Charles Brown, et al. v. Crown Equipment Corporation
We granted appeal in this products liability action to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding as unreliable the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses, a mechanical engineer and a biomechanical engineer, and thereafter granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. We hold that the trial court erred in applying the nonexclusive list of reliability factors set out in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997). These factors are not mandated in every case in which expert evidence is offered and should not be applied unless the factor or factors provide a reasonable measure of the expert’s methodology. We further conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Frank D'Antonio
The defendant appeals his conviction for premeditated first degree murder and presents nine issues for review: (1) Sufficiency of the evidence; (2) Failure to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial delay; (3) Failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (4) Failure to suppress a crime scene photograph; (5) Admission of hearsay under the state of mind exception; (6) Admission of hearsay under the co-conspirator exception; (7) Admission of conduct and activities by Chuck Dixon with Cashbox magazine; (8) Admission of a tape recording and transcript of the defendant's conversations; and (9) Error in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. After careful review, we find no reversible error and affirm the defendant's conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dane Lee Duckett
Cumberland County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Dane Lee Duckett, of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on a suspended license, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eli J. Landry, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eli J. Landry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Luke Seiber, alias - Concurring
Respectfully, I find I cannot fully concur in the opinion because, based upon the absence of a contemporaneous objection, it treats as waived the issue of the trial court’s “reading the aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense out of order during the charge to the jury.” The instructional problem alleged is one of instructional error, not instructional omission. In the case of the former, no contemporaneous objection is required, unlike when an instruction is omitted. See, e.g., State v. Johnny Wade Meeks, No. 03C01-9811-CR-00411, slip op. at 8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 3, 1999). |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Luke Seiber
The appellant, Donald Luke Seiber, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and two counts of sexual battery, and he received a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Boyd Collins
The defendant, Terry Boyd Collins, stands convicted by a Sullivan County jury of arson and presenting a fraudulent insurance claim, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. Aggrieved of his sentence and convictions, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims that prosecutorial comments during closing arguments constitute reversible error, that the trial court's sentencing determination conflicted with the mandates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that the trial court erred when denying all forms of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jesse Teasley v. Jack Morgan, Warden
The petitioner, Jesse Teasley, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rick A. Hughes and Lisa J. Hughes v. Richard C. Poulton and Annette L. Poulton
This is a property dispute between next-door neighbors over a gate across a driveway easement. The two neighbors shared a common driveway from the public road in front of both properties. After a clash between the two neighbors' dogs, one neighbor erected a fence on the boundary line with a gate across the other neighbor's portion of the driveway. This lawsuit followed. The trial court enjoined the defendant neighbor from placing the fence and gate over a portion of an easement that was the only existing driveway to the plaintiff's residence on the adjoining property. The trial court found that the gate was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of their property, and held that the defendants' erection of the gate constituted an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement. The defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that, although the gate may not have been an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that it was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of the property. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al. - Concurring
I fully concur with all aspects of the Court’s well reasoned majority opinion. Nevertheless, I wish to address the scurrilous, unfounded and unprofessional personal attacks made by Appellee against the person holding the position of and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee. Unfounded and unwarranted accusations such as those cast by Appellee accomplish little but to reflect adversely on the one casting. This jurist enjoys a heated exchange of differing opinions and an aggressive analysis of legal theories and principles. Moreover, I find such exchanges often productive, enabling the tribunal to get to the intellectually honest assessment of the case; however, scurrilous and unfounded personal attacks serve no legitimate purpose and have no place in the dispute resolution arena. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al.
Defendants appeal the refusal of the Chancellor to impose Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Phil Bredesen, et al. - Dissenting
The trial court specifically found that the complaint herein was “duplicative of matters already settled and litigated by rulings of superior courts.” Nonetheless, the court decided sanctions were not appropriate due to the ambiguity created by the Special Master’s determination the case could proceed under the order limiting the cases filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion agrees that the lawsuit’s clearance under the screening order and the Attorney General’s failure to challenge the result of that screening justify the refusal to impose sanctions. Thus, the test applied by the trial court and the majority of this court is whether the complaint complied with the screening order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Kay Hepler v. Donald Merle Hepler
This is a petition to modify custody. When the parties divorced in 2000, the mother received primary custody of the parties' three children. After the mother sought an increase in the father's child support obligation, the father filed this petition to obtain primary custody of the children, alleging a material change in circumstances. The father later amended his petition to include allegations of physical abuse by the mother. The trial court declined to modify custody, finding the evidence insufficient to justify modification. We vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for written findings on the abuse allegations, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a)(8). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Goode v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Goode, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s case and failed to effectively cross-examine the victim. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Eidson v. Lee Moore, Jr.
After the trial court denied an inmate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the inmate filed a suit against the trial judge seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to section 29-21-108 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s complaint for numerous reasons, including the judicial immunity of the trial judge. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
James Yates v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, James Yates, filed a pro se pleading seeking to have a conviction and sentence set aside as unconstitutional. The trial court treated the pleading as seeking a writ of habeas corpus and summarily denied the Defendant’s claim for relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George R. Caldwell, Jr., et ux v. PBM Properties
George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Caldwell" as appropriate) sued PBM Properties ("Defendant") for nuisance claiming that during Defendant's development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision ("Blue Grass"), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs' property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant's property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ben D. Braden v. Boeing-Oak Ridge Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of causation, the trial court found plaintiff’s cirrhosis of liver condition was not caused by his exposure to methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) and methyl ethyl toluene (MET) and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff’s appeal challenges the ruling upon the ground the trial court failed to properly weigh the expert testimony and also upon the ground the trial court applied an incorrect standard of law to the case. We find the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator’s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband’s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator’s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator’s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form. Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator’s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Martha M. Boote v. Helen Boote Shivers, et al.
This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent's wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband's will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year's support. The decedent's daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent's wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent's daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Peter Keenan and wife, Jan Keenan v. The City of Kingston, Tennessee and Jim Pinkerton (in his capacity as City Manager of City of Kingston)
Petitioners' Writ of Certiorari was dismissed as being moot because petitioners had moved outside defendants' jurisdiction. On appeal, we affirm and remand with instructions. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sarah Martin
The defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Knox County for arson and aggravated burglary, as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant six (6) months confinement and five (5) years and (6) months on probation to be followed by a second six (6) year sentence to be served entirely on probation. The defendant argues three (3) issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony at trial contrary to the defendant's motion in limine which was granted by the trial court; and (3) the defendant's sentence was imposed contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and remand for resentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
AT&T Corporation, Network Systems Division v. Loren Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Phyllis A. Young v. Taylor-White, LLC
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic. After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment. |
Cocke | Supreme Court | |
Sherrye Hampton-Cross, et al. v. State of Tennessee, et al.
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |