Sons of Confederate Veterans Nathan Bedford Forrest Camp #215 v. City of Memphis, ET AL.
Appellant appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee concerning appellees' authority to rename three city parks by way of resolution. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stacey Fair, Et Al. v. Clarksville Montgomery County School System
This appeal involves a determination by a school system that children were attending the wrong schools based upon their domicile within the county. We grant the school system’s motion to consider post-judgment facts indicating that the children no longer attend any school in the school system and accordingly dismiss this appeal as moot. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Craig Robert Nunn v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
This case involves a sex offender’s complaint for declaratory relief under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising various constitutional and other challenges to the conditions imposed on him in accordance with his sentence to community supervision for life. The trial court found that most of the offender’s constitutional claims were time-barred. The trial court reviewed the substantive merit of the remaining claims and found them meritless. As a result, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, the Tennessee Department of Correction and the Tennessee Attorney General. The offender raises numerous issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Joe Greenwood v. Tennessee Board of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole to an inmate by the Tennessee Board of Parole (“the Board”). The inmate was convicted in 1990 of first degree murder and first degree burglary. The Board denied parole on the basis that the inmate’s release at the time of the hearing would depreciate the seriousness of the crime for which he was convicted. The inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Davidson County Chancery Court (“trial court”), alleging violations of due process and equal protection. The trial court denied relief, determining that no grounds existed to disturb the Board’s decision. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey W. Tittle
A jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey W. Tittle, of attempted aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, Class C felonies, for grabbing the victim, placing a knife to her throat, and dragging her approximately twenty feet down a dark driveway into a scrap yard. The Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each offense, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to introduce a video from the responding officer’s patrol car, the trial court’s decision to permit the jury to view the video more than once, and the trial court’s refusal to merge the offenses based on the principles of double jeopardy and due process. We conclude that there was no error in admitting the video, that there was no error in allowing the jury to view it during deliberations, that double jeopardy principles do not bar dual convictions for attempted aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, and that there is no basis to disturb the determination of the jury that any removal or confinement was beyond that necessary to commit the aggravated assault. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. We remand only for the correction of clerical errors in the judgment form. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick Richardson
On December 10, 1992, Derrick Richardson, the Petitioner, was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. Derrick Richardson, No. 03C01-9305-CR-00165, 1994 WL 247114, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 9, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 12, 1994) (concurring in results only). The Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on the affidavits of three individuals who claimed that one of the State’s “key witnesses,” LaKeysh Davis, lied about seeing the Petitioner shoot the victim because she was inside her home and could not have seen the location where the shooting occurred. The Petitioner claims that the information provided by the affiants is newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing, the coram nobis court denied coram nobis relief. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David L. Alford v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, David L. Alford, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s judgment summarily dismissing his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s position is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David A. Brimmer
The pro se Appellant, David A. Brimmer, appeals the Anderson County Circuit Court’s order summarily dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua Paul Lewis v. State of Tennessee
A Cumberland County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joshua Paul Lewis, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of twenty-five years. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. State v. Joshua Paul Lewis, No. E2014-00918- CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 795856 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 25, 2015), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition and denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Amy Jo Slocum v. Jamie Don Slocum
This is a divorce case. Jamie Don Slocum appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the trial court’s award of rehabilitative support to his spouse, Amy Jo Slocum. Husband argues that the trial court erred in finding that he dissipated marital assets (1) before the parties’ separation and (2) during the pendency of the divorce. Husband also asserts that wife has an earning capacity higher than the $1,449 per month found by the trial court. Wife posits that the trial court’s findings of fact are correct and supported by the preponderance of the evidence. She argues, however, that her spousal support award of $1,264 per month until May 31, 2025, should be classified as transitional support rather than rehabilitative. We hold that the trial court’s judgment with respect to spousal support should be modified to reflect that her support award is in the nature of transitional spousal support. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert J. Bynum
The defendant, Robert J. Bynum, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court jury conviction of facilitation of the possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the propriety of the total effective sentence imposed for all the convictions in this case. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Lloyd Odom v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard Lloyd Odom, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree felony murder and resulting sentence of death. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, raises various issues related to his post-conviction evidentiary hearing, and challenges the imposition of the death penalty. Having discerned no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donriel A. Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc.
This appeal arises out of sequential rear-end collisions involving three tractor trailer vehicles. The plaintiff’s tractor trailer was rear-ended by a tractor trailer owned by the defendant, which was in turn rear-ended by a third tractor trailer. The plaintiff sued the owners and drivers of both of the other tractor trailers, seeking compensation for personal injuries. Before trial, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the owner of the third tractor trailer that neither would take any action adverse to the other and that the owner of the third tractor trailer would only owe the plaintiff half of any judgment entered against it. The owner of the third tractor trailer was later dismissed on a directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for new trial and, with little explanation, also suggested a remittitur of the jury’s verdict in all four categories of damages awarded. After the defendant appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings regarding the pretrial agreement between the plaintiff and the owner of the third tractor trailer. Regarding the trial court’s remittitur, the Court of Appeals reinstated the jury’s award for lost earning capacity, suggested a further remittitur to the award for loss of enjoyment of life, and affirmed the remitted award in the remaining two categories of damages. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s rulings regarding the pretrial agreement. We find no error in the trial court’s decision not to give the jury a special instruction on superseding cause. We hold that the Court of Appeals had no authority to suggest a further remittitur absent a finding that the jury’s award—as remitted by the trial court—exceeds the uppermost boundary of the range of reasonableness under the evidence at trial, and so we reverse the Court of Appeals’ remittitur of the award for loss of enjoyment of life. As to the trial court’s remittitur, in view of the sharply conflicting evidence on the plaintiff’s damages, the trial court’s failure to indicate the reasons for its suggested remittitur leaves us unable to determine whether the evidence preponderates against the remittitur and, consequently, unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the trial court’s remittitur decision. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for explanation of its reasons for suggesting remittitur of the jury’s award. For the same reason, the Court of Appeals was without sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of the trial court’s suggested remittitur, so we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse the trial court’s remittitur of the award on lost earning capacity. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Donriel A. Borne v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur in the majority’s decision regarding the pretrial agreement. I dissent from the majority’s analysis regarding superseding cause. The trial court did not err in declining to give an instruction on superseding cause; the majority’s analysis confuses causation in fact with superseding cause. Further, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the remittitur issue and its remand to the trial court. The majority, in five lengthy footnotes, attempts to defend its decision. The reasoning in this separate opinion is clearly stated; I will not debate with the majority in a series of footnotes. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re Estate of Veronica Stewart
This appeal arises from a will contest. The contestant insists the purported Last Will and Testament of the decedent, dated June 19, 2015, is invalid because the attesting witnesses, who duly executed the attestation affidavit, failed to affix their signatures to the will as required by the Tennessee Execution of Wills Act at the time the will was executed. The proponent insists the will was validly executed based on a 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which applies to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, and states “to the extent necessary for the Will to be validly executed, witness signatures affixed to an affidavit meeting the requirements of § 32-2-110 shall be considered signatures to the Will.” The trial court ruled that the 2016 amendment did not apply because the testator died before it went into effect. Consequently, the 2015 will was invalid because it was not executed in accordance with the law then in effect. We have determined that the 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 applies retrospectively to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, because that is the clear and unambiguous intent of the legislation. We have also determined that the retrospective application of the law does not impair any vested legal right of the contestant. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Wade Harvey, Ex Rel. Alexis Breanna Gladden v. Cumberland Trust And Investment Company, Et Al.
In this interlocutory appeal, the trustee of a trust executed an investment/brokerage account agreement that included a provision requiring the arbitration of disputes. The trust beneficiary filed a lawsuit asserting claims against the investment broker, and the defendant broker sought to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision in the account agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration and granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the signature of the trustee on the account agreement binds the beneficiary of the trust to the predispute arbitration provision. We hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee. We also hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument. We hold that the trust instrument in this case gives the named trustee broad authority and does not prohibit the trustee from entering into a predispute arbitration agreement. As a result, we interpret the trust instrument as authorizing the trustee to execute the account agreement with the defendant broker, including the predispute arbitration provision therein. Thus, under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the operative trust instrument, the trustee had authority to enter into the arbitration agreement contained within the account agreement. The question of whether the trust beneficiary in this case is bound by the arbitration provision is governed by the principle that a third party who seeks the benefit of a contract must also bear its burdens. Applying this principle, the trust beneficiary in this case may be bound to arbitrate claims against the investment broker that seek to enforce the account agreement. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate the trial court order compelling arbitration of all claims. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, including a determination as to which if any of the claims asserted by the trust beneficiary seek to enforce the account agreement. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In Re Elizabeth Beck Hoisington Living Trust
Appellant appeals the trial court’s determination that settlor’s holographic notations on her trust agreement did not operate to modify the original trust. Specifically, the trial court held that settlor neither satisfied the requirements for modification of the trust as set out in the trust agreement, nor manifested a clear intent to amend the trust under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 35-15-602(c)(2)(B). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joe David Erwin, et al. v. Great River Road Supercross, LLC, et al.
At oral argument, the parties agreed that the trial court made a finding concerning the reliance element of Appellants’ fraud claim that was not supported by the record. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Corey M. Searcy, et al. v. Walter Axley, et al.
Parents filed suit against dog owners following their son’s injury from a dog bite that occurred at the owners’ home. The trial court granted the dog owners’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that parents failed to show that owners knew or should have known of their dog’s dangerous propensities as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Thomas v. Richard J. Myers, et al.
This is a legal malpractice case. Appellees, who are licensed attorneys, represented Appellant in a trademark infringement and consumer protection lawsuit in federal court that resulted in a judgment against Appellant. On October 21, 2015, more than a year after the federal court judgment, Appellant filed a complaint for misrepresentation and negligence against Appellees. The trial court interpreted Appellant’s claims against Appellees as a legal malpractice action and granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations had expired prior to commencement of the action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(c)(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Milon
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Eric Milon, of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a stop and search of the Defendant and when it admitted inadmissible hearsay. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tray Simmons v. John Cheadle, Et Al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a judgment debtor and the attorneys for the judgment creditor. In an effort to collect on a final judgment, attorneys for the judgment creditor served the judgment debtor with a notice of deposition. After some discussion, it became clear that the debtor failed to bring the requested documents with him to the deposition, and the attorneys for the creditor refused to go forward with the deposition that day. The debtor then filed this separate lawsuit, pro se, against the creditor’s attorneys alleging that they had taken an “unlawful deposition” of him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys for the judgment creditor. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James William Mabe
The Defendant, James William Mabe, was found guilty by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of three counts of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2014) (child rape); 39-12-101 (2014) (attempt); 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court merged the attempted child rape convictions with the aggravated sexual battery convictions and imposed eleven-year sentences for each conviction. The court ordered partial consecutive sentences, for an effective twenty-two-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of the offenses, (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of child rape; and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dianne Elizabeth Lutzak, Trustee Of The Dianne Elizabeth Lutzak Family Revocable Trust v. Phoenix American Development Partners, L. P. Et Al.
The owner of undeveloped property sought a declaratory judgment that restrictive covenants governing an adjacent subdivision did not apply to its property. The developer of the subdivision and the homeowners’ association of the subdivision filed counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants applied to the undeveloped property and attorney’s fees and costs. On cross-motions for summary declaratory judgment, the trial court granted summary declaratory judgment to the owner of the undeveloped property. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding no express restrictive covenants applicable to the undeveloped property and in refusing to enforce negative reciprocal easements by implication from an alleged common development plan. We conclude that the restrictive covenants, by their express terms, do not apply to the undeveloped property. We further conclude that the trial court properly declined to impose negative reciprocal easements on the undeveloped property. Thus, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamantez Desha Robinson
Lamantez Desha Robinson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a Facebook photograph of the Defendant posing with two handguns and that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |