Daniel Clay Lewis v. Dana Holding Corporation
An employee sustained an injury to his shoulder at work. After a surgical repair, he briefly returned to work but was laid off prior to reaching maximum medical improvement. He filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. His treating physician assigned no impairment rating and placed no restrictions on his activities. An evaluating physician assigned 6% impairment to the body as a whole and recommended that Mr. Lewis avoid certain activities. The trial court awarded 36% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the award is excessive. We modify the judgment to award 24% permanent partial disability to the employee. We also conclude that local Rule 17A of the Chancery Court of the 28th Judicial District of Tennessee conflicts with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In the Matter of: the Conservatorship of: Mary Louise Sottong, Appellee, Geoffrey Sottong, Appellant
In this conservatorship estate, Geoffrey Sottong, son of Mary Louise Sottong, raises issues as to the ruling of the Trial Court regarding the conservator's administration of the conservatorship estate. Upon review, we conclude that the Trial Court's series of orders properly instructed the conservator on administering the estate, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on these issues. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leonard Eugene Myers
The Defendant, Leonard Eugene Myers, was convicted following a jury trial in the Hamilton County Criminal Court of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; vehicular assault, a Class D felony; and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102(2)(A) (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-13-106(a) (2010), 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). The trial court merged the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions with the vehicular assault conviction and sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting blood analysis evidence because the chain of custody was not properly established; (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s civil judgment against the Defendant; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant based upon enhancement factors that were not found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. We affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case to the trial court for entry of one judgment reflecting that the reckless aggravated assault and DUI convictions are merged with the vehicular assault conviction. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetrius Nacoyea Dunn aka Nick Dunn
The Defendant-Appellant, Demetrius Nacoyea Dunn, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and burglary, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years for aggravated robbery and one year for burglary. On appeal, Dunn claims: (1) his convictions were not supported 1 by sufficient evidence; and (2) the trial court erred by failing to issue a curative instruction following hearsay testimony. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dusty B. Haynes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dusty Haynes, appeals the order of the post-conviction that denied him postconviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for burglary but nonetheless granted him a delayed appeal of his sentence. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court instead should have reversed his conviction and granted him a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief and reverse the granting of a delayed appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brande Kirk, et al. v. Michael A. Chavin, M.D.
Brande Kirk and Amanda Jordan, as children of Barbara Jordan, (“Plaintiffs”) sued Michael A. Chavin, M.D. alleging medical malpractice in his treatment of Barbara Jordan. Dr. Chavin filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on August 30, 2010 finding and holding that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to testify in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115, and granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Newman, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance v. Smart Data Solutions, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal of the grant of an application by the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Tennessee to place an allegedly illegal insurance enterprise into receivership for purposes of liquidation pursuant to the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-9-101, et. seq. Respondents contend they are not insurers subject to the Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act and that, because the court found that the insurance was nonexistent, the appointment of a receiver of the businesses was not authorized. Finding that the activities of the various respondents constitute “insurance business” as defined by the applicable statute and that placing the businesses into receivership was proper, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earnest Ulyessee McEwen
Defendant, Earnest Ulyessee McEwen, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. In 2006, Defendant was indicted for burglary and theft of property over $1,000. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to burglary and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender with one year to serve in confinement and eleven years on community corrections, and the theft charge was dismissed. A warrant was issued charging Defendant with a violation of his community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s sentence and imposed his original twelve-year sentence, to be served in confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris L. Robinson
The defendant, Chris L. Robinson, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eight-year sentence, leaving the trial court to determine whether he would serve the sentence concurrently with or consecutively to his six-year sentence in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 2009-I-508. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve the eight-year sentence consecutively to the six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes. Following our review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court and remand solely for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the defendant’s sentence in this case is to run consecutively to his sentence in case number 2009-I-508. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny D. Holmes
The Defendant-Appellant, Danny D. Holmes, appeals the revocation of his probation. He pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Rutherford County to robbery and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies. Holmes received an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was granted an alternative sentence of six years on probation. Holmes claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and imposing the original term of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry W. Alley, Jr.
The defendant, Jerry W. Alley, Jr., entered pleas of guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to one count of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-435 (2006); one count of simple possession of methamphetamine, see id. § 39-17-418(a); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1); and one count of child neglect, see id. § 39-15-401(a). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Smith
Defendant-Appellant Kristopher Smith was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated kidnapping and rape, both Class B felonies. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective ten-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Smith claims the trial court erred by: (1) failing to sustain his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of two African American males; (2) finding that “the prosecution’s explanation of its peremptory strike of a white male sufficiently sex neutral”; (3) finding that his prior aggravated robbery conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes; (4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Daniels v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Daniels, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life in prison and twelve years, respectively. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. James Wesley Daniels, No. E2006-01119-CCA-R3-CS, 2007 WL 2757636 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 24, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Administrative Resources, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
This case involves judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance’s denial of a staff leasing company license. The trial court reviewed the denial of the license under the common law writ of certiorari standard and upheld the decision. Finding that the denial was unsupported by substantial and material evidence, we vacate the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dodson
The defendant, Anthony Dodson, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, claiming insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was excessive. After reviewing the record, we find error in neither the defendant’s conviction nor his sentence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Alan Whited and William Henry Rutherford
The co-defendants, Larry Alan Whited and William Henry Rutherford, appeal their resentencing, which resulted in their receiving effective sentences of forty-five years and twenty-seven years, respectively. Both defendants argue on appeal that the trial court misapplied enhancement factors, weighed the only applicable enhancement factor too heavily, and failed to apply an appropriate factor in mitigation. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court committed no error by not applying any factors in mitigation but that its use of the defendants’ juvenile adjudications and violations of probation to enhance the sentences violates the principles announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Accordingly, we modify the defendants’ respective sentences for second degree murder to twenty-one years, one year beyond the presumptive midpoint of twenty years, and their sentences for reckless endangerment to one year and six months, six months beyond the presumptive minimum sentence of one year. In addition, we modify Whited’s aggravated assault sentences to four years, one year beyond the presumptive minimum sentence of three years. This case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for entry of modified sentences in accordance with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Dewayne Bonds
The Defendant, Darryl Dewayne Bonds, pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(2). Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to four years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and by denying alternative sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mack Transou v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, petition for writ of error. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Young Bok Song v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, et al.
The petitioner, Young Bok Song (“Song”), a prisoner serving a 65-year sentence resulting from convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) be directed to release to him copies of its investigative records from his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Song appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi - Concurring
I concur with the majority’s decision; however, I would assess costs of this appeal against Mr. Obi (“Husband”), not Mrs. Obi (“Wife”), in that this appeal was a result of Husband’s omissions. Further, I write separately to state that I believe, upon proper application pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 by Wife on remand, the trial court may consider imposing monetary sanctions against Husband in the form of expenses and/or attorney fees. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Odell Binkley v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
The appellant sought a special exception to establish a waste transfer facility. The Metro Council, pursuant to its authority under the Metropolitan Code, disapproved of the proposed location. The appellant sought a writ of certiorari and the trial court dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to this court. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victor W. Isaac, M.D. v. The Center for Spine, Joint, and Neuromuscular Rehabilitation, P.C.
In this employment contract dispute, the plaintiff seeks to recover a bonus from his former employer. He asserts the defendant breached the contract by failing to pay a bonus as provided in the employment agreement; alternatively, he asserts a claim for promissory fraud. The trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Following a bench trial on the promissory fraud claim, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $64,471.86 in attorney fees pursuant to the employment agreement. We affirm and remand with instructions that the defendants be awarded reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leon Booker
A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Leon Booker, of two counts of driving while his driver’s license was revoked, second or subsequent offense. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days, to be served as six months’ incarceration followed by placement in a community corrections program. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding no evidentiary insufficiency, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Shaw
Appellant, Terrence Shaw, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, a lesser included offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence on probation. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, Appellant’s conviction is vacated, and the charge is dismissed. In the event of a further appeal, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying judicial diversion. |
Shelby | ||
Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi
The trial court granted the wife a judgment of divorce after the husband failed to respond to requests for discovery and a motion to compel. After the judgment became final, the husband, who had been represented by counsel earlier in the proceedings, filed a pro se Rule 60 motion for relief, arguing that he was deprived of proper notice because the address on the certificates of service appended to each unanswered motion and notice was not accurate, with the result that he did not receive the motions and notices. The trial court denied the husband’s Rule 60 motion, but since husband’s address was incorrect on the certificates of service, we conclude the trial court erred and should have granted the husband relief from the parenting plan and child support provisions of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to those provisions and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |