealed the award of in futuro alimony. We affirm.

Bruce Martin vs. Beverly Martin
W2002-00819-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This is a divorce case. Prior to their marriage, the husband and the wife executed a prenuptial agreement. The agreement stated that upon divorce, if jointly-held property were sold, each party would be credited his or her share of separate property contributed to the purchase of the jointly-held property, with the remaining funds divided according to each party's ownership share. After the parties married, they purchased land with the intention of converting it into a catfish farm. The husband and the wife both contributed financially towards the purchase of the land. Both parties worked full time. The husband used his machinery that he owned separately and expended labor to convert the land to a catfish farm. The wife maintained their home. The parties divorced. At the divorce hearing, the husband argued that, under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, he should be credited for his labor and the use of his heavy machinery to improve the farm land. The trial court declined to do so, and credited the husband and the wife with their respective financial contributions. The parties' personal property was divided equally. The husband appeals, arguing that he should have been credited for his labor and the use of his heavy machinery, and also disputing the division of the personal property. The wife asserts that she should have received a larger percentage of the proceeds from the sale of the property. We affirm.

2000-00161-COA-R3-CV
2000-00161-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

CH-02-0287-3
CH-02-0287-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Jesse E. Rogers v. State of Tennessee
E2001-02869-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James Edward Beckner

The petitioner, Jesse E. Rogers, entered "best interest" guilty pleas to five counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Wayne Grimes
M2001-01460-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Burch

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Timothy Wayne Grimes, of possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years in a community corrections program. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the lesser included offenses of simple possession and casual exchange. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding simple possession of the controlled substance. Although we hold that casual exchange is not a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver, we also conclude that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the casual exchange inference provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

Willie Joseph Lagano v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01576-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

Petitioner, Willie Joseph Lagano, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Nelson Edward Meeks
M2001-03108-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

Nelson Edward Meeks appeals the sentence imposed for three convictions for third offense driving under the influence, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. He claims that the lower court erred in (1) failing to consider the statutory sentencing principles and considerations, and (2) imposing a sentence not authorized by law. Because we disagree in both respects, we affirm.

Antonio M. Miller v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01265-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Steve Daniel

Antonio M. Miller appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Miller is presently serving an effective nineteen-year sentence for convictions of second-degree murder, six counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of felony drug possession. He claims that two of his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The lower court ruled against the petitioner, and upon review of the record, we affirm that ruling.

State of Tennessee v. Ricky Brandon and Jimmy W. Brandon
M2002-00073-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Craig Johnson

The Appellants, Ricky Brandon and Jimmy W. Brandon, were convicted by a Coffee County jury of misdemeanor assault. In this direct appeal of their convictions, the Appellants argue that they received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and, as such, their convictions should be vacated. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Key
M2002-00154-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

Defendant, Gregory Key, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury on two counts of aggravated sexual battery. During a hearing on several pretrial motions, defense counsel, Darrell Scarlett, advised the trial court of a joint business venture between himself and Detective Lawson, an investigating officer in the case. The court entered an Order disqualifying Defendant's attorney from further representation, finding that the relationship constituted an appearance of impropriety. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendant appeals the trial court's disqualification of his attorney and argues that he waived any conflict or appearance of impropriety after full disclosure.

Robert Stephenson vs. Mary Stephenson
W2002-01064-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Christy R. Little
This appeal involves a will contest. The trial court found the testator to be competent at the time the will was executed and held that the will was the "complete, whole, true and valid Last Will and Testament" of the testator. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Melvin Johnson v. State of Tennessee
W2002-00904-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. C. Mclin

The Shelby County Criminal Court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief filed by the petitioner, Melvin Johnson, as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations. In this appeal, the sole issue before this court is whether the petitioner's allegation that he was housed in a therapeutic community with limited access to legal information tolls the statute of limitations. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Patsy Moss vs. John McGarvey
W2001-02347-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This is an action to collect a child support arrearage. The mother and father of two minor children were divorced in 1973, and custody was awarded to the mother. In July 1981, the trial court entered a consent order requiring the father to pay the mother $35 per week in child support. In May 2000, nineteen years after the consent order was entered and ten years after the younger child turned eighteen, the mother filed a petition to collect the child support arrearage from the father. The father argued, among other things, that the mother's petition was barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court granted the mother's petition and ordered the father to pay the child support arrearage, plus interest and attorney's fees. The father now appeals that order. We affirm, based on established caselaw holding that the doctrine of laches is not available as a defense in an action to recover child support arrearages.

Mid-America Apt. Communities vs. Country Walk
W2002-00032-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Plaintiff filed suit for damages to ponds on its property caused by silt flowing from upstream property under development by Defendants. The trial court found that the suit was timed barred by the three year statute of limitations applicable to causes of actions for injuries to property and accordingly entered judgment in favor of the defendants. We reverse and remand.

State of Tennessee v. Marquez Winters
W2001-00740-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Axley

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and for one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was subsequently convicted of one count of aggravated kidnapping and of one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive maximum sentences totaling thirty-seven years. The Defendant now appeals his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors, that the trial court improperly imposed maximum sentences for both convictions, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Although the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors, we conclude that it properly considered other enhancement factors which warranted sentencing the Defendant to consecutive maximum terms. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

Lafayette Romine Sr./Debra Romine vs. Julia Fernandez & Johnathan Isom
W2002-00703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers

Lafayette Romine Sr./Debra Romine vs. Julia Fernandez & Johnathan Isom
W2002-00703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers

Kubota Credit vs. Doug Tillman
W2002-00885-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
The plaintiff creditor in this case filed suit to recover a tractor that was subject to a security agreement and was pawned to the defendant pawnbroker. The court below awarded summary judgment to the creditor. The pawnbroker appeals, claiming the creditor's security agreement was not properly perfected, and that the creditor therefore does not have a superior right to possession of the tractor. We find issues of material fact exist regarding whether the security agreement was perfected, whether the pledgor had authority to pawn the tractor, and whether the pawn transaction was entered into in good faith. We reverse summary judgment and remand.

First Citizens Nat'l Bank for Will Wray vs. Janice Wray
W2002-00525-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore
This case involves a trust. The decedent established a trust in his will. His son-in-law and a bank were designated as co-trustees. A parcel of property with a home was placed into the trust. The trust allowed one of the beneficiaries, the decedent's grandson, and his wife to live in the house at no charge. The beneficiary and his wife divorced, and as part of their marital dissolution agreement, the beneficiary gave his ex-wife his possessory interest in the home, at no charge. The son-in-law/trustee died, leaving the bank as the sole trustee. The bank required the ex-wife to begin paying rent; she declined. The bank then filed the instant lawsuit against the ex-wife for past rent from the time they first requested rent from her, and also a declaratory judgment permitting the bank to sell the home. The trial court found that the trustees ratified the terms of the MDA between the beneficiary and the ex-wife, allowing her to remain in the home rent-free until the trust expired. The bank appeals. We reverse, finding that the trustees could not ratify the MDA, a contract to which the trust was not a party.

State of Tennessee v. Roy L. Denton
E2001-03018-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

The Defendant, Roy L. Denton, was convicted by a jury of DUI and public intoxication. The Defendant now appeals as of right, raising the following issues: whether the trial court should have dismissed the indictment; whether the trial court should have stayed the proceedings; whether the trial court should have suppressed evidence; whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence proffered by the Defendant; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant's conviction of DUI; whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during trial; whether the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motions for mistrial and/or new trial; whether the Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and whether the trial court erred with respect to advising the Defendant about his right to appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James E. Swiggett v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00174-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The Defendant, James E. Swiggett, was convicted by a jury in 1992 of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. James Swiggett, No. 03C01-9209-CR-00312, 1994 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 766 (Knoxville, Nov. 23, 1994), perm. appeal den. (Tenn. 1995). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which petition was denied by the trial court as barred by the statute of limitations. This ruling was affirmed on direct appeal. See James E. Swiggett v. State, No. 03C01-9804-CR-00161, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 422 (Knoxville, May 4, 1999), perm. appeal den. (Tenn. 1999). The Defendant then filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, claiming grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the instant petition on the grounds that a prior petition had already been filed. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. William A. Marshall
M2001-02954-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The defendant, William A. Marshall, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation of a two-year sentence for sexual battery. Because we disagree with the trial court's view of whether the defendant satisfied a condition of his probation by "completing" a sexual offender treatment program, we reverse the revocation and dismiss the warrant.

Virginia Abernethy v. Robert S. Brand
M2002-00274-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Stella L. Hargrove
This is a malicious prosecution case. In the underlying case, plaintiff was sued by the defendants herein seeking recovery of damages for plaintiff's alleged fraud and embezzlement. In a bench trial, judgment was entered for plaintiff. Plaintiff filed the instant case alleging malicious prosecution. Defendants raise the defense of advice of counsel and their motion for summary judgment was granted. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.