Danny Miller v. State of Tennessee
E2011-00498-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The Petitioner, Danny Miller, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 conviction of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition to test DNA evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Guy Alvin Williamson
W2011-00049-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker

After an investigatory stop and frisk, the defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of a handgun after a felony conviction and the unlawful possession of a handgun while under the influence of alcohol and was convicted on both counts. The trial court imposed probationary sentences of three years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. The defendant appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress evidence should have been granted. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Because the investigatory stop and frisk of the defendant was not supported by specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion that a criminal act was being or about to be committed, the trial court erred by failing to suppress the handgun found by the police and presented as evidence at trial. The judgments of conviction are, therefore, reversed and the cause dismissed.
 

Tipton Supreme Court

Joseph Barna v. Preston Law Group, P.C. et al.
M2011-02016-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Binkley

Plaintiff appeals from the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice claim against his former attorney who represented him during an arbitration of a securities dispute. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, causation, we affirm the summary dismissal of the action.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Douglas Stogner v. Roseann Stogner (Sullivan)
M2011-00503-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Philip E. Smith

In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Rozbeh Zaire v. Amir Roshan-Far
M2011-00012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amanda Jane McClendon

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Terry Bonds
E2011-01199-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don W. Poole

Appellant, Terry Bonds, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation because his sentence had expired. Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The State contends that this court should dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely and deficient in form. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

Caroline Tippens-Florea v. Johnathan Matthew Florea
M2011-00408-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol Soloman

Following a short marriage, the parties were divorced. The issues raised in this appeal by the husband pertain to the marital classification and valuation of the husband’s gun collection, the award of one year of transitional alimony to the wife, and the award of $15,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees. For her part, the wife contends the husband has not paid the judgment for her portion of the marital estate, $8,065.94, and that she is entitled to post-judgment interest. We find no error with the valuation of the marital estate or the award of transitional alimony and attorney’s fees and, thus, affirm the trial court. As for the wife’s claim for postjudgment interest on any portion of the marital estate which the husband has not paid, it is an issue for the trial court to determine whether the husband has failed to timely pay any portion of the judgment and, if so, to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 & -122. The wife also seeks to recover attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. We find she is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Ted A. Puckett v. Ray Lyons
M2012-00696-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Franklin L. Russell

This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Bedford County denying the appellant leave to proceed in that court on a pauper’s oath. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Bedford Court of Appeals

In Re The Matter of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba "The Cheetah Lounge" et al. v. Sarasota County
E2011-02027-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

After a subpoena duces tecum was served on Chattanooga attorney Scott D. Bergthold (“the Attorney”) requiring him to appear for a deposition in Hamilton County and to produce documents regarding ordinances enacted by Sarasota County, Florida (“the County”)pertaining to “adult businesses,” he filed this action as a motion for a protective order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-9-201, et seq. (Supp. 2011). The Attorney asserted, on behalf of himself and the County, that the information sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine and that the discovery was overly broad and unduly burdensome. The trial court granted the protective order and quashed the subpoena. The subpoena had been issued and served at the request of Cheetah Lounge, Inc., dba “The Cheetah Lounge” and Sarasota Eateries, LLC (“the Adult Clubs”) as a part of their discovery in a Florida case wherein they challenged the constitutionality of the subject ordinances. The Adult Clubs appeal. While this matter was pending oral argument before us, the County filed motions asking that this Court consider dual facts, i.e., (1) that, following the entry of the trial court’s judgment, the Florida court dismissed the underlying case and (2) that court later denied the Adult Clubs’ motion to rehear. We directed the parties to brief the issue of whether this ancillary matter is rendered moot by the dismissal of the underlying action. We now hold that this case is moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Harriet Tubman Development/CHA v. Reginald Locklin
E2011-01068-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

The Chattanooga Housing Authority (“CHA”) evicted its tenant, Reginald Locklin (“the Tenant”), after two of his sons were involved in an incident with neighbors. The eviction was accomplished by order of the trial court giving CHA possession of the property. The Tenant appeals arguing that CHA, which is a public housing authority (“PHA”), made the decision to evict him and his family arbitrarily and without due process. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
M2011-02025-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction.

Giles Court of Criminal Appeals

Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
M2010-02145-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
 

Sumner Supreme Court

In Re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg
M2009-02107-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux, Jr.

In this case, we address the following two matters: (1) the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review of a judgment of a probate court created by private act upholding a claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare against the estate of a TennCare recipient and (2) the right of TennCare to obtain reimbursement for properlypaid TennCare benefits from real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death. After the decedent’s will was admitted to probate in the Putnam County Probate Court, TennCare filed a claim against her estate seeking reimbursement for services provided through theTennCare program. The decedent’s personal representative filed an exception to this claim. After the probate court upheld TennCare’s claim, the estate appealed to the Circuit Court for Putnam County. The circuit court determined that the decedent’s real property was not subject to TennCare’s claim, and TennCare appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the probate court and that the appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it vacated the circuit court’s judgment and affirmed the judgment of the probate court. In re Estate of Trigg, No. M200902107-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 497459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). We granted the estate’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s order upholding TennCare’s claim and whether real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims. We have determined that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s judgment regarding TennCare’s disputed claim and that the real property owned by the decedent at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims for reimbursement.
 

Putnam Supreme Court

In Re: Emily N.I., et. al.
E2011-01439-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jayne Johnston Crowley

This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Teresa O. and Harrison O. Teresa O. was the mother of three children, while Harrison O. was the father of two of those children. The trial court terminated Teresa O.'s parental rights to all three children and terminated Harrison O.'s parental rights to his two children. Teresa O. and Harrions O. appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Jefferson Court of Appeals

Leslie Raydell Jones v. State of Tennessee
M2011-01128-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert G. Crigler

The petitioner, Leslie Raydell Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan v. Kandi Tonyelle Morgan
E2011-00164-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas J. Wright

Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan (“Father”) filed this divorce action after his spouse, Kandi Tonyelle Morgan (“Mother”), was hospitalized because she had ingested an overdose of medication. Father was given temporary custody of the parties’ daughter who was four years old when the parties separated. Mother then obtained temporary custody based on proof that the Father allowed the marital residence to become filthy and dangerous. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary parenting plan based on “week-about” parenting. After a trial, the court made Mother the primary residential parent during the school year and Father the primary residential parent during the summer. The court also awarded Father parenting time during the spring break and two-thirds of the Christmas break. The court further ordered that Father would pick up the child after school and exercise parenting time from then until he went to work at 6:00 p.m. on his workdays, or until 7:00 p.m., when Mother got off from work on her workdays. Mother had 252 parenting days and Father had 113. The court set Father’s child support according to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), but allowed Father a downward deviation of $30 per month based on the extra parenting time after school, which the court found was not taken into account by the Guidelines. Mother appeals. We modify the judgment to designate Mother the sole primary residential parent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Greene Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
M2011-02025-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction.
 

Giles General Sessions Courts

Jonathan Lawrence v. State of Tennessee
M2010-02548-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve Dozier

The Petitioner, Jonathan Lawrence, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Jamiel D. Williams v. State of Tennessee
M2011-01316-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The petitioner, Jamiel D. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Barry D. McCoy
M2011-02121-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

In this interlocutory appeal by the State, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling denying the State’s request to admit into evidence at trial the video-recorded interview of the minor victim pursuant to newly-enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123. Because the trial court erred by reaching the constitutional question before it was ripe for review, the ruling of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
 

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

Kenneth E. Diggs v. LaSalle National Bank Association, et al.
W2011-02203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin

This is an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court found that the Appellant’s claim sounded in fraud. However, the trial court ruled that the Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity and dismissed. Affirmed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
M2010-02163-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. L. Rogers

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
 

Sumner Supreme Court

Consumer Advocate & Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Tennessee v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
M2011-00028-COA-R12-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby

This is an appeal from an order of the Tennessee RegulatoryAuthority(“TRA”). The appeal was filed by the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of Tennessee’s Attorney General. It challenges the TRA’s authority to allow a gas company to recover attorney fees that were incurred in a proceeding before the TRA that did not involve ratemaking, and the TRA’s authority to order that the attorney fees be recovered from asset management funds. We conclude that the TRA has the authority to order that such litigation fees be recovered as any other reasonable and prudent operating expense of the utility, and that the TRA acted within its authority in ordering that the fees be paid out of asset management funds. The TRA’s decision, therefore, is affirmed.
 

Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Hubert Glenn Sexton
E2008-00292-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Shayne Sexton

The defendant, tried and convicted of two counts of first degree murder, was sentenced to death for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In our review, we have found that the trial court erred by admitting detailed evidence of a prior claim of child sex abuse and by allowing references to the defendant’s refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Further, the record demonstrates several instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the opening statement and during the final arguments of both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Because, however, the defendant admitted to at least three witnesses that he committed the murders and the evidence of guilt was otherwise overwhelming, the errors had no effect on the verdicts rendered at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial. Each of the convictions is, therefore, affirmed. Nevertheless, because certain of the inadmissible evidence was particularly inflammatory and the prosecution made several inappropriate comments, the sentences of death must be set aside. The Court of Criminal Appeals is, in consequence, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the trial court for new sentencing hearings.
 

Scott Supreme Court

Ronnie Summey v. Monroe County Department of Education, et al.
E2011-01400-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

This appeal arises from an employment dispute between Ronnie Summey (“Summey”) and the Monroe County Board of Education (“the Board”). Summey worked as head football coach and as a teacher at Sequoyah High School (“Sequoyah”) in Monroe County. Summey sued the Board in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, breach of contract and violation of various constitutional rights stemming from when Summey was relieved as head coach and offered a new assignment in the school system. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Board, finding that it was Summey who had breached the contract when he refused to accept the new assignment. Summey appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Monroe Court of Appeals