In re S.D.D.
This case involves an effort to terminate parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of E.D. (Mother) with respect to her child, S.D.D. (the Child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of four grounds supporting termination. The court also found, by the same quantum of proof, that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Monica Dawn Hammers
A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant, Monica Dawn Hammers, guilty of attempted aggravated child abuse. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve a nine year sentence through supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence of the Defendant's prior bad acts; and (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Michael Thayer v. Jennifer Lynn Thayer
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify child support. The father agreed, in the original parenting plan, to pay the tuition for a program for children with autism in lieu of child support. Subsequently, the parties agreed to enroll their child in a private school for children with learning challenges, and the father voluntarily paid the tuition. Several years later, the mother filed a petition for modification of child support after the father refused to continue paying the tuition. After a hearing, the trial court found a significant variance between the child support obligation in the agreed parenting plan and the presumed amount of child support under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. The court calculated a new child support amount after finding that the father was voluntarily underemployed and allocating additional income to him based on his earning potential. The court also ordered an upward deviation for extraordinary educational expenses and awarded the mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. Upon review of the record, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. Therefore, we affirm and remand this case for a determination of the amount of the mother’s reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: A.E.T.
DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of T.E.W. (Father) to his child, A.E.T. (the Child), on two grounds. Following a bench trial, the court entered a termination order, finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had been sentenced by a federal court to a term of imprisonment of more than ten years, at a time when the Child was not yet eight years of age. The court also found that termination was in the Child’s best interest. DCS had sought to terminate Father’s parental rights based on abandonment by wanton disregard, but the trial court initially declined to do so. After the trial, DCS realized that the parties had made a mutual mistake, the result of which was to render invalid the sole ground for termination found by the trial court. At the request of DCS, the trial court re-opened the proof. In light of additional evidence, the court entered a new order that terminated Father’s parental rights, this time finding DCS had established the ground of wanton disregard by clear and convincing evidence. The court adopted its earlier holding regarding the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jacqueline G. et al.
The mother and stepfather of two children filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the children’s father. Father was incarcerated when the petition was filed and had not visited or supported the children during the four months preceding his incarceration. Father was released in February 2015 after serving more than three years in prison on a theft of property charge and admitted at trial that the oldest child “might remember” him but that the youngest child would not. Nevertheless, Father testified that he had been sober for more than four years, had started his own business, had paid child support since his release, and wanted to restore his relationship with his children. While the petition was pending, Mother, who also had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, was arrested for driving under the influence. After a two-day trial, the court found that two grounds for termination had been proved; however, the court found that Mother and Stepfather had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. The trial court’s best-interest findings were based in part on findings that Father had “turned his life around” and was addressing his addiction while Mother, who admitted to having a “very serious, addiction to alcohol,” was not realistically dealing with her addiction. Mother and Stepfather appeal contending the trial court erred by considering Mother’s DUI and addiction when it was Father who was the subject of the petition. They also contend the evidence demonstrated that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights. We find no error with the trial court’s consideration of Mother’s addiction in its best-interest analysis because Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 1 113(i) expressly authorizes consideration of factors other than the enumerated factors when determining the best interest of a child. Furthermore, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Mother and Stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Therefore, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Denton v. Edna Taylor et al.
This case arises out of a head-on automobile accident that resulted in the death of Howard Taylor, the driver of one of the cars, and serious injuries to Christopher Denton (plaintiff), the other driver. Plaintiff brought this negligence action against the decedent’s widow, Edna Taylor, and his estate. There were no witnesses to the accident, and plaintiff has no memory of what happened. Some fifteen months after the complaint was filed, the sole remaining defendant, Edna Taylor, moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish causation. In support of the motion, defendant filed the affidavit of the officer who investigated the accident, in which he stated that he “wasn’t able to locate any roadway evidence that indicated the point of impact.” After a hearing on defendant’s motion, plaintiff filed a motion asking the trial court to grant him more time to obtain and file an accident reconstruction “report.” The court denied the motion and granted summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff provided no evidence establishing that the decedent’s negligence caused the accident. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carla Landrum et al v. Methodist Medical Center et al.
This is a premises liability action in which the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, filed suit against the defendant hospital for personal injuries and other damages resulting from wife’s slip and fall. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition by failing to proffer material evidence establishing the cause, source, or duration of the dangerous condition. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Helmboldt et al v. Michael R. Jugan et al.
This appeal concerns certain declarations of covenants and restrictions (i.e., a buffer easement) on a piece of property. The purchasers of the property filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the foreclosure by the bank on its superior mortgage extinguished by operation of law any covenants and restrictions recorded after the bank’s deed of trust was recorded. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the purchasers. The holders of the buffer easement containing the covenants and restrictions appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Alys Harris Lipscomb
Appellants appeal from an order that was not final pursuant to Rule 58 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ardell Allen
Based on a tip from a confidential informant, police stopped the Defendant and ultimately discovered cocaine in his pocket. He was charged with possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a daycare, a Class B felony. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted. The State appeals, arguing that the confidential informant's credibility and basis of knowledge were sufficiently established, giving officers reasonable suspicion to seize the Defendant. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Ray Lacy v. State of Tennessee
In 1996, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Danny Ray Lacy, of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence. State v. Lacy, 983 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus relief. Danny Ray Lacy v. Cherry Lindamon, Warden, No. M2009-00072-CCA-R3-CO, 2009 WL 3029619, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 22, 2009), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner then filed this petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the Jackson Police Department possessed exculpatory evidence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and, after review, we affirm that judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie Ali Bell
In conjunction with the entry of a nolo contendere plea to driving under the influence (“DUI”), Defendant, Freddie Ali Bell, reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which he asked this Court to determine whether the record supports the finding of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to legally permit a seizure of Defendant and his vehicle. After a review, we determine that the evidence supports a finding of probable cause for the stop. Consequently, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Wells
A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kevin Wells, of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; two counts of possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, a Class D felony; and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and he received an effective thirteen-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, by allowing the State to introduce text messages from a codefendant's cellular telephone into evidence, and by admitting his statement into evidence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Thomas Kirby v. Mable Dean Kirby
In this divorce action, the trial court fashioned a division of the parties’ marital property without determining values for several items of personal property and amounts of certain debt and without reference to the statutory factors. The trial court also awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,500 per month and attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,000. The husband has appealed. Due to the lack of factual findings regarding the basis for the trial court’s marital property distribution, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand the issue to the trial court for entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because we have vacated the trial court’s distribution of marital property, we must also vacate and remand the issues of alimony and attorney’s fees for reconsideration by the trial court once an equitable distribution of marital property has been fashioned. The wife’s claim seeking attorney’s fees incurred on appeal is denied. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Bruce Coleman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Edward Bruce Coleman, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2010 Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated assault, for which he received a sentence of 12 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the order denying post-conviction relief was inadequate and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raygan L. Presley v. Grady Perry, Warden
In 2008, a Warren County jury convicted the Petitioner, Raygan L. Presley, of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years, to be served at 100%. Upon review, this Court ordered that all the sentences run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of eleven years, to be served at 100%. See State v. Raygan L. Presley, No. M2007-02487-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 3843849, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 18, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. In December 2015, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that his sentence had expired. He asserted that, in addition to the pretrial jail credits, he had earned 140 days of behavior credits and 492 days of program credits, meaning that his sentence expired on November 1, 2015. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the face of the judgments did not show that his sentence had expired and that he must pursue relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition. After review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Denver Napier et al v. Gail Howard et al.
Gail Howard purchased at auction a subdivision lot in Grainger County. The deed to Howard’s lot, as well as the deeds to the other lots in the subdivision, contains a restrictive covenant prohibiting “single wide mobile homes.” Howard converted her lot into a campground with sixteen camper trailer sites for rent. Denver Napier, Sheryl Napier, and Jeffrey Bryant (collectively the plaintiffs), each of whom had purchased a lot in the subdivision, filed a complaint against Howard seeking an injunction enjoining her from using her property as a campground. They based their complaint on the restrictive covenant against “single wide mobile homes.” The trial court held that the restrictive covenant prohibited, in the court’s words, “camping trailers and/or single wide mobile homes” in the subdivision. Accordingly, the trial court permanently enjoined Howard and all other owners of lots from having, again in the court’s words, “camping trailers/single wide mobile homes” on their property. Howard appeals. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Reinsburg
Defendant, Aaron Reinsberg, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of rape (Counts 1 and 2), one count of assault (Count 3), and two counts of official misconduct (Counts 4 and 5). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 into Count 1, and Count 5 was merged into Count 4. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven years for rape in Count 1 and one year for official misconduct in Count 4 to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eleven years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his rape convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven years. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John A. Bailey
On October 26, 2007, the defendant, John A. Bailey, pled guilty to aggravated robbery and evading arrest and received an eight-year sentence for aggravated robbery, two-year sentence for evading arrest, and almost five years of pretrial jail credit. The trial court then imposed alternative sentences of unsupervised state probation for both convictions. The sentences were to be served concurrent with one another and a prior federal sentence, for which the defendant was already incarcerated. The defendant’s state sentences expired on December 21, 2010, yet he filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence on July 6, 2015, asserting in part that he illegally received probation for the aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court summarily denied the motion without a hearing and without appointing counsel for the defendant. The defendant now appeals, maintaining that his sentence was illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s untimely motion to correct his sentence. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mack C. Stone
The defendant, Mack C. Stone, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence imposed for his 1992 Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of the sale of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arthur Ray Turner v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Arthur Ray Turner, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2012 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and attempted aggravated rape, for which he received a sentence of 70 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetrius J. Pirtle and Cordarius R. Maxwell
The defendants, Demetrius J. Pirtle and Cordarius R. Maxwell, were each convicted by a jury of one count of robbery, a Class C felony; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; six counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; six counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; one count of vandalism of property worth $1,000 or more, a Class D felony; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. After merging the aggravated assault convictions into the attempted second degree murder convictions, the trial court sentenced both defendants to an effective thirty-year sentence. On appeal, Mr. Pirtle challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that his identity was insufficiently proven on all counts save the vandalism conviction and that the elements of robbery were not established. Mr. Maxwell raises the same issues as Mr. Pirtle, and he also challenges the conviction on the weapons offense as inconsistent with the other parts of the jury's verdict and contests the imposition of consecutive sentences. The appeals were consolidated. Following our review, we affirm the defendants' sentences and convictions. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilma J. White v. James Dale White, Jr.
This is an appeal of an order denying Husband’s motion to alter or amend the trial court’s judgment modifying Husband’s alimony obligation. Husband argues that he was not provided adequate notice that a hearing held on July 6, 2015 was the final hearing in the matter and was therefore deprived of due process. We affirm. |
Clay | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Parker Jones v. Parker Jones
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Norman C. Reece, II v. Jennifer Louise Reece
In this post-divorce action, Norman C. Reece, II (“Father”) appeals the June 9, 2015 order of the Circuit Court for Johnson County (“the Trial Court”) which, inter alia dismissed Father's motion for contempt against Jennifer Louise Reece (“Mother”) and adjusted visitation with, and support for, the parties' minor children. Father's brief on appeal severely fails to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Father has waived his issues on appeal. Furthermore, the record on appeal contains no transcript and Father's statement of the evidence contains nothing whatsoever to show what evidence was heard by the Trial Court. As such, the record presented to this Court precludes meaningful review of the issues on appeal. Given all this, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals |