Bryant Jennings v. City of Memphis
This case involves the eligibility of a Memphis police officer for automatic promotion to thirty-year Captain. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. However, because the officer was a temporary employee prior to the cut-off date set forth in the automatic promotion provision, we find that he is not entitled to automatic promotion. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officer and we grant summary judgment in favor of the City of Memphis. The case is remanded for further proceedings, as may be necessary, consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jane Field v. The Ladies' Hermitage Association
This is the third round in a battle between these parties over the terms of a deed requiring certain payments to the heirs of the grantor. The property at issue is the historic Tulip Grove Mansion near The Hermitage, in Nashville, Tennessee. The deed conveying Tulip Grove to the Ladies’ Hermitage Association required payments to the heirs of the grantor of one-third “of all gate receipts received by [the LHA] from visitors to Tulip Grove House[.]” In a prior appeal, we held that “the term ‘gate receipts’ in the deed includes the rent paid to LHA for use of the property for special events.” The parties now dispute whether the LHA can deduct expenses from the special event rental fees prior to calculating the heirs’ one-third share. The chancellor held that such a deduction is permissible. We hold that it is not. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Arthur E. Wair, Jr.
This appeal arises from alleged violations of the Tennessee Adult Protection Act (“TAPA”). Arthur E. Wair, Jr. (“Decedent”) executed a last will and testament leaving his entire estate to his friend and accountant, Larry Mullins (“Mullins”). After Decedent died, his siblings Sidney Wair, Ralph Wair, and Juanita Jackson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Mullins in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) not as a will contest but instead alleging that Mullins had exercised undue influence over their brother to manipulate him into executing the will all in violation of TAPA. Mullins filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold, inter alia, that any claim for abuse or neglect under TAPA was barred by the one-year statute of limitations for personal torts, and that Plaintiffs otherwise failed to state a claim under TAPA. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Guyear, Heir of Leroy Guyear, Deceased v. Joey Blalock, Et AL.
The owner of a promissory note died, and his widow filed a complaint in the name of his estate to collect the unpaid balance, even though her late husband’s estate had never been opened. She subsequently amended her complaint to designate herself as the plaintiff in her capacity as her late husband’s wife and next friend. The obligors on the note filed a motion for dismissal, contending that the widow had not demonstrated that she was a proper plaintiff or that she had any right to collect on the note. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jawaune Massey
Jawaune Massey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder as to victim Nolan; one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder as to victim Alexander; one count of especially aggravated robbery; one count of criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery; one count of criminal conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver; one count of possessing more than 26 grams of cocaine for resale; and one count of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold. For these crimes, the Defendant was sentenced to serve an effective term of two consecutive life sentences. In these consolidated appeals, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court (1) erred in consolidating offenses; (2) should have conducted a hearing to determine if a “stun belt” was a necessary restraint of the Defendant during trial; (3) should have instructed the jury that several witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law; and (4) should not have run his life sentences consecutively. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse on grounds of insufficient evidence the Defendant’s conviction of criminal conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and his conviction of maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used or sold. We affirm the remaining judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STEVEN JAMES MCCAIN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
The petitioner, Steven James McCain, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1998 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the State withheld material evidence at trial and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Middlebrook v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles Middlebrook, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2011 convictions upon guilty pleas for theft valued more than $1000 but less than $10,000 and assault and his Range III eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Joseph Ryan
Following a jury trial in Knox County Criminal Court, Defendant, James Joseph Ryan, was convicted of burglary of a business (an automobile dealership) and theft of property of more than $10,000.00 in value. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal, Defendant asserts that accomplice testimony was not corroborated, that the trial court erred by not finding a certain witness was an accomplice as a matter of law, and that the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay the court costs. After a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.
The plaintiff filed a civil action in the general sessions court asserting a health care liability claim against the defendant. Following a trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in the defendant’s favor. The next day, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and deposited $211.50 with the general sessions court clerk, which represents the amount of the standard court cost of $150 for an appeal to the circuit court required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) plus state and local litigation taxes. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to file a bond “with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that payment of the standard court cost is sufficient to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court. After a thorough review of the statutory scheme at issue, we conclude that the plaintiff’s cash bond was sufficient to perfect her appeal to the circuit court. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Samuel Bridgefourth, Jr. v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.
Plaintiff’s car was repossessed. Plaintiff paid the amount owed, but never received the car. Plaintiff sued and won a judgment for conversion. He was also awarded attorney’s fees, first as special damages and then, in an amended order, as punitive damages. Defendant appeals. We reverse because attorney’s fees cannot be awarded as punitive damages and no statute or contract involved in this case provides for attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TOMMY DALE ADAMS
A Wilson County Jury convicted Defendant, Tommy Dale Adams, of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He received concurrent sentences of life for first degree felony murder, twenty years for second degree murder, and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in admitting a photograph into evidence after finding that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect; (2) that the trial court erred in excluding testimony by Dewy Raymond, finding that it was inadmissible hearsay; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that the convictions of felony murder and second degree murder are merged into one count of felony murder. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacqueline Nicole Bolden
Defendant, Jacqueline Nicole Bolden, pled guilty to one count of theft of property in an amount more than $60,000, a Class B felony, with an agreed upon sentence of eight years as a Range I offender with the trial court to determine manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve her eight-year sentence on “split confinement” with fifty days to be served on the weekends. Defendant was also ordered to perform one day of community service per month for the first three years of her sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her request for full probation. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LEONARD ALLEN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
On January 3, 2003 the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Leonard Allen, for especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the charged offense. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty years of incarceration. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition to plead guilty to aggravated robbery in the same case. The trial court, upon agreement of the parties, vacated the conviction for especially aggravated robbery and accepted a plea agreement to aggravated robbery with a sentence of ten years at thirty percent with credit for time served and the balance of the sentence to be served on probation. Petitioner appealed, challenging various aspects of his original conviction as well as the guilty plea. See State v. Leonard Allen, No. M2007-02581-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1344462 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, April 5, 2011), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. July 14, 2011). On direct appeal, this Court invalidated the plea agreement, finding, among other things, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the plea agreement where Petitioner had already filed a notice of appeal. This Court then reinstated Petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery. On remand, the trial court reinstated the accompanying twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in which he argued, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order denying Petitioner relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition for relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Chandler M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and confinement under a sentence of ten years or more. The court further found that termination of his rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and confinement under a sentence of 10 years or more. However, we reverse the trial court on the ground of persistent conditions. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Chandler M. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur fully in everything in the majority’s decision except the majority’s determination that the statutory ground of termination found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1113(g)(6) was proven byclear and convincing evidence. I believe the language of the statute itself is dispositive: |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Ok Nan Kim Lambert v. Mark Stephen Lambert
This appeal involves the interpretation of two marital dissolution agreements. The parties married, divorced , and then remarried each other. They stayed remarried for a few years and then divorced again. In both divorces, the parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement. Years later, after the husband retired from military service, this litigation was commenced regarding the award of a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits to the wife. The trial court held that the wife’s award of benefits was based on the combined duration of both marriages. Both parties appeal. The husband argues that the trial court erred in not limiting the wife’s award to the duration of the first marriage only. We construe the parties’ marital dissolution agreement as awarding the wife the agreed percentage of all of the husband’s military retirement benefits, irrespective of the duration of marriage. Thus, we decline to adopt the husband’s argument. The wife does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to award her the agreed percentage of all of the husband’s military retirement benefits. Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s decision to base the award on the combined duration of both of the parties’ marriages. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher I. Thrasher
The Defendant, Christopher I. Thrasher, was convicted by an Overton County jury of delivery of oxycodone within 1000 feet of a school zone, and the trial court imposed a sentence of seventeen years for that conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges that the following errors were made at his trial: (1) that his motion to suppress should have been granted because he was under the influence of drugs at the time he waived his rights and gave his statement; (2) that the chain of custody regarding the pills was not sufficiently established; and (3) that enhancement of his sentencing term above the range minimum was improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hanna (John) Nazi, et al. v. Jerry's Oil Company Inc.
In this contract dispute, the parties disagree as to whether the signatory of the contracts may be personally liable thereon, as well as to whether the contract provides for a fuel surcharge. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Hall v. James H. Crenshaw, M.D., The Jackson Clinic Professional Association, et al.
This interlocutory appeal involves ex parte communications between defense counsel for a defendant medical entity and non-party physicians who treated the plaintiff’s decedent and are employed by the defendant medical entity. The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against the defendant medical entity arising out of treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The trial court held that the attorneys for the defendant medical entity are barred under Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006), from conferring ex parte with treating physicians employed by the defendant medical entity who are not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The defendant medical entity was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We hold that the defendant medical entity has an independent right to communicate privately with its employees, and this right is not abrogated by the filing of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability lawsuit. Therefore, Alsip does not bar the medical entity’s attorneys from communicating ex parte with physicians employed by the medical entity about the physician employee’s medical treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Hall v. James H. Crenshaw, M.D., The Jackson Clinic Professional Association, et al.
This interlocutory appeal involves ex parte communications between defense counsel for a defendant medical entity and non-party physicians who treated the plaintiff’s decedent and are employed by the defendant medical entity. The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against the defendant medical entity arising out of treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The trial court held that the attorneys for the defendant medical entity are barred under Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006), from conferring ex parte with treating physicians employed by the defendant medical entity who are not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The defendant medical entity was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We hold that the defendant medical entity has an independent right to communicate privately with its employees, and this right is not abrogated by the filing of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability lawsuit. Therefore, Alsip does not bar the medical entity’s attorneys from communicating ex parte with physicians employed by the medical entity about the physician employee’s medical treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Johnvonta Sain v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Johnvonta Sain, pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated assault with an agreed upon sentence of four years, suspended upon time served. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis that his plea was involuntary and that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner now appeals, maintaining that his guilty plea was involuntary and asserting that the post-conviction court should have recused itself in this matter. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant athorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vincent Hunt v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Vincent Hunt, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping in Shelby County. On direct appeal, his convictions and sentences were affirmed. See State v. Vincent Hunt, No. W2009-00165-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1407236, at *1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 8, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2012). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court issued improper jury instructions at trial. The post-conviction court denied relief and Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Petitioner failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Randle v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Carl Randle, of aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the convictions and ordered the Petitioner to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Carl Randle, No. W2011–02374–CCA–R3-CD, 2012 WL 3642730, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 27, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing, and the Petitioner appealed that dismissal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jarvis Payne v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jarvis Payne, pled guilty to second degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to fifteen years as a violent offender. He filed a post-conviction petition in which he alleged that a dying declaration by the victim showed that he lacked the requisite intent for second degree murder. He claimed that his attorney was ineffective because she did not make him aware of the victim’s dying declaration and urged him to plead guilty without explaining the importance of intent in the charged offense. After listening to testimony from Petitioner’s public defender and the prosecuting attorney, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Maloney v. Gloria Maloney
Husband and paramour are represented by two partners in the same law firm. Wife sought to disqualify Husband’s attorney. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify, citing the inevitability of conflict. Husband appealed. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |