State vs. Patrick Wingate M1999-00624-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
Bedford
Court of Criminal Appeals
Amonette vs. Amonette M1999-01283-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Reeves vs. Granite State Ins. Co. M1998-00286-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart
We accepted review in this case to determine whether the rights of Ed Reeves, the loss payee, were extinguished by cancellation of an automobile policy by the issuer, Granite State Insurance Co., where the cancellation had been occasioned by the insured's misrepresentation. The trial court found that the policy should be construed to require notice to the loss payee before cancellation could affect the loss payee, that any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the loss payee, and that the loss occurred prior to the notice of cancellation of the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We conclude that Granite State cannot extinguish the loss payee's interest because of acts or omissions of the insured except those enumerated in the loss payable clause, which is of the standard/union type. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
James E. Fleenor v. Grand Piano and Furniture Company 03S01-9905-CV-00061
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. G. Richard Johnson
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Grand Piano and Furniture Company (hereafter "Grand Piano") has appealed an award to James E. Fleenor of 8 per cent disability to the body as a whole. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Fleenor sustained a compensable injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). James E. Fleenor, age 47, has a 5th grade education. His tested I.Q. is 49 and he reads at a 2nd grade level and can do arithmetic at the 1st grade level. He began work at Grand Piano in 1995. He had worked as a furniture mover for most of his life. He drove a truck for Grand Piano and loaded and delivered furniture. He had hurt his back approximately 15 years before when a co-worker dropped the end of a couch; and while he had pain in his back for many years, he testified that the pain at Grand Piano became worse than the pain he had working for previous employers. He told his supervisor at Grand Piano that the work was "getting to me." He never had any specific incident at Grand Piano that caused sudden pain. He testified, "the more I worked, the more I picked up, the worser it got. And I just, I just had to give it up." 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Brenda K. Bascko v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A.J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc. 03S01-9907-CV-00083
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben W. Hooper
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A. J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc., contend that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that there was a causal connection between the fatal heart attack suffered by Richard I. Bascko and his driving a tractor-trailer rig. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). This case was tried upon stipulations and depositions of medical doctors. As relevant to this decision, the stipulations are as follows: 1. Richard I. Bascko died on October 15, 1993 while driving a tractor-trailer rig for A.J. Metler. The truck was found at 2:48 a.m. on October 15 and Mr. Bascko was unresponsive over the driver's wheel. 2
Harris vs. Chern M1998-00250-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
We granted this appeal to determine the standard to be applied in ruling upon a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 motion to revise a grant of partial summary judgment based upon evidence beyond that which was before the court when the motion was initially granted. For the reasons stated below, we reject the newly discovered evidence rule applied by the trial court and set forth in Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We adopt a test requiring the trial court to consider, when applicable: 1) the movant's efforts to obtain evidence to respond to the motion for summary judgment; 2) the importance of the newly submitted evidence to the movant's case; 3) the explanation offered by the movant for its failure to offer the newly submitted evidence in its initial response to the motion for summary judgment; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice; and 5) any other relevant factor. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for application of this standard.
