Legacy Auto Sales, LLC, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al.
This appeal arises from a suit by a borrower against a bank and its servicing agent. In its amended complaint, the borrower sought to enjoin a foreclosure sale and set aside the assignment of the deed of trust. Additionally, the borrower sought damages for several statutory violations, including alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Though the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most of the claims, there is no final judgment with regard to the borrower’s TCPA claim. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Walker Sellers v. Billy Joe Walker
This action involves the modification of a child support award. The trial court determined the self-employed obligor's income to be consistent with amounts deposited in his personal bank account, rather than the income reported on his federal tax returns, and calculated his child support obligation accordingly. The obligor has appealed the trial court's determination regarding his income and resultant child support obligation. We determine that the trial court properly based the obligor's income on the combined amount of his annual deposits. We also determine that the trial court properly set the obligee's income based on her testimony. We reverse the trial court's calculation regarding the amount of child support to be paid, however, due to a mathematical error in the trial court's income calculation and its failure to consider the obligor's self-employment taxes. We remand the case for a recalculation of child support utilizing the proper monthly income for the obligor and taking into consideration the amount of self-employment tax paid by him. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Connie L. Watson v. Ruby Anne Pike
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a Will contest proceeding initiated by the appellant, Connie Louise Watson (“Watson”), seeking to invalidate the Last Will and Testament executed by her father, Noah Richard Earls, Sr. (“Decedent”), in which the appellee, Ruby Anne Pike (“Pike”), was appointed the Decedent’s Personal Representative and Executrix of his estate. Because the order on appeal contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court, it is not a final order and we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Albert Franklin Summers v. Nakisha Layne
At issue in this appeal is a custody dispute between Albert Franklin Summers (“Father”) and Nakisha Layne (“Mother”). In addition to finding that Mother failed to comply with the parental relocation statute codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, the trial court determined that it would be in the minor child’s best interests to designate Father as the primary residential parent. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in finding the parental relocation statute to be applicable to this case, we nonetheless determine that it conducted the proper analysis with respect to its custody decision. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jake S.
This appeal arises out of a dispute regarding parenting time and child support obligations. After Father’s paternity was established, a magistrate judge named Mother the primary residential parent and granted her 230 days of parenting time. The magistrate judge granted Father 135 days. Father was ordered to pay $156 in monthly child support, plus $50 per month towards his arrearage. After Mother’s request for rehearing, the juvenile court judge conducted a de novo hearing. The juvenile court granted Mother 285 days of parenting time and Father only 80. The juvenile court also set Father’s child support at $331 per month, plus $50 towards his arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Joshua Gooding v. Jessika Ann Gooding
Father appeals the parenting schedule contending it is not supported by the evidence and that the trial court erred by implicitly basing the parenting schedule on an erroneous legal standard, the tender years doctrine. Decisions concerning parenting plans are reviewed based on the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, discretionary decisions must be based on the applicable law and the relevant facts; accordingly, they are not immune from meaningful appellate review. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the trial court is required, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and enter judgment accordingly. The underlying rationale for this mandate is that it facilitates appellate review by affording a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision; in the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its ultimate decision. When a trial court fails to comply with Rule 52.01, the appellate court cannot determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard or what reasoning it employed. In such circumstances, the appellate court is not required to review the discretionary decision with deference. In this case, the trial court established a parenting schedule without identifying the legal principles it applied or the factual basis for its decision; therefore, it failed to satisfy the Rule 52.01 mandate. Having no way of knowing the reasoning for the trial court’s decision, we conducted a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies and found no factual or legal basis for the disparity in parenting time afforded the parents. Accordingly, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand with instructions for the trial court to establish a parenting schedule consistent with the statutory aspiration to maximize each parent’s participation in the life of the child based on all relevant facts and circumstances. Further, the court is to identify the factual and legal basis upon which the new parenting schedule is based as Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 requires. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Ann Cremeens v. Eric Scott Cremeens
Mother challenges the modification of the parenting plan, specifically the designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the new parenting schedule. Mother contends that the trial court’s best interest determination was flawed because the trial court failed to consider the expert testimony of a psychologist who examined the child in Tennessee. She also contends the court erred by failing to require the guardian ad litem to investigate the records of a psychologist who examined the child in Georgia. Because Mother failed to provide a transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence, we must assume there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual determinations. We find no error with the investigation by the guardian ad litem because he was not required to investigate the records of every medical professional that examined the child; instead, by rule, the guardian ad litem is to “conduct an investigation to the extent that the guardian ad litem considers necessary to determine the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A, § 8(b)(1). Further, Mother failed to proffer a summary of the Georgia psychologist’s records or testimony; therefore, there is no factual basis for us to conclude that testimony of the Georgia psychologist would have affected the court’s decision. As for the Tennessee psychologist, the record reveals that the trial court did consider the expert’s testimony. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also declare this a frivolous appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Broadrick v. Troy Broadrick
Father and Mother were divorced in Kentucky. As part of the divorce, they entered into an agreed custodial arrangement that granted them equal time with their child. Both parties subsequently relocated to Tennessee and now live within sixty miles of each other. Mother filed a petition to register the Kentucky plan and modify residential parenting time. Following a trial, the Tennessee court concluded that a material change in circumstance had occurred and modification of the parenting schedule was in the child’s best interest. In a new parenting plan, the court allocated Mother 246 days and Father 119 days of parenting time. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Eve C.
Mother, whose daughter was placed in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at birth, appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of Mother’s rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Maurice Kibbe v. Mary Carolyn Kibbe
In this divorce action, the husband seeks reversal of the allocation of marital debt, the parenting plan, and the grant of alimony in futuro. The wife requests alimony in solido. We affirm the trial court's decision on all issues. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Matrin Becton v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Matrin Becton, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He was also convicted in the same trial for especially aggravated robbery and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to serve twenty-five years’ incarceration for each conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery and ordered consecutive sentencing which resulted in an effective sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole plus seventy-five years’. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Matrin Becton and Antonio Sykes, No. W1999-00581-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1349530 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2001). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended and supplemented. After several years of delays, an evidentiary hearing was finally held in 2013. The post-conviction trial court denied relief and Petitioner has timely appealed that ruling. Following a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cole Woodard v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Cole Woodard, of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve three concurrent sentences of ten years each for these convictions. On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions, but it vacated the judgments and remanded the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine. State v. Cole Woodard, W2011-02224-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4057266 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 17, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on January 28, 2014, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing regarding whether the Petitioner petition was untimely filed, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Dewayne Moon
A Davidson County jury convicted appellant, Casey Dewayne Moon, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to four years for the aggravated burglary conviction and a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor theft conviction. The trial court ordered him to serve the first six months in confinement with the remainder to be supervised in community corrections. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior theft conviction; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and that the trial court erred in its sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kurt Brewer
A Grundy County Grand Jury indicted Kurt Brewer, the Defendant, for one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A jury found the Defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide and not guilty on both counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was not submitted to the jury. The jury set the maximum fine for a class D felony, $5,000. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence to be served. The Defendant claims the trial court erred in not granting an alternative sentence and in denying judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kerrie Janel Wade v. Vernon Franklin Wade, Jr.
This is a divorce action. The trial court designated Father primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children and denied Mother’s request for alimony. We affirm designation of Father as primary residential parent, reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for alimony, and remand this matter to the trial court to fashion an award of transitional alimony consistent with this Opinion. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Kerrie Janel Wade v. Vernon Franklin Wade, Jr., concurring in part, dissenting in part
BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Victor D. McMiller, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from inmate Victor D. McMiller, Sr.'s (“Claimant”) lawsuit against the State of Tennessee (“the State”) for negligence. According to Claimant, he was injured when he fell off a bunk bed, and, given his medical status, the State never should have required him to use a top bunk as it did. The Tennessee Claims Commission found that the State was predominantly at fault in the incident but that Claimant failed to prove he actually was injured by the fall, thus defeating the negligence claim. Claimant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sweet Water Sustainability Institute et al v. Urban Centruy Institute et al.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing only the appellant, Sweet Water Sustainability Institute, from the proceedings below. Because the order appealed from does not resolve any of the remaining claims in the case, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Bashar F. Kaddoura v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Medical Center
The plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of his action against the defendant hospital. The plaintiff averred that he had entered into a contract with the hospital to pay $6,720.00 for a bariatric surgical procedure. Due to complications following surgery, the plaintiff required a second surgery, incurring additional charges. The plaintiff brought this action, alleging negligence, breach of contract, money had and received, and unjust enrichment. The hospital moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Following consideration of the pleadings and argument of counsel, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice, finding that the complaint sounded in medical malpractice and that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 29-26-121 and -122, as well as the statute of limitations provided by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. 29-20-305(b). The plaintiff concomitantly filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and a motion seeking permission to amend the complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment but granted the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. The plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment and the court's dismissal of his action. On appeal, the hospital raises the issue of whether the trial court erred by simultaneously upholding its dismissal of the action while granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Lewis v. Sam Lewis et al.
Dorothy Lewis and Roscoe Lewis, although not legally married, held themselves out as husband and wife for over 41 years. At an earlier time, Roscoe Lewis had been married. He had three sons by that marriage, one of whom is the defendant Sam Lewis. In 2010, after Roscoe Lewis' health declined, Sam Lewis took care of his father and Dorothy. On April 7, 2011, Sam Lewis took his father to several banks. While there, Roscoe Lewis authorized the banks to add the names of Sam Lewis and Dorothy to multiple accounts that had previously been only in Roscoe Lewis' name.1 On April 26, 2011, Dorothy and Roscoe Lewis each executed an individual power of attorney granting Sam Lewis authority and control over their financial and medical decisions. On that same day, Dorothy and Roscoe Lewis executed a warranty deed conveying a remainder interest in their home and farm to Sam Lewis and his wife Lora Lewis for $40,000, less than one-third of the fair market value as found by the trial court. On March 9, 2012, two days before Roscoe Lewis died, Sam Lewis withdrew funds totaling over $600,000 from the accounts held jointly in the names of Sam, Roscoe, and Dorothy Lewis. He placed the withdrawn funds in accounts held in the names of Sam Lewis and his wife, Lora Lewis. Dorothy Lewis brought this action alleging, among other things, that the real estate and bank account transfers should be rescinded because of Sam Lewis' undue influence on his father and Dorothy. The trial court found and held (1) that Sam Lewis exercised undue influence over them and (2) that he committed conversion and fraud. The court's judgment against Sam Lewis included an award of attorney's fees to Dorothy Lewis. The same fees were also awarded against a constructive trust established by the trial court. On appeal, we hold that the trial court's award of attorney's fees against the constructive trust is not supported by the evidence or by any legal or equitable principle. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Davidson Hamby, Jr.
The defendant, William Davidson Hamby, Jr., was convicted after a bench trial of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and he was sentenced to serve fourteen years in prison. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. He also asserts that the trial court erred in not ordering a second evaluation of his competency after he initially refused to attend his own trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court’s failure to order a second evaluation was not error, and we accordingly affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Walden v. Central Parking System of Tennessee, Inc. et al.
Jennifer Walden (Plaintiff) sued Central Parking System of Tennessee, Inc. (Central Parking) and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (Fort Sanders) for negligence after she allegedly suffered injuries as a result of a fall in a parking garage located in Knoxville, Tennessee. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court for Knox County (the Trial Court) granted defendants summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, Athat no alleged fault on the part of the defendants was the cause of plaintiff's accident and injuries, that the same occurred due to her own failure to observe the open and obvious condition of the premises that was there to be seen, and that reasonable minds could not differ on this issue. We find and hold that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff's fault was greater than defendants. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Roger T., et al.
In this appeal, R.C.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. Because the grounds for termination are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the minor children at issue, we affirm |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lambdin
The Defendant, Michael Lambdin, appeals as of right his conviction for first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted robbery. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the State failed to prove felony murder because the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of the underlying felony and because he abandoned his intent to commit the underlying felony prior to the shooting and killing of the victim by his co-defendant. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Hensley v. Cocke Farmers Cooperative
This is a workers’ compensation settlement reconsideration case. Jimmy Hensley (“Employee”) was injured in April 2005. He was able to return to his pre-injury job and settled his claim for permanent disability benefits in November 2007. In May 2010, he was terminated by his employer, Cocke Farmers Cooperative (“Employer”). The minutes of Employer’s board of directors state that Employee was terminated without cause. Employee then sought reconsideration of the workers’ compensation settlement. Employer argued that Employee had been terminated for misconduct and, therefore, was not entitled to reconsideration. The Circuit Court for Cocke County (“the Trial Court”) granted Employee’s motion for partial summary judgment and then awarded additional permanent disability benefits after a hearing. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
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Cocke | Workers Compensation Panel |