In Re Jayden R., et al. - dissenting
The majority opinion dismisses this case due to the failure of Mother and Father to sign the notice of appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d). I recognize that the majority opinion is based on a prior Court of Appeals decision, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Carrie Payton Hamm and David Lee Hamm - Concurring
I concur in the majority opinion, but I write separately to express my views regarding the additional issues that arise from warrantless, suspicionless searches of probationers conducted pursuant to a condition of probation. I believe that at a minimum, reasonable suspicion is required before the State may conduct a warrantless search of a probationer who is subject to a warrantless search requirement as a condition of probation. While neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Tennessee Supreme Court have addressed whether something less than reasonable suspicion would permit searches of probationers, both courts have addressed the issue as it related to parolees. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); State v. Turner, 297 S.W.3d 155 (Tenn. 2009). |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Carrie Payton Hamm and David Lee Hamm - Dissent
I dissent from the majority opinion for reasons which I will explain. The majority is correct that there is a split of authority as to whether reasonable suspicion must exist before a search may be made pursuant to a probation order providing that, as a condition of probation, the probationer is subject to warrantless searches. See Jay M. Zitter, Validity of Requirement That, as Condition of Probation, Defendant Submit to Warrantless Searches, 99 A.L.R.5th 557 (2002). However, I do not believe it is necessary for this court to make a determination as to this question, for it is clear that the officers had reasonable suspicion to search Angela Hamm’s residence. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Eugene Sample, was convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to death. Following his unsuccessful direct appeal, he began filing, over the next twenty years, a series of various types of post-conviction petitions, all of which were unsuccessful. This appeal followed his claim, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, that he is intellectually disabled and not eligible to be executed. Thus, in his view, his sentence is illegal and void; and he is entitled to a hearing on his claim. Further, he argues that he is entitled to a writ of error audita querela and a writ of error coram nobis. The coram nobis court denied relief as to each of these claims and we affirm the judgment of that court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deborah J. Meadows v Ronald E. McCarter Et Al.
The Defendant, Ronald E. McCarter (“Defendant”), seeks to appeal from a ruling of the Trial Court which does not constitute a final judgment. Specifically, the ruling to which the Notice of Appeal is directed in this case did not resolve the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Plaintiff, Deborah J. Meadows (“Plaintiff”), nor did it fully resolve Plaintiff’s claims against Tiffany Sharp. As such, it is clear that there is not a final judgment from which an appeal as of right would lie. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kendall H.
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of the appellant to her minor child, Kendall H. The only Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant was signed only by her attorney. The appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing that the Notice of Appeal was insufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-124(d), which states: “Any notice of appeal filed in a termination of parental rights action shall be signed by the appellant.” The absence of appellant’s signature on the notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, this case is dismissed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Dewayna M. Killen v. Phillips Wrecker Service And Garage
This dispute stems from an agreement for the purchase and installation of a used automobile motor. The parties to the agreement both claim the other breached the agreement. Following a trial, the circuit court determined that the purchaser breached the agreement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. James T. Jones, et al
The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute and for failing to respond to affirmative defenses. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because disposition of litigation on the merits is favored over procedural dismissals, we reverse. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzia Biles, et al. v. Tiffany Roby
This case involves residential property that was purchased after a foreclosure. The purchaser filed this detainer action against the original homeowners, who refused to vacate the property. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the purchaser, and after a de novo trial in circuit court, the circuit court ruled in favor of the purchaser as well. We do the same. The decision of the circuit court is hereby affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Graham v. Stacy Lynn Archer, Et Al.
This is an invasion of privacy case filed by Betty Graham. It arises out of disclosures made by the defendants in an underlying health care liability action. In the underlying case, the defendants moved to dismiss Graham’s case on the ground that she (1) had failed to file a statutory-mandated pre-suit notice and (2) had failed to file with her complaint a certificate of good faith, all as required by the Health Care Liability Act (the Act). Graham claims that she could not comply with the Act because the defendants failed to provide her with the relevant medical records. To demonstrate that they had complied or attempted to comply with Graham’s requests for records, the defendants filed in the earlier case two affidavits detailing their response to her requests. After the dismissal of her health care liability action, Graham filed this case for invasion of privacy, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully disclosed her personal medical information by filing the affidavits in the underlying case. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Graham appeals. We affirm |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Butler, ET AL., v. Malvin Carvin Pitts, Jr., ET AL.
This is the second appeal of this easement case. Appellants, the servient land owners, appeal the trial court’s award of a monetary judgment in favor of Appellees, the owners of the dominant estate. On remand, the parties agreed to have the trial court determine the precise location of the easement, but the trial court refused to hear the issue, and also refused to allow Appellants to make an offer of proof. We vacate the damage award due to the trial court’s failure to make sufficient findings. We also conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to determine the location of the easement. Vacated and remanded. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Danny C. Garland, II v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee
A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that a Knoxville attorney should receive a public censure based on his violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(a). The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. After careful consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Danny C. Garland, II v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. From the majority’s recitation of the facts in this case, we can all agree that the complainant, Ms. McKeogh, did not get good service overall from Mr. Garland’s office. However, the majority’s recitation of the facts also makes it clear that the problems of which Ms. McKeogh complains arise from the actions or inactions of Mr. Garland’s staff, particularly Ms. Harris and Ms. Snyder. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Frederick Copeland v. Healthcare/Methodist Rehabilitation Hospital LP ET AL.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Following Appellant’s knee surgery, Appellee provided Appellant transportation, by wheelchair van, from the rehabilitation hospital to a follow-up appointment with his surgeon. Prior to transport, Appellant signed an exculpatory agreement, releasing Appellee from all claims of ordinary negligence. Appellant was injured when he fell while trying to enter the van and filed suit against Appellee for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, finding that the exculpatory agreement was enforceable. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Alan Portice v. Roshawnda Lynn Foster Portice
This case involves a post-divorce motion for contempt. In her motion, Appellant/Wife averred that Appellee/Husband was in violation of the final decree of divorce. The trial court did not find Appellee in contempt, but entered an order enforcing its final decree of divorce regarding sale of the marital residence, Appellant’s access to the marital residence, and division of Appellee’s 401-K. The trial court also declined to award Appellant half of Appellee’s 2015 tax return. Because the trial court’s order, on the motion for contempt, appears to deviate from its previous order regarding division of Appellee’s 401-K, we reverse this portion of the trial court’s order. The order is otherwise affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Francisco G. Parvin
Defendant, Francisco G. Parvin, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury for aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Count 1 and aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon in Count 2. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted in Count 2 of the lesser-included offense of assault and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with 120 days to be served in jail and the remainder to be suspended on probation. The record does not contain a judgment form in Count 1, but the record indicates that only Count 2 was submitted for trial. Presumably, Count 1 was dismissed. The offenses in both counts were against the same victim. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in Count 2. After a careful review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judith Husk v. Brandon Thompson
The trial court granted a default judgment against the appellant for claims of conversion, unjust enrichment, and malicious prosecution. Immediately after granting the default judgment, the trial court awarded the appellee damages without hearing proof. The appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court denied the appellant’s motion. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all regards except for its award of damages. The case is remanded for a hearing on damages. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Barry N. Waddell v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Barry N. Waddell, appeals the denial of his second motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing an appeal from the denial of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Allen Carey
Defendant, Roy Allen Carey, was convicted of hindering a secured creditor. He received an alternative sentence of two years’ probation after serving ten days in incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the amended indictment was void; (3) the bill of particulars was insufficient; (4) the trial court committed error by not providing the requested jury instructions; and (5) the lack of notice as to the prohibited conduct violated his due process rights. After review, we find that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for hindering a secured creditor and that the trial court erred by not providing a jury instruction on the creation of a security interest. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and vacated. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Edward Bostic, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea conviction of possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony, for which he is serving a twelve-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. Because the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition as untimely, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dowlen
The Defendant, Anthony Dowlen, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon, and evading arrest, and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective twenty-five-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Johnsonv. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
An inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the revocation of his parole. Because the inmate failed to file his petition within the sixty-day period required by statute, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction. We, therefore, affirm the chancery court’s judgment dismissing the case. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendall J. Summers
The Defendant, Kendall J. Summers, appeals from the Giles County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation for his convictions for possession with the intent to sell 0.5 gram or more of methamphetamine, initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine, and felony possession of drug paraphernalia and its order that he serve the remainder of his effective eight-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Ethan R.
Mother appeals judgment holding her in criminal contempt of court, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the order as to which she was found in contempt, that she was not given the notice required by Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 42(b), and that she was improperly served with the contempt petition. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Kay Clary v. Deidra A. Miller, et al
This appeal concerns the dismissal of a health care liability action for noncompliance with the Health Care Liability Act, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2016). Before filing this action, the plaintiff gave timely written pre-suit notice of her health care liability claim, including the required medical authorizations, to all potential defendants. But when she filed her complaint, the plaintiff failed to provide copies of the medical authorizations as required by statute. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing documents. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the statute and that the defendants were not prejudiced by the omission. Even so, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after concluding that strict compliance with the statute was required when the defendant was a governmental entity. Upon review, we conclude that substantial compliance with the documentation requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(b) is sufficient even when the defendant is a governmental entity. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals |