James Heflin, et al. v. Iberiabank Corporation
Plaintiffs, an elderly man and his wife, sued their bank and affiliated entities and others, alleging various theories of liability. The elderly man, upon making two separate withdrawals of a large amount of cash from the bank, was robbed on two separate occasions following the withdrawals. Plaintiffs alleged that the robberies occurred because a bank employee informed her husband of the elderly couple’s address and of the large cash withdrawals. The bank filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the dismissal of several claims because the Appellants’ brief does not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm the dismissal of the remaining claims because Appellants have not stated a claim for which relief may be granted. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Henry v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, was indicted in case number 13-06323 by a Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner was also indicted in case number 13-06324 for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas in both cases to each count of aggravated sexual battery in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. Petitioner agreed to serve an out-of-range sentence of 20 years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julia Putman, et al. v. John W. Leach Administrator Ad Litem of the Estate of Bryane R. Litsinberger
This is a personal injury case involving a motor vehicle accident. The alleged tortfeasor died subsequent to the injury-causing accident. The plaintiffs were unaware of the decedent’s death and commenced this suit naming him as a defendant. Some months later, after learning of the decedent’s death, the plaintiffs sought the appointment of an administrator ad litem in the Probate Court and amended their complaint naming the administrator ad litem as a party as required by the survival statute. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs’ complaint was not properly filed until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Having concluded that the plaintiffs did not properly commence their lawsuit within the time afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy B. Wyatt v. Mueller Company
Mueller Company (“Employer”) manufactures cast iron valves and related objects. Tommy Wyatt (“Employee”) worked for Employer for nineteen years, primarily in the cleaning room where flawed cast iron parts are chipped and ground. The job required moving and manipulating heavy objects. After suffering from low back pain for approximately three years, Employee underwent surgery in 2006. He returned to his regular job without restrictions. However, his symptoms persisted, and he underwent spinal fusion surgery in July 2013. In March 2014, he notified Employer he was seeking benefits for an alleged gradual injury. After investigation, Employer denied the claim contending Employee’s condition was caused by preexisting degenerative disease in his spine and further asserting Employee had failed to give timely notice. The trial court ruled in favor of Employee and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
C.D. Et Al. v. Keystone Continuum, LLC dba Mountain Youth Academy
The plaintiff, C.D., a minor, was a resident of Mountain Youth Academy, a traumafocused residential treatment facility, when he got into a physical altercation with an employee of the defendant Keystone Continuum, LLC doing business as Mountain Youth Academy. The employee, Jacob Spencer, is described by the defendant as a “mental health associate.” The plaintiffs describe him as a “third shift night guard.” The minor’s mother filed this action, proceeding both individually and on behalf of her son. The complaint alleges, among other things, that Spencer pulled the minor plaintiff to the ground and stomped on his foot, causing him injury. Defendant moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint in this case alleges health care liability claims. Defendant argued that because of plaintiffs’ (1) failure to provide pre-suit notice under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (the THCLA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121 (Supp. 2017), and (2) their failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint, id. § 29-26-122, the lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court held that plaintiffs’ claims sounded in health care liability. It dismissed the mother’s action with prejudice. The court also dismissed the minor’s action, but did so without prejudice. Defendant appeals, arguing that the minor’s action should have been dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs also present issues. They argue that the trial court erred in ruling that their claims are based upon health care liability. Additionally and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the “common knowledge” exception to the general requirement of expert testimony in a health care liability action. We hold that plaintiffs’ claims for assault and battery are unrelated to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. As a consequence of this, we hold that the plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims do not fall within the ambit of a “health care liability action” as defined by the statute. We further hold that plaintiffs’ direct claims against the defendant, for negligent supervision and/or training of its employees, are health care liability claims but ones involving matters that ordinary laypersons will be able to assess by their common knowledge. Hence, expert medical testimony is not required. The trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for assault and battery is vacated. We further hold that mother’s failure to provide the defendant with pre-suit notice mandates a dismissal of her claim for negligent supervision and/or training, but that dismissal should have been without prejudice rather than with prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment on this part of mother’s claim is modified to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the minor’s claim of negligent supervision and/or training and further affirm the trial court’s judgment that this dismissal is without prejudice. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Earl D. Crawford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Earl D. Crawford, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2016 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1986 convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery. Because the petition was filed nearly three decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief, because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief, and because there is no merit to the petitioner’s claim of sentence illegality, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John B. Evans v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc.
John B. Evans (“Plaintiff”) appeals the December 13, 2016 order of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc. (“Piedmont”) after finding and holding that there was no evidence that Piedmont or its agent had committed any intentional, reckless, or malicious act which caused the damages claimed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff additionally raises an issue regarding the Trial Court’s grant of discretionary costs to Piedmont, which included costs taxed to Piedmont by this Court in a previous appeal. We find and hold that Piedmont made a properly supported motion for summary judgment and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate specific facts in the record showing that Piedmont or its agent had committed any intentional, reckless, or malicious act. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. We further find and hold that costs taxed to Piedmont by this Court in the previous appeal are not properly included in an award of discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. We, therefore, modify the award of discretionary costs by reducing the discretionary costs from $1,133.00 to $643.00. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Lamont Green
The Appellant, William Lamont Green, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Stokely, Et Al. v. James Stokely, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a family dispute over a life estate. Charles Eason, Thomas Eason, Marsha Grayer, and Walter Stokely (“Petitioners”) filed suit against their siblings Anna Eason, James Stokely, and Mark Stokely (“Respondents”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking partition of their late mother’s home and property which they all had inherited but to which they had executed a quitclaim deed to sister Anna Eason to hold as life tenant. Respondents filed an answer asserting that Anna Eason was the life tenant and the land was not subject to partition. Respondents asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, as well. After a trial, the Trial Court dismissed Petitioners’ lawsuit. Petitioners’ appeal, arguing that Respondents waived the statute of limitations as a defense through abandonment and also that the Trial Court erred in not reforming the deed when the parties did not understand it would create a life estate for Anna Eason. We hold, inter alia, that Respondents properly pled the statute of limitations and could rely upon it. We hold further that Petitioners’ lack of knowledge regarding all the implications of a life estate is not, in itself, a basis for reforming the deed. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zackary James Childress
The Defendant, Zackary James Childress, entered an open guilty plea to two counts of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent release eligibility on each count. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jones
Defendant, Christopher Jones, appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to serve in confinement his effective two-year sentence resulting from his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), simple possession of buprenophine (a Schedule III drug), and simple possession of marijuana (a Schedule VI drug). Upon reviewing the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andre Benson, was convicted of aggravated robbery after a jury trial and was sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison. The Petitioner filed a timely postconviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied the petition without a hearing for failure to state a colorable claim. The Petitioner then filed a second petition, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the second petition, which it proceeded to deny. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of his counsel at trial and that, as a result, he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The State counters that the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to hear a second post-conviction petition when a prior petition was decided on the merits. Alternatively, the State argues that the petition was without merit and that the denial should be affirmed. We conclude that the post-conviction court was required by statute to dismiss the second or subsequent petition, and we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Phillips
The Defendant, David Wayne Phillips, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine and was sentenced by the trial court to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements made to an officer after the Defendant consented to a search of his bedroom. The Defendant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jaquan Gathing and Prince Parker
The Defendants, Jaquan Gathing and Prince Parker, were convicted of various offenses in connection with the robbery and assault of three victims committed with firearms and a hatchet. Mr. Gathing was convicted of attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, facilitation of aggravated assault, facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery, and he received an effective sentence of forty-seven years. Mr. Parker was convicted of facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery, facilitation of aggravated assault, facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, Mr. Gathing relies on his brief and oral argument and challenges: (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress; (2) improper comments made by the State during voir dire; (3) the insufficient chain of custody for DNA evidence; (4) improper comments made to the jury regarding the merger of offenses; and (5) the State’s failure to preserve the record for appeal. On appeal, Mr. Parker relies on his brief and challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; (2) the admission of a photograph of an alleged victim’s injuries; (3) the trial court’s application of enhancement factors to his sentences; and (4) the trial court’s decision to run his sentences consecutively. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments of Prince Parker to reflect facilitation of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, rather than with serious bodily injury, and to reflect the proper classification of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery as a Class B felony, rather than a Class C felony. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Company ET AL.
Deborah Goodman (“Employee”) sustained a back injury in the course of her work for Schwarz Paper Company (“Employer”). It is undisputed that the injury was compensable. All medical expenses were paid by Employer. Employee continued to work after her injury. The sole issue presented to the trial court was whether Employee successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness attached to the authorized treating physician’s impairment rating. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(k)(7) (2014 & Supp. 2017). After a compensation hearing, the trial court ruled that Employee had not overcome the presumption. Benefits were awarded based on the treating physician’s impairment rating. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
In Re Aaralyn O., et al.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by demonstrating a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare; (3) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; and (4) persistent conditions. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Mario Starnes
The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Christopher Scott
The Defendant, Brandon Christopher Scott, was sentenced to an effective twenty-five-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions to attempted first degree murder and reckless endangerment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to provide adequate analysis in support of its decision to enhance his sentence to the maximum within the range for a Class A felony, failed to assign enough weight to the one mitigating factor it found applicable, and failed to apply two additional mitigating factors. Additionally, the Defendant submits that his enhanced sentence does not comport with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act. Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jerald Crowley
The Defendant, Christopher Jerald Crowley, was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of expert witnesses about the Defendant’s mental health that the Defendant sought to present to establish that the killing was a voluntary manslaughter; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a witness about a statement the Defendant made several months before the killing; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Ernest Young v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Thomas Ernest Young, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief, alleging that his guilty-pleaded conviction for Class C felony possession of cocaine is void because the cocaine was obtained following his unlawful arrest, because he was the victim of vindictive prosecution, because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and because his plea resulted from coercion. Alternatively, he submits that we should treat his petition as one seeking post-conviction relief and that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled due to his mental incompetence. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and, furthermore, that tolling of the one-year limitations period for filing a post-conviction petition is not required. Therefore, we affirm summary dismissal of his petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffrey Bryan Duggan v. Michelle Denise Duggan
Wife challenges the trial court’s correction of the final divorce decree pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 by correcting the type of alimony awarded and adding an end date for the payment of alimony. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Howard Hinson, III
A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Joseph Howard Hinson, III, of selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine within a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Alan Walls v. Grady Perry, Warden
Christopher Alan Walls, the Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, stating as his ground for relief that he was “presently restrained of his liberty by virtue of an illegal, void, and/or expired criminal conviction/sentence[.]” The Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to receive the pretrial jail credit for the time he was incarcerated in Loudon County after a hold was placed on him by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department on October 25, 2010. Therefore his sentence, after applying sentence reduction credits, expired on or about December 29, 2016. The habeas corpus court found that “the petition demonstrates no right to relief” and summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm the dismissal of the petition but remand the cause to the habeas corpus court for transfer to the Circuit Court for Jefferson County for correction of the judgments to provide the pretrial jail credit to which the Petitioner is entitled. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Addison E., Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights action involving two minor children. In June 2015, temporary custody of the children was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the children were placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father on May 12, 2016, following the mother’s surrender of her parental rights. The trial court conducted a bench trial on January 18, 2017. On February 1, 2017, the court entered an order granting the petition upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of abandonment by the father’s engagement in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to his incarceration. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Earnest Smith
Defendant, James Earnest Smith, was indicted for one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals |