Kevin D. Buford v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kevin D. Buford, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court found that although Petitioner’s appellate counsel was deficient for not timely filing his application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Petitioner was not prejudiced because the Tennessee Supreme Court would have ultimately denied the appeal. On appeal, the State concedes that Petitioner was entitled to a delayed appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings in compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benny S. Towns
The defendant, Benny S. Towns, appeals from the entry of an order denying his “Motion to Discharge Community Supervision.” On appeal, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing on the motion and requests the matter be remanded for the same. Following our review of the record, we conclude the defendant’s motion is premature and he is not entitled to relief. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Les Stiers
This appeal stems from an ouster proceeding that was commenced against the former mayor of Jellico, Tennessee. When the mayor was defeated in his bid to seek reelection, the trial court dismissed the ouster complaint as moot. Notwithstanding this outcome, the defendant argued that the trial court should consider his “Counter- Complaint” that he filed in connection with the underlying proceeding. The trial court, however, ultimately dismissed the “Counter-Complaint.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Carpenter v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Larry Carpenter, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty pleas were involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Howard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher A. Howard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark London
Defendant, Mark London, was convicted by an Obion County jury of aggravated assault and simple assault. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions, sentencing Defendant to one count of aggravated assault for three years as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Neas Welding & Steel Fabricating, Inc. v. Patricia Neas
This appeal involves a corporation’s debt collection action. The corporation, a steel welding and fabricating company, was previously owned jointly by husband and wife. After nearly thirty years of marriage, husband filed for divorce, after which he was awarded sole ownership of the company. Following the divorce, the corporation brought a separate suit in a different court against the former wife for money she had taken from the company and which the divorce court had determined was a debt she owed to the company. The former wife argued the debt was for rent money the company owed to her. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the money was a debt that the former wife owed to the corporation. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1- 102(1)(A)(i). Mother also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava H.
Adam R. P. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Ava H. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We, therefore, affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, Et Al. v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, Et Al.
This negligence action primarily concerns a failed attempt at service of process in an underlying healthcare liability action filed in 2008. After the dismissal of a defendant doctor in the underlying suit, the plaintiffs filed the present case asserting that the defendants prevented the doctor from being served with process in the healthcare liability action. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court, among other rulings, granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s various rulings. In an opinion filed on April 28, 2017, we affirmed the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their own complaint as moot, and for additional time to conduct discovery; however, we vacated the order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for entry of an order that complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment explaining that its decision was based on its conclusion that no duty of care was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristin McKenzie Et Al. Women's Health Services-Chattanooga, P.C. Et Al.
Kristin McKenzie and her husband, Joshua McKenzie, filed this health care liability action individually, and on behalf of their infant child, Jacob, who sustained injuries during his birth. As a result of these injuries, Jacob has limited use of his left arm. The plaintiffs allege that defendant Dr. Matthew A. Roberts was negligent in the delivery of Jacob. They assert that he applied a vacuum extractor during the delivery without first obtaining mother’s informed consent. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Roberts and his employer. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court committed several errors that entitle them to a new trial. They claim that the court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence that violates the collateral source rule. Specifically, they argue that the defendants were allowed to extensively cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses regarding possible health insurance benefits under the Affordable Care Act and other benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants pursued this line of interrogation in an attempt to show that some of Jacob’s needs would be covered by these collateral sources. The plaintiffs state that the trial court also erred in restricting the scope of the plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the concepts of “foresight” and “hindsight.” Plaintiffs appeal, arguing reversible errors on the part of the trial court. We vacate the trial court’s judgment on the jury verdict. We affirm some of the actions of the trial court, actions that are challenged by plaintiffs. We vacate the trial court’s order awarding the defendants $81,343.47 in discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Buckingham
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Devin Buckingham, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; that the trial court erred by ruling that defense counsel’s notes, taken during counsel’s interview of a defense witness, qualified as Jencks material; and that the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a defense witness about the victim’s prior bad acts. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lloyd Rush Pratt, Jr.
Defendant, Lloyd Rush Pratt, Jr., appeals from his convictions for driving as an habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence, and failure to exercise due care, for which he received an effective sentence of one year with 120 days to serve followed by supervised probation. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial, that the State committed a Brady violation, and that the trial court allowed statements of a witness to be admitted despite her unavailability at trial. For the following reasons, we determine that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial and improperly admitting hearsay evidence. The judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lavelle Moore
The Defendant, Lavelle Moore, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of theft of merchandise over $1000, a Class D felony, under alternate theories. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years at 60% in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in another case. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermel Brown
Defendant, Jermel Brown, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-six years’ incarceration. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to adequately prove his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Smith
Defendant, Robert L. Smith, was convicted of two counts of reckless aggravated assault in case number 18093 and of failure to appear in case number 18094 and received a total effective sentence of thirteen years with release eligibility after service of thirty-five percent of the sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of two counts of reckless aggravated assault and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne Cross
The pro se Defendant, Dewayne Cross, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kendall Southall
The Petitioner, Kendall Southall, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to terminate costs from his drug-related convictions between 1992 and 2002. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying relief because multiple pending civil actions existed to collect unpaid costs relative to the convictions and that the ten-year statute of limitations period prohibits the State from attempting to collect the costs. We dismiss the appeal because this court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Piper B., Et Al.
A mother’s parental rights to her two daughters were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support; substantial noncompliance with permanency plans; failure to manifest an ability and willingness personally to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the children; and persistence of conditions. The court also found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that Mother willfully failed to abandon the children by her failure to pay support; in all other respects, we affirm the termination. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony Thomas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2010 conviction of aggravated sexual battery. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition on grounds that he had filed more than one petition for post-conviction relief and that the grounds in his petition had been previously determined. The post-conviction court correctly determined that the petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial was previously determined; that portion of the court’s order so holding is affirmed. Because the postconviction court erred by concluding that (1) the petitioner had filed more than one petition for |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daramis Sharkey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Daramis Sharkey, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged the validity of his guilty pleas to three counts of aggravated rape and four counts of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter into his original guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily because his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by inappropriately pressuring the Petitioner to enter into a plea deal rather than proceed with the jury trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nicholas Watkins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Nicholas Watkins, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because of his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Mark Jones
On May 25, 2017, the Defendant, Kenneth Mark Jones, was convicted by a jury for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(3). The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to three years confinement as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was merely guilty of facilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re P.G.
Both parties appeal from the trial court’s order finding two grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights, but ultimately concluding that termination was not in the child’s best interests. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Ann Null v. Kenneth Andrew Cummins
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify a permanent parenting plan. In her petition to modify, Mother set forth distinct material changes in circumstances she claimed warranted either a change in custody or a change in the residential parenting schedule. Specifically, the petition alleged, among other things, that Father interfered with Mother’s visitation and her ability to be more involved in the children’s lives. The court found Mother did not prove any of the factual allegations in her petition by a preponderance of the evidence and thus found no material change in circumstances. From this ruling, Mother appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals |