Wanda Shaw v. Shelby County Government
Shelby County employee appealed denial of review by the County’s Civil Service Merit Board following elimination of her position. The Shelby County Circuit Court affirmed the denial of a review by the Board because employee’s position was eliminated due to loss of funding as opposed to disciplinary action against her. Employee appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Flautt And Mann, a Partnership v. The Council of The City Of Memphis, et al.
This appeal involves protracted litigation concerning the zoning of a parcel of land located in Memphis, Tennessee. After a bridge, which provided the only access to the property, washed away, the landowner planned to install and maintain billboards on the subject parcel by helicopter. The landowner initially applied to the Memphis City Council to have the subject parcel re-zoned from agricultural uses to commercial uses. The Memphis City Council rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for review by common law writ of certiorari and an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court. The circuit court entered an order reversing the decision of the Memphis City Council and remanding the case to the Council for a new hearing. Upon remand, the Memphis City Council once again rejected the landowner’s application. The landowner filed a petition for contempt in the circuit court alleging the Council violated the court’s order on remand. The trial court found that, while the Memphis City Council violated the court’s order in every respect, it was not in willful contempt of the court’s order because it relied on the erroneous advice of its lawyer in interpreting the order. The trial court then proceeded to remand the case to the Memphis City Council once more for a new hearing. The City filed an appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carlos Rice v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgement of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Carlos Rice, appeals the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Bohannon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Larry Bohannon, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations and is, therefore, time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Tate
The appellant, Curtis Tate, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) “[p]lain error exists in the record in that the two material and crucial witnesses were not called at trial”; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury were incomplete and misleading; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction; and (5) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randy Lee Hayes v. First Source Furniture Group, et al.
First Source Furniture Group and Travelers Insurance Company have appealed the decisions of the trial court in favor of Randy Lee Hayes. First, the trial court awarded Mr. Hayes 25% permanent partial disability to his left arm due to a new injury. Second, the trial court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2), reconsidered Mr. Hayes’ prior award and increased it by 7% to the body as a whole. We affirm the decisions of the trial court while correcting an admitted error regarding Mr. Hayes’ workers’ compensation benefit rate for the arm injury. |
Lauderdale | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Sharon Whitelow v. Craig Johnson
This is a child support case. The appellant is the father of eight children who are the subject of this dispute. The State filed a petition in the Juvenile Court alleging that the children were dependent and neglected due to the drug use of the mother and father. The mother and father stipulated to these charges and the children were placed in the care of relatives. The State later filed a petition to establish paternity and set support, seeking adjudication of numerous issues, including child support. The trial court ruled on the issue of child support, but did not rule on the other issues. Without seeking permission for interlocutory appeal, the father appealed the ruling on child support. We dismiss the appeal, finding that the order from which the father appeals is not a final order and is thus not properly before this Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Frounfelker v. Identity Group, Inc.
This is a breach of contract case in which the controlling issue involves the commencement and conclusion of the term of an employment contract and, more specifically, when Plaintiff's guaranteed term of employment ended. The trial court determined that Defendant had breached the contract by terminating Plaintiff prior to the end of his employment term and awarded damages, together with contract authorized attorney fees and expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Brown, et al. v. Clint Seal, et al.
In the 1940's, Tyler Seal received a life estate interest in a parcel of land with the remainder going to his heirs at law upon his death. In 1968, Tyler Seal conveyed his interest in the property to his brother, Clint Seal, via a deed which purported to convey a fee simple interest. This deed was not recorded until 1991. Tyler Seal passed away in March of 1996. Clint Seal deeded the property in fee simple to his son and daughter-in-law, Tony and Patricia Seal, the following year. This lawsuit was filed by various persons claiming an interest in the land because they were remaindermen pursuant to the will which originally conveyed the life estate to Tyler Seal. Suit was brought against Clint Seal as well as Tony and Patricia Seal ("Defendants"). Defendants claimed they were the rightful record owners of the property or, alternatively, that they were entitled to ownership of the property based on adverse possession. The Trial Court concluded Defendants were entitled to ownership of the property because they had adversely possessed the property for the requisite number of years and further that Plaintiffs' seven year statute of limitations to file suit had expired. We reverse. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Frances Fritts v. Safety National Casualty Corporation
The employee in this workers' compensation case suffered a spontaneous and large right-lung pneumothorax while at work. The pneumothorax required two corrective surgeries and resulted in treatment with narcotics for chronic pain. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the injury sustained was an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. We further hold that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the employee was totally and permanently disabled. We affirm the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Joseph B. Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 jury conviction of misdemeanor theft on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court committed certain errors. The state has moved this court to affirm the order of dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the motion and affirm the order. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joanne Hurst
The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence to be served on probation. In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert R. McCray v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Robert R. McCray, petitioned the Sullivan County Criminal Court for a writ of habeas corpus to gain release from that court's 18-month sentence imposed for a conviction of selling a counterfeit controlled substance. The court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the order via memorandum opinion pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the state's motion and affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jackie F. Curry v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, petitioned the Johnson County Criminal Court for habeas corpus relief from his three 2000 Knox County convictions of aggravated rape. The court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The state has moved this court to affirm the convictions pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. We sustain the court's motion and affirm the order of dismissal. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Ed Leming v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carl Ed Leming, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Circuit Court to two counts of aggravated rape. He received consecutive sentences of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because he received statutorily impermissible release eligibility. The court dismissed the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elmer Fritts v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Elmer Fritts, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Santita Makeva Sutton
The defendant, Santita Makeva Sutton, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to two counts of sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a Class E felony, and simple possession of a schedule VI controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eight years for each Class B felony conviction, one year for the Class E felony conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered two of the three Class B felony convictions, the Class E felony conviction, and the Class A misdemeanor conviction to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other Class B felony conviction for an effective total sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing under state law and the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Chumney
The Appellant, Edward Chumney, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Madison County Circuit Court. On appeal, Chumney argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his probation because the violation warrants were issued after his sentence of probation had expired. After review, we agree that three of his sentences had expired; however, his two sentences for aggravated burglary had not. Accordingly, we affirm revocation of his two sentences for aggravated burglary and reverse and vacate revocation of his sentences for misdemeanor theft, class E felony theft, and class D felony theft. The case is remanded for correction of the records below to reflect this holding and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel., Connie Mitchell v. Percy Mitchell
This is a Title IV child support case. Father/Appellee was subject to a court order requiring him to make monthly child support payments. Mother allegedly requested to end Father’s child support obligation and Title IV-D services due to a private agreement between the parties whereby Father paid some child support directly to Mother. The State/Appellant, on behalf of Mother, filed a contempt petition against Father seeking payment of child support and arrears. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the support orders and forgave any arrears. The trial court also denied the State’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. The State appeals based upon T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(5) because no petition or motion to modify child support was filed and based upon T.C.A. § 71-3-124 because the State asserts it is entitled to reimbursement from the arrears for public benefits paid to Mother. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman
Defendant,Ronald Lynn Chatman, was indicted for the offense of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of facilitation of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to nine years imprisonment as a Range I, standard offender. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and argues that the trial court erred in not granting Defendant’s request for a probated sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Lynn Chatman - Concurring
The majority concludes that application of enhancing factor (21), adjudication of a delinquent act by a juvenile which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, is inapplicable in this case under the holding of Blakely. I respectfully disagree. The decision in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004), applied Apprendi, which recognized the Almendarez-Torres holding permitting sentencing enhancement based upon a prior guilty plea, as opposed to the necessity of a jury conviction, because guilty pleas are “entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2361 (2000). Similarly, I find that juvenile adjudications in this state are entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards and constitutional protections of their own. A panel of this court recently concluded that enhancement factor (21) is not implicated under Blakely. The panel reasoned: The constitutional protections of due process and a finding that the delinquent charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 512 U.S. 224, 243, 118 S. Ct 1219, 1230 (1998), are integral to an adjudication of delinquency in this state. State v. Strickland, 532 S.W.2d 912, 921 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-129(b) (2003); Tenn. R. Juv. P. 28(d)(2). |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gibbs Brothers Construction, Inc. v. Brook Hollow Green, LLC, National Grange Mutual Insurance Company, Continental Development and Construction, Inc., Nicholas S. Psillas, and Marshall Collier, Indivdually and d/b/a P&C Contractors
This case is about a construction lien. A real estate developer hired a contractor to perform paving work on new roads in a subdivision. After the work was completed, the contractor sent the developer an invoice for the work done, but the developer did not pay. Eventually, the developer paid a portion of the invoice. When no further payments were made, the contractor filed a lien on the developer's roadway. The contractor then sued the developer to enforce the lien. After the suit was filed, the developer asserted that the contractor's workmanship was poor and that, as a result, the pavement on the roadway was defective. The trial court found that the contractor had a valid lien and awarded a judgment against the developer and the developer's surety. The trial court also awarded the contractor prejudgment interest. The developer appeals, asserting that the road was public and not subject to lien, that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings, that the trial court erred in finding that a variance from the listed measurements was permissible under the contract, that it should have been awarded a setoff against the contractor's judgment, and that the contractor should not have been awarded prejudgment interest. We affirm, finding that the contractor's lien was valid and enforceable, that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, that the developer failed to prove damages to setoff, and that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in the award of prejudgment interest. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Lee Miller v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jeffery Lee Miller, was convicted by a jury in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of premeditated first degree murder. The petitioner received a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Earls v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Ricky Lynn Earls, was convicted by a jury of four counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court subsequently merged two of the forgery counts into the remaining two counts. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to an effective sentence of twelve years. The Defendant’s sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Ricky Lynn Earls, No. M2001-00112-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1586286 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 18, 2002). The Defendant subsequently filed for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. The sole issue before us is whether the Defendant suffered from the ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s failure to file timely a motion for new trial. We find that the Defendant is entitled to relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand this cause with instructions that the trial court grant the Defendant a delayed appeal. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Duwan Robertson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Duwan Robertson, appeals the dismissal by the Davidson County Criminal Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review of the record, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |