Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexanderand Phillip R. Jones, M.D.
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff, Ethel Faye George, appeals from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. This case presents the following issue for our determination: whether a defendant in a negligence case must, pursuant to Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, plead comparative fault as an affirmative defense if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff’s injury. We conclude that the defendant is required to affirmatively plead comparative fault in such a situation; and because that was not done in this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Ethel Faye George v. Clyde Wayne Alexander, M.D. and Phillip R. Jones, M.D. - Concurring
I agree with the result reached by the majoirity however, resolution of the important principles of comparative fault and rules of pleading and evidence presented in this case requires, in my view, a more precise articulation and analysis of the pleadings, the facts, and the legal issues. As an example, the statement of the issue decided in themajority's introductory paragraph - if the defendant wishes to introduce evidence that a person other than itself caused the plaintiff's injury - encompasses various situations controlled by different rules and cannot be decided as stated. Since the ruls of substantive law. pleading and evidence are correlated, I can best state my views in an integrated opinion rather than in a commentary on the majority's opinion.
|
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Mitchell Brian Ramsey v. James G. Beavers
In this case we are faced with the issue of the continued viability of the zone of danger test as a limitation on liability when plaintiff is neither physically injured nor in an area where physical injury is possible. We conclude that in cases such as this, in which plaintiff sensorily observes the injury and resulting death of his mother, recovery should be allowed under circumstances in which the incident which produces the emotional injuries and the emotional injuries are reasonably foreseeable. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Walter P. Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Svcs. & Dina Tobin, Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation, Tennessee Department of Labor Second Injury Fund, State of Tennessee and Charles Burson, Atty General, State of Tennessee
In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to review the trial court’s determination that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6- 207(4)(A)(i) is unconstitutional and that plaintiff is entitled to life-time workers’ compensation benefits. Having considered the positions of the parties, the plain language and the legislative intent of the statute, and relevant authority in other jurisdictions, we reverse. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Ella Mae Brown v. Marvin Douglas Brown - Concurring
The wife of a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed for divorce, claiming that her husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband answered and counterclaimed, and moved the court to order the wife to file a Bill of Particulars, setting forth the facts she was relying upon as grounds for the pending divorce. The court did not respond to the husband’s motion, nor did it respond to the husband’s Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Testificandum, but granted the wife an absolute divorce without affording the husband the opportunity to present any evidence. We reverse, and vacate the trial court’s order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy E. Smith v. Connie Sue Argo Smith
The counter-plaintiff, Connie Argo Smith, appeals from the Trial Court’s judgment awarding her a divorce on grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. The Trial Court also awarded her the marital residence and contents, a 1990 Astro Mini Van, and $100,000.00 cash. The Trial Court required the counter-defendant, Jimmy E. Smith, to pay all marital debts including the mortgage on the home. The court also awarded Mr. Smith a farm, commercial property, the “Smart Station” property, a houseboat, a bass boat, a Chevrolet truck, Mercedes automobile, riding mower, tractor, personal effects and unspecified stocks. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy E. Smith, v. Connie Sue Argo Smith - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the criteria for determining the |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
United National Real Estate, Inc., v. C.F. Thompson and Columbia Auto Parts, Inc.
This is a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent transfer of assets and to subject said assets to the satisfaction of the judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Richard D. Phillips, v. Interstate Hotels Corporation #L07 and Interstate Hotels Corporation on #L07, D/B/A Chattanooga Marriott and Kicks Lounge
In this case, the Plaintiff, Richard D. Phillips, sues Interstate Hotels Corporation and Instate Hotels Corporation #L07, D/B/A Chattanooga Marriott and Kicks Lounge, seeking damages by reason of the Defendant's violating his civil rights under the provisions of T.C.A. 4-21-301( 2) . |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Department of Human Services and William D. Gardner and Joann Gardner, v. Dana D. Defriece, In the Matter of John Defriece, a Minor
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Dana D. Defriece (Mother) to her son, John Defriece (John)(DOB: Januar 9, 1988). Mother appeals, raising three issues that present the followig questions: |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald D. Mackie and Brenda L. Mackie, v. David K. Hinchy and Pearline HInchy
David K. Hinchy and Pearline Henchy, who are residents of Indiana, appeal judgment of the Chancery Court for Cocke County. The Chancellor, first, granted a default judgment against them in favor of Ronald D. Mackie and Brenda L. Mackie, who are residents of Florida. The Court also ordered the sale of certain real estate, the proceeds of which would be applied to the satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the real estate and, preliminarily, a personal judgment in the amount of $18,200, plus interest at the rate of 8.65 percent per annum from October 1, 1989. Second, after sale of the property and giving credit for payments previously made, he awarded a definciency judgment in the amount of $15,719.97, which included court costs and expenses of the sale. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Yates v. The Chattanooga Police Dept., Ervin N. Dinsmore, Public Safety Administrator, et al.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the chancery court for Hamilton County, whereby the court affirmed the decision of the City Council of the City of Chattanooga finding the appellant, a police officer, guilty of violating Chattanooga Police Manual Orders and imposing disciplinary sanctions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
|
Court of Appeals | ||
Grover R. Bass, v. John C. Kimbrough
This case concerns liability in connection with the default on a promissory note for the purchase of stock in a closely held corporation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and also awarded attorneys’ fees to plaintiff. Two principal issues are before the Court. The first is whether the plaintiff gave the necessary parties proper notice of default under the terms of the promissory notes executed by the parties. The second is whether the guarantor of the promissory notes is liable under the personal guaranty if proper notice was, in fact, given. We find that the trial court was correct in its holding that proper notice was given and that the personal guarantor was liable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Lemoine Ford v. Michael Burke Ford
In this post-divorce proceeding, Pamela Ford (“wife”) filed a petition to modify child support and alimony. Although the trial court declined to increase alimony, the court increased the amount of child support that Michael Ford (“husband”) was obligated to pay based upon his increased income. Wife has appealed and argues that the trial court erred in several respects. First, she asserts that the trial court erred in holding that the husband’s receipt of principal from an irrevocable trust is not “gross income” as that term is defined within the child support guidelines. Next, she contends that the trial court improperly failed to consider the value of the trust in increasing child support. Furthermore, wife argues that the trial court should have imputed income to husband based upon his voluntary unemployment. Finally, wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an increase in alimony. For the reasons stated below, the judgment below is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Kay Malik v. Kafait U. Malik - Concurring
In this post-divorce proceeding, Kafait U. Malik (“husband”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment ordering him to cash out and/or borrow against his pension and retirement funds in order to satisfy the court’s prior distribution of marital property to Susan K. Malik (“wife”). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lamar Fletcher, v. John W. Campbell
Plaintiff-Appellant, Lamar Fletcher (“Fletcher”), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant-Appellee, John W. Campbell (“Campbell”). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Collins, III v. Helene Larose Clegg
The mother and father lived together in Michigan for approximately fifteen (15) years but were never married. They had a daughter, Cnanah, now seven (7) years of age. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Diane Stamp, v. Stephen Ray Stamp
Stephen Ray Stamps appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing his “Petition |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Lynn Burleson v. Mickey Dwayne Burleson
Defendant-Appellant, Mickey Dwayne Burleson (“Father”), appeals the trial court’s judgment denying his petition to modify the child custody provisions of the parties’ final divorce decree. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Sally B. Coggins, Deceased
The pivotal issue on this appeal is, if an attorney in fact issues a check to a bank, drawn on the checking account of her principal, for which the bank issues a time certificate of deposit for the amount of the check in the name of the principal "or" the attorney in fact, and there is no specific provision in the power of attorney for such transaction and no signature card or contract 2 relating to the certificate of deposit signed by either the principal or the attorney in fact, upon the death of the principal, which is entitled to the funds, the principal's estate or the attorney in fact? We hold the estate is entitled to the funds, and affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeannie Farrow v. Charles F. Barnett and Fort Sanders Parkwest Medical Center
This is an appeal by plaintiff/appellant, Jeannie Farrow, from two orders of the trial court which granted the motion to dismiss filed by defendant/appellee, Charles F. Barnett, M.D. (“Dr. Barnett”), and the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant/appellee, Fort Sanders Parkwest Medical Center (“the Medical Center”). In its orders, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to file her action within the applicable statute of limitations. The facts out of which this controversy arose are as follows. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee, v. Allen Ray Ricker
The appellant, Allen Ray Ricker, was convicted of theft under $10,000, a Class D felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court found that the appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for three (3) years in the Department of Correction. The appellant contends that the trial court committed error of prejudicial dimensions by: (a) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state’s case in chief because the state failed to prove the venue of the offense and failed to prove that the person named in the indictment was the owner of the wrecker in question, and (b) permitting the state to reopen its case in chief to prove the venue of the offense. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the law that governs the issues presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Elmer Richardson, Individully and as Surviving Spouse of Goldie H. Richardson, Deceased, v. City of Knoxville
The City of Knoxville appeals judgments rendered in favor of Elmer Richardson, surviving spouse of Goldie H. Richardson, for personal injuries received by him and the wrongful death of his wife in the amount of $30,000, and $130,000, respectively. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex. Rel., v. Brook Thompson, Riley Darnell, Charles Burson, Don Sundquist, and Penny White
These consolidated cases arise from the efforts of appellants, Lewis Laska and John Jay Hooker, to have their names placed on the ballot for the August 1, 1996, statewide election to the office of Supreme Court Justice. The deadline for filing nominating petitions for this election was 12:00 noon on May 16, 1996, in accordance with T.C.A. § 2-5-101. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Keith Bissell, Steve Hewlett, Sara Kyle, Constituting the Tennessee Public Service Commission
The Tennessee Public Service Commission ordered the completion of a previously authorized investigation of the future earnings of BellSouth Telecommunications, despite legislative developments that stripped the Commission of its authority to use such an investigation to set telephone rates. BellSouth filed a petition with this court for review of the PSC’s order, arguing that completion of the investigation was inconsistent with the legislative purpose. We reverse the Commission’s order and remand the case for further consideration by the Tennessee Regulatory Commission. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |