Opinions
Guy A. Cobb v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Guy A. Cobb, appeals the McMinn County Criminal Court’s denial of his |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence Darrell Patton
Lawrence Darrell Patton, Defendant, claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement following the revocation of his probation. Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in partially denying his Rule 36 motion seeking pretrial jail credits. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s probation and the trial court’s award of pretrial jail credits. We reverse the trial court’s judgment requiring Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement and remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christian Sanderson
Defendant, Christian Sanderson, pled guilty in two separate cases to four counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. As part of the negotiated agreement, Defendant agreed to a five- to six-year sentence of incarceration on each count, with the trial court to determine whether to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve four consecutive six-year sentences, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering complete consecutive sentencing. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KENYON DEMARIO REYNOLDS
The Defendant, Kenyon Demario Reynolds, appeals from the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by summarily ordering a corrected judgment instead of holding a new sentencing hearing to resentence him to a legal sentence. Because the Defendant fails to state a colorable claim for Rule 36.1 relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacquiz McBee v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, of first-degree murder, and |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Maurice Tyrone Flanigan
The Defendant, Maurice Tyrone Flanigan, filed a pro se pleading seeking to “correct” his six-year sentence for robbery, asserting that it had expired. The trial court treated the filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directed that the Defendant be brought before the court for a hearing. At that hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant’s sentence had expired and entered a release order based on its understanding that the district attorney general did not dispute that conclusion. The State now appeals through the Attorney General and Reporter, contending that it was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the trial court granted habeas corpus relief. Upon our review, we agree that the Attorney General and Reporter is the only party who is statutorily authorized to appear and represent the State’s interests in a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, we respectfully vacate the trial court’s order granting relief and remand for further proceedings so that the Attorney General may present the State’s arguments in the first instance. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Leroy Littleton, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Leroy Littleton, III, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely filed. Primarily, he argues that his petition was timely because it was filed during the “grace period” within which he had the opportunity to seek a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. He also alleges tolling exceptions to the limitations period based upon (1) his actual innocence and (2) attorney misconduct. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Elvis Presley
In this interlocutory appeal, the State asks this court to review the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for new trial. After reviewing the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jabriel Linzy v. State of Tennessee
In 2015, a Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jabriel Linzy, of first-degree murder, |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Morris
The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order dismissing the indictment |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
ROBERT MICHAEL SWAFFORD v. CATHERINE LYDIA TRAIL SWAFFORD
Husband and Wife divorced. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court determined that an account inherited by Wife had been transmuted into marital property and that Wife had dissipated a substantial portion of the transmuted account. Considered as a whole, the trial court allocated the marital estate in a manner that Wife asserted was inequitable. She repeatedly requested findings by the trial court explicating its division of marital estate. The trial court declined to provide such findings. On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s classification of the aforementioned account and its conclusion that she dissipated the account. Wife also challenges the trial court’s overall division of marital property both as being inequitable and for the insufficiency of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to transmutation. We vacate the trial court’s ruling as to dissipation and the trial court’s division of property, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC
This case addresses whether the Uniform Arbitration Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on Tennessee courts to confirm an arbitration award when the parties’ arbitration agreement specified that arbitration would occur in another state. Berkeley Research Group, LLC and Southern Advanced Materials, LLC entered into a contract which provided that any dispute would be resolved by arbitration in Pennsylvania, not Tennessee. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration, which resulted in an award to Berkeley. Berkeley sought to confirm the arbitration award in Shelby County Chancery Court. The trial court confirmed Berkeley’s arbitration award and entered judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that while the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Southern. We find that Tennessee courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration reward when the parties agreed arbitration would occur in another state. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to confirm an award resulting from an arbitration the parties agreed would occur in Pennsylvania. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and dismiss the petition to confirm the award. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Benson
The defendant, Raymond Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide and convicted felon in possession of a handgun for which he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Paige Roper (now Stephanie Paige Bruce) v. Wesley Garrett Roper
In this post-divorce dispute, a father petitioned to modify the permanent parenting plan and child support. The mother counterpetitioned for civil contempt alleging the father had willfully violated the parenting plan. After a bench trial, the court denied the father’s petition and held him in civil contempt. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule, we vacate the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand for the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the court’s decision to hold the father in civil contempt for failure to maintain insurance coverage because the decision lacked sufficient factual support. Given our disposition of these issues, we also vacate the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother as the prevailing party. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
THOMAS N. ALLEN v. TAMMY LYNCH ET AL
The April 2025 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Fisher
A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patricia Slate v. Smiley Bail Bonds et al.
The plaintiff, Patricia Slate, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of the defendants. Because the appellant’s brief is profoundly noncompliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby V. Summers
The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Burma Anderson v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital et al.
This appeal presents the question of whether, under the Health Care Liability Act, a party in a wrongful death action can rely on a prior beneficiary’s pre-suit notice after succeeding to that beneficiary’s interest in the wrongful death litigation. The trial court concluded that such reliance is permissible. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rickey Benson, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD EUGENE FOX, II
Defendant, Ronald Eugene Fox, II, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and initiating a false report. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his first degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Carnett v. State of Tennessee, et al.
We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Brian S. Waggoner, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
A physician disciplined by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners challenges the reasonableness and necessity of the costs assessed against him. We find substantial and material evidence to support the cost assessment and affirm the chancery court’s decision affirming the Board’s final order. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |