Phyllis Ann McBride v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phyllis Ann McBride, was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of her husband and was sentenced to life in prison. She appealed her conviction, and this court affirmed. State v. Phyliss Ann McBride, No. 01C01-9606-CC-00269, Rutherford County (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1997). The Petitioner's subsequent petition for post-conviction relief was denied, and this court affirmed. Phyllis McBride v. State, No. M2000-00034-CCA-R3-CD, Rutherford County (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2001). The Petitioner now appeals pro se the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of her petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis, post-conviction relief, and "DNA Pathological and Toxicological Analysis." We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Edward Dougherty
A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Gary Edward Dougherty, of two counts of attempt to commit first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged all counts and sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appealed, contending: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. This Court held that a written order disposing of the motion for a new trial or a minute entry disposing of the motion and bearing the signature of the trial judge is required to confer upon this court jurisdiction of this appeal, and because neither was part of the record, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See State v. Dougherty, No. E2008-00131-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 445070 (Knoxville, March 17, 2009). On August 31, 2009, our supreme court remanded this case to us, directing us to reconsider our opinion in light of State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 200, 223 (Tenn. 2009) (noting that "the procedure for correcting and modifying the record reflects the dual goals of avoiding technicality and expediting a just resolution of the case on its merits"). Based upon Byington, we conclude that we do have jurisdiction to review this case on the merits. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Hubbard
A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of carjacking, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, six months, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Brown
The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alvin Castleman - Dissenting
The majority opinion correctly sets out the posture of this case, and I will not restate it. However, I write to dissent from the majority’s opinion because I feel that the facts of this case clearly establish that an illegal judgment of conviction was entered against the defendant and, as such, should not now stand to allow him to be convicted of the very crime that the Tennessee trial court failed to warn him of. In this case, the blatant fundamental unfairness is obvious and, in my opinion, clearly rises to the level of a due process violation. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Macklin
The Defendant, Shawn Macklin, is charged with sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. He sought pretrial diversion, and the prosecutor denied his request. Upon consideration of the Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court found that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court properly denied the writ of certiorari by finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor acted within his discretion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case with instructions that the prosecutor shall reconsider the Defendant's application for pretrial diversion in light of only the relevant factors. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Stanley Hilliard
The defendant, Raymond Stanley Hilliard, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a legend drug, three counts of the possession of a schedule IV drug, possession of a schedule II drug, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used and sold. He argues that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the entirety of his agreed seven-year effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Allen Sumner
The defendant, Timothy Allen Sumner, appeals from the order of the Criminal Court of Sullivan County revoking his probation. On appeal, he claims that the evidence supported neither the trial court's revocation of probation nor the resulting order that he serve his sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Spencer P. et al.
Parents in a dependency and neglect proceeding appealed a juvenile court decision finding their six minor children dependent and neglected and awarding custody to DCS. The circuit court dismissed the parents' appeal as untimely; parents appeal the dismissal to this Court. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Scales v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the Metropolitan Police Department
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Dean McDaniel vs. Kimberly Ruth McDaniel
In this divorce case, Kimberly Ruth McDaniel ("Mother") appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the admission of a tape recorded conversation between Mother and one of her children from a previous marriage. Neither party to this telephone conversation knew that it was being recorded. Admission of the tape recorded conversation damaged Mother's credibility because, prior to its admission, Mother expressly denied making numerous comments contained in this recording. In addition, Mother's father, Homer Jerrolds ("Jerrolds") appeals the Trial Court's finding that he was in criminal contempt for threatening the guardian ad litem outside the courtroom after the Trial Court announced its judgment from the bench. Jerrolds claims he did not receive proper notice pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42. We affirm the Trial Court's award of a divorce to Father based on Mother's admitted affair. However, we conclude that the tape recorded conversation should not have been admitted and that its admission was not harmless error. We further conclude that Jerrolds did not receive proper notice pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Leonard vs. Leo's Exterminating Services, Inc.
In May 1997, Paul Leonard ("the Homeowner") discovered termites in his home. On June 11, 1997, he contracted with Leo's Exterminating Services, Inc., to treat his home. Leo's performed the initial treatment. The contract provided for annual renewals at a reduced rate. The Homeowner renewed twice. The last renewal was on June 11, 1999, which renewal qualified the Homeowner to receive, free of additional charge, retreatment for a "live infestation" until June 11, 2000. Unfortunately, the initial treatment did not eliminate the termites. The Homeowner reported a recurrence of termites several times between 1997 and 1999. Leo's made additional treatments. In 1998, Leo's assisted the homeowner with repairs to a sagging hallway over the area of infestation. In 1999, the Homeowner switched to another exterminator who installed a "bait" system to control the termites. On July 24, 2000, the Homeowner filed this action against Leo's in which he alleged that his home had been damaged as a result of deficient treatment by Leo's. He alleged a breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"), Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101 et seq. (2001). In the bench trial that ensued, Leo's challenged almost every aspect of the Homeowner's case including the causal connection between the deficiencies and the damage. Leo's also raised the defense that the contract limited the Homeowner's remedy to retreatment only, and that the statute of limitations had expired on the TCPA claim. In its opinion and order, entered as the final judgment, the trial court found that Leo's had failed to control the termites and that its failure amounted to a breach of the contract; that the Homeowner sustained damages of $39,910.87 as a result of the breach; and that Leo's was guilty of willful deception in violation of the TCPA, justifying trebled damages of $119,732.61. The trial court also awarded the Homeowner his resonable attorney's fees of $30,000. Leo's appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment awarding damages of $39,910.87 for breach of the contract. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding treble damages and attorney's fees under the TCPA because we find that the TCPA claim is barred by the statute of limitations. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Stanley Hilliard
The defendant, Raymond Stanley Hilliard, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a legend drug, three counts of the possession of a schedule IV drug, possession of a schedule II drug, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used and sold. He argues that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the entirety of his agreed seven-year effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Titus A. Miller
A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Titus A. Miller, of simple possession of marijuana and evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and to a sixty-month federal sentence. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in the county jail, with a release eligibility percentage of seventy-five percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the Madison County Circuit Court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andor Williams
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Andor Williams, of one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana and one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to serve a four-year sentence in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alvin Castleman
The State appeals the grant of Petitioner James Alvin Castleman’s petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in finding that the statute of limitations should be tolled for due process reasons. We agree with the State and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the judgment of conviction. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus D. Lee v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marcus D. Lee, appeals the summary dismissal of his “motion for delayed appeal and post-conviction relief,” claiming that he was deprived of the opportunity to seek appellate review of his convictions and sentences and that he is entitled to due process tolling of the statue of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion because the statute of limitations had expired and the petitioner failed to present an appropriate basis for tolling the statute of limitations. The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we grant the motion of the State to affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court pursuant to Rule 20. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Martindill v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jason Martindill, pled guilty to first degree murder on August 28, 2007, and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis - Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the ecclesiastical doctrine and its holding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction of Mr. Redwing’s claims of negligent hiring and retention, but that we do have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim of negligent supervision. I must dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that, as a matter of law, Mr. Redwing’s claim of negligent supervision is barred by the statute of limitations. I believe that, in this case, dismissal based on the pleadings is premature and that Mr. Redwing is entitled to conduct discovery on facts pertinent to whether the statute of limitations is tolled. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis
Plaintiff filed an action against the Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis, asserting the Diocese was liable for damages arising from the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a priest, who Plaintiff alleged abused him when he was a child. The Diocese moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the grounds that the statute of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104 had expired. The trial court denied the motions. It also denied the Diocese’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Diocese’s motion for extraordinary appeal under Rule 10. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim of negligent supervision, but hold that Plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the expiration of the statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barbara Ann Riggs
The Defendant, Barbara Ann Riggs, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-103; -105(4). The trial court imposed a Range I, six-year sentence to be served on probation consecutively to a one-year sentence in another case and set the amount of restitution at $28,600.95. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, that the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence based upon enhancement factors that were not found by a jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court erred in awarding restitution for attorney's fees and accountant's fees the victim incurred as a consequence of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James H. Saint, Jr.
The Defendant, James H. Saint, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). The trial court, applying the 2005 Amendments to our Sentencing Act, originally sentenced the Defendant to serve sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On his first appeal, however, we reversed his sentences and remanded his case for resentencing under the 1989 Act. See State v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Following a resentencing hearing, held on May 14, 2009, the trial court again sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each of his six convictions, those sentences to be served consecutively to one another, for a total effective sentence of sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences and in ordering him to serve them consecutively. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melissa A. Stewart et al. v. A.K.M. Fakhruddin, M.D. et al.
A man receiving outpatient treatment from a psychiatrist shot and killed his wife and himself. Patient's daughter filed wrongful death actions on behalf of her mother and her father and a negligence action on her own behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment with respect to the wrongful death claim on behalf of the mother and the individual claim of the daughter. The wrongful death claim on behalf of father was voluntarily dismissed. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 33-3-206 does not apply in this case and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to mother's and daughter's negligence claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin S. Nettles v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Melvin S. Nettles, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. In 2007, he pled guilty to sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he received a twelve year sentence to be served on community corrections. He was also assessed a fine of $2,000. The trial court subsequently found that the petitioner violated his community corrections' sentence and ordered confinement. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donna Sue Mrozowski
Appellant, Donna Sue Mrozowski, pled nolo contendere to a Class B vehicular homicide charge stemming from an incident in which she drove her car off a highway, killing a pedestrian. Appellant and the State agreed to an eight year sentence but left the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the court denied Appellant's request for alternative sentencing. Appellant now appeals, and we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |