Ernest Frye vs. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Center, et al
E2000-02155-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
Plaintiff sued Defendants on November 25, 1998, alleging medical malpractice. Summonses were issued but never served on Defendants or returned to the court. Process was never reissued on the first Complaint. A voluntary nonsuit was entered by the Trial Court on June 8, 1999. On November 22, 1999, Plaintiff refiled a similar lawsuit, process issued, and Defendants were served the next day. Defendants filed summary judgment motions claiming that the statute of limitations had run because Plaintiff failed to have process reissued on the first Complaint as required by Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. Plaintiff claimed compliance with Rule 3, and, therefore, that the second lawsuit was filed within the statute of limitations. The Trial Court denied the summary judgment motions after determining that Defendants had actual notice of the first lawsuit and thus the spirit of the rules had been complied with. The Trial Court granted Defendants' request for an interlocutory appeal. We granted this interlocutory appeal to decide whether Plaintiff can comply with Rule 3 of the Tenn. R. Civ. P. not by obtaining issuance of new process in his original lawsuit within the one year period provided for in Rule 3, but instead by voluntarily dismissing the first lawsuit and refiling a similar lawsuit with the issuance of process in the second lawsuit within the one year period. Our answer is "no." We reverse the decision of the Trial Court.
Sullivan
Court of Appeals
Ernest F. Phillips vs. County of Anderson, et al
E2000-01204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: William E. Lantrip
The defendants, Anderson County and the City of Clinton, entered into an agreement to jointly finance the development of an industrial park to be owned and operated by the City. The plaintiff, Ernest F. Phillips, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the County's financing of a portion of the industrial park is illegal and unconstitutional and that the defendants violated various statutory requirements for the development of industrial parks. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals, arguing: (1) that the County's use of bond proceeds to finance its portion of the industrial park's infrastructure costs constitutes a lending or giving of credit to or in aid of a corporation within the meaning of Article II, Section 29 of the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the agreement between the County and the City is not legally sufficient under the Industrial Park Act; (3) that the County obtained a statutorily-required certificate of public purpose and necessity by fraud and misrepresentation; and (4) that the County's bond resolutions are fatally defective and call for prohibited expenditures. The City argues (a) that the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the City's actions and (b) that the plaintiff's appeal is frivolous. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants but do not find the plaintiff's appeal to be frivolous.
Gary Willingham vs. Gallatin Group, Inc., et al
M1998-00990-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves a dispute between a secured creditor and two local governments regarding the priority of their claims against the proceeds from the sale of the assets of a judicially dissolved corporation. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Sumner County held that the local governments' claims for delinquent business taxes had priority over the claim of the secured creditor. We have determined that the secured creditor's claim should have been given priority over the local governments' claims and, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
State ex rel Debbie Whitfield vs. Michael Honeycutt
M1999-00914-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
Appellant, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth, responded to a petition for contempt regarding past due child support with a request to determine paternity of the child. A paternity test is irrelevant in this case because even proof that he is not the child's father would not be a defense to contempt for failure to comply with a valid court order. We affirm the trial court's denial of the request.
The Defendant pleaded guilty to rape. After a hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years and six months in confinement. The Defendant appealed and asks this Court to shorten his sentence. He contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and failed to apply at least two mitigating factors. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant was charged with rape and convicted of that offense after a jury trial. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of statutory rape. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of felony escape and theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of four years for escape and seven years for theft, for an effective sentence of eleven years. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for escape; (2) the escape statute is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on attempted escape. The defendant does not challenge his theft conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Defendant challenges his conviction for premeditated first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior bad act; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Town of Greeneville vs. John O. Hardin, et al
E2000-00827-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
This is a suit by the Town of Greeneville to condemn a right-of-way for a sanitary sewer line over the property of John O. Hardin and Peggy Hardin, Defendants. The Hardins contested Greeneville's right to condemn in the Trial Court and, after an adverse ruling, appeal to this Court. We affirm.
Greene
Court of Appeals
City of Church Hill vs. Patrick Reynolds, III
E2000-01376-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
Patrick H. Reynolds, III ("Defendant") was issued a Misdemeanor Citation alleging violations of multiple city ordinances of the City of Church Hill ("Plaintiff") over a one-month period. Defendant was found guilty in the Church Hill City Court of violating these ordinances. Defendant appealed to the Hawkins County Circuit Court which likewise found the Defendant guilty of violating the ordinances. The Circuit Court, however, found Defendant guilty of several violations on days for which the Defendant was tried by the City Court with no finding of guilt by the City Court. Because Defendant cannot be placed in double jeopardy for violations of these municipal ordinances, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court finding Defendant guilty for violations on days for which Defendant was tried by the City Court with no finding of guilt made by the City Court. We affirm the Circuit Court's determination with regard to the remaining violations.
Rick Richards vs. Traci Domalik
E2000-01882-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson
This is a tort action arising out of an accident involving a bicycle and an automobile. The plaintiff was riding his bicycle on the shoulder of the highway facing traffic. The driver of the automobile was to the plaintiff's left and was preparing to turn right out of the premises of a restaurant onto the highway. As the plaintiff moved to his left and started to pass in front of the automobile, the vehicles collided and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover compensatory damages. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding the plaintiff 75% at fault. The plaintiff appeals, asserting, inter alia, that the jury charge was erroneous and that this error warrants a new trial. We vacate the judgment below and remand for a new trial.
Hawkins
Court of Appeals
Terry Hahn vs. Thomas Hahn, et al
E2000-00330-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
An intra-family business transaction which occurred nearly 30 years ago fomented this litigation involving an undisclosed interest in a hotel in Gatlinburg. The original parties are former spouses; the intervenors are their children. The complaint was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Melanie Conger vs. Timothy Gowder, M.D.
E2000-01584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
In this medical malpractice case arising out of surgery, the trial court granted the defendant summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims of surgical negligence and lack of informed consent. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) that disputed issues of material fact exist that make summary judgment inappropriate and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the depositions of the defendant and another physician pending a hearing on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because we find that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the subject depositions, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Donna Winstead, et al v.Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home
E2000-02214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.
In this wrongful death action, the Trial Court held that defendant's nurses met the standard of care required of them in the treatment and care of the deceased, and dismissed the case. On appeal, we reverse and enter Judgment for damages.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
Bobby Everett, et al vs. Gordon McCall, M.D.
E2000-02012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The complaint in this medical malpractice case was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a Rule 56.07 Response to the motion, requesting additional time within which to take the defendant's deposition for the purpose, inter alia, of ascertaining his thought processes during the 27-day period he treated the plaintiff for a gastroenterological condition which ended in her death. The request for additional time was denied, and the motion for summary judgment was granted because the affidavit of the defendant was not countervailed. The judgment is reversed.
Linda Asher vs. Eugene Asher
E2000-00821-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John D. Mcafee
In this appeal from the Claiborne County Chancery Court the Appellant, Linda Ward Asher, questions whether the Chancery Court erred in granting her an absolute divorce, in failing to award her alimony in futuro, and in failing to require that the Appellee, Eugene Asher, be required to maintain health insurance coverage on her behalf. Mr. Asher questions whether the Chancery Court erred in finding that funds withdrawn by him from a Putnam Investment savings account should be counted against his equitable share of the marital property and in finding that Ms. Asher should be awarded alimony. We affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court as modified and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of this appeal against the Ashers equally.
Claiborne
Court of Appeals
First Citizens Bank of Cleveland vs. Carol Cross
E2000-01325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
This is the second time that this case has been before us on appeal. The case originated as a suit on two promissory notes executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff and secured by deeds of trust on real property owned by the defendant. The defendant filed a pleading incorporating a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint against one of the plaintiff's employees, which pleading alleges that the plaintiff, through its employee, breached its undertaking to arrange for additional insurance coverage on the mortgaged property. On the first appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request for a jury trial. On remand, the plaintiff and the third-party defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the parol evidence rule bars consideration of the defendant's claim that the plaintiff, through its employee, agreed to contact the agent for the insurance company and arrange for additional insurance on the mortgaged property. The trial court granted the movants summary judgment and, upon confirmation of a Master's report as to the amounts due under the notes, entered a judgment against the defendant. The defendant appeals. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the promissory notes; however, we vacate the grant of summary judgment as to the defendant's counterclaim and third-party complaint.
Bradley
Court of Appeals
Marcus Mooneyham vs. Harold Cates
E2000-01337-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
Marcus Mooneyham, former General Sessions Judge of Cocke County, seeks by this suit to recover a mental health commitment supplement which he contends he is entitled to receive by virtue of his position as Juvenile Judge. The Trial Court found adversely, and further found that because he was not acting in good faith he was required to repay the County $8912.94. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court that he was not entitled to the supplement he claimed and was required to repay the County the sum assessed.
