The appellant, Westminster Realty Company, appeals an order entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court denying its claim to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of property pursuant to forfeiture proceedings. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner, Sidney McGlowan, filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner alleges that the court erred by dismissing his petition without appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Ronald Cox W2000-02238-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey
The defendant, Ronald Cox, was found guilty of robbery following a jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. In this appeal, he raises three issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of theft; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its answers to questions submitted to the trial court during jury deliberations. Defendant is not entitled to relief on the first and third issues. However, under the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001), we hold that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to include the lesser-included offense of theft in the charge to the jury. Therefore, we reverse Defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
Defendant appeals his conviction of second degree murder following a jury trial. He presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain hearsay testimony; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to rule on defendant's objection to a question asked by the prosecuting attorney. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tipton
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Lewis A. Forbess W2001-00202-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III
The defendant, Lewis A. Forbess, entered pleas of guilt to aggravated rape, theft of property between $10,000.00 and $60,000.00, aggravated burglary, and possession of a weapon in a penal facility. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences as follows:
Offense Term Range Aggravated Rape 25 years 100% Violent Offender Theft 15 years Persistent Offender Aggravated Burglary 15 years Persistent Offender Possession of Contraband in a Penal Facility 10 years Persistent Offender
The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an earlier burglary sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the sentences are excessive. The judgments are affirmed.
Tipton
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Robbie R. Bailey E2001-00210-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp
The Appellant, Robbie R. Bailey, was indicted by a Washington County Grand Jury for one count of driving under the influence, fourth offense, one count of driving on a revoked license, and two counts of vehicular assault. On December 1, 2000, Bailey pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault and one count of driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing on January 10, 2001, the trial court sentenced Bailey, as a range I standard offender, to the maximum term of four years on each count of vehicular assault and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction.
On appeal, Bailey raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the sentences imposed for vehicular assault were excessive; and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying Bailey's request for a non incarcerative alternative sentence. After review, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Washington
Court of Criminal Appeals
State v. Bobby Godsey E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
Sullivan
Supreme Court
State v. Bobby Godsey E1997-00207-SC-R11-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
Sullivan
Supreme Court
Bernice Rothstein, et al. v. Orange Grove Center, Inc., et al. E1999-00900-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
We granted appeal to determine 1) whether the defendants are entitled to a new trial based upon their claim that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence from four different sources, and 2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for consortium damages and, if so, the proper remedy for that error. We hold that the four evidentiary issues are without merit. The defendants therefore are not entitled to a new trial. We further hold, pursuant to our decisions in Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999), Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000), and Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Hospital Authority, 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2001), that the plaintiffs may maintain a claim for loss of filial consortium. We remand this case for a trial on the issue of incidental damages, limited to loss of consortium.
Hamilton
Supreme Court
In Re: Kiersten Cierra Burchette E2010-02132-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: D. Michael Swiney, J.
Trial Court Judge: A. Benjamin Strand, Jr., Judge
This lawsuit involves whether custody of Kiersten Cierra Burchette (the "Child") should be changed from Carey A. Bible ("Mother") to Chadwick J. Burchette ("Father"). Father filed an emergency petition seeking custody. Father claimed, among other things, that the Child was being sexually abused by Mother's boyfriend. Although the emergency petition eventually was dismissed, the Juvenile Court did designate Father as the Child's primary residential parent. The Juvenile Court, however, specifically reserved ruling on who should pay certain medical expenses as well as a bill for the deposition of Father's private investigator. The Juvenile Court also reserved ruling on all child support issues. Mother appeals. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.
Cocke
Court of Appeals
Terminix International Co. v. Department of Labor M2001-00174-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This matter is before the Court upon a petition seeking judicial review of our administrative order. The Petition was initiated in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, wherein the appellants challenged the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Department of Labor, Division of Occupational Safety and Health ("TOSHA") to conduct safety inspections concerning pesticide applicators (i.e., persons who apply pesticides) and to enforce such regulations. The Chancery Court ruled that the Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (TOSHA) has subject matter jurisdiction to conduct inspections and issue citations concerning the safety of pesticide applicators in the work place. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Stacy Harris v. Thomas Hall M2000-00784-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
This case was transferred to a judge in another county for "binding mediation," and the mediating judge entered an order dismissing the lawsuit and enjoining plaintiff from certain actions, including further litigation. The original trial court later denied the plaintiff's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from orders, and the plaintiff appealed. We find the trial court had no authority to order the case to any alternative dispute resolution procedure other than one established in Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 31, that the mediating judge had no authority to dispose of the case and, consequently, all orders entered by that judge are void. We reverse the trial court's denial of Rule 60.02 relief, vacate orders entered in the court of the mediating judge, and remand for further proceedings.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District v. Health Facilities Commission M1999-02804-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute between two hospitals regarding one hospital's desire to expand its intensive care and open-heart surgery services. After Methodist Healthcare-Jackson Hospital applied to the Tennessee Health Facilities Commission for a certificate of need, Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District objected on the ground that the proposed services would unnecessarily duplicate services it was already providing. Even though the Commission denied the application, the Commission's staff issued the certificate of need after the Attorney General and Reporter opined that the Commission's vote on reconsideration was inconsistent with the Commission's enabling statute. Rather than pursuing a contested case hearing before the Commission, Jackson-Madison County filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Commission's vote to deny the certificate of need was proper and that one Commission member who voted to approve the certificate should have been disqualified because of a financial conflict of interest. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari but, following a hearing, dismissed the writ because Jackson-Madison County had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Jackson-Madison County appealed to this court. While this appeal was pending, Jackson-Madison County requested and received a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge sitting in place of the Commission. After the administrative law judge determined that the Commission's vote to deny Methodist Healthcare's application for a certificate of need was proper and that one of the Commission members who voted to grant the certificate of need should have been disqualified, Jackson-Madison County moved to dismiss its appeal. Methodist Healthcare opposed dismissing the appeal. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed Jackson-Madison County's petition for writ of certiorari and that this appeal should be dismissed.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Trinity Industries, Inc. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., Inc. M2000-00510-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
An uncompleted highway bridge over the Tennessee River collapsed, triggering a lengthy and convoluted course of litigation between the parties involved in its construction. Litigation began when the company that fabricated the bridge's structural steel components sued the general contractor for non-payment on the contract. The general contractor filed a counter-claim which alleged that the fabricator had breached the contract by producing defective steel components that caused the collapse. The contractor named some of its other subcontractors as third party defendants, claiming that they also bore some responsibility for the collapse of the bridge. In a series of orders, the trial court dismissed the counterclaim and third party claims, and declared that its judgments were final for purposes of Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 54.02. After this court heard oral argument on the first of the Rule 54.02 appeals, but before it could issue an opinion, the trial court conducted a hearing on the merits of the steel fabricator's claim, and rendered a judgment in its favor. We affirm the judgment for the price of the steel and the judgment for the fabricator on the general contractor's counterclaim. We reverse the judgment dismissing the third party claims.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Robert Davidson vs. Charles Lindsey W2000-02891-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This appeal arises from an automobile accident involving the Appellants and the Appellees in which the Appellee's wife was killed and the Appellee was seriously injured. The Appellee, individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, and the Appellee's children filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Henry County against the Appellants and three of the Appellees. Following a jury trial, the jury found that the Appellants were 100% liable for the accident and dismissed the claims against the three Appellees. The jury awarded the Appellee $1,250,000.00 and awarded the estate of the Appellee's wife $500,000.00. The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. The Appellants filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
Henry
Court of Appeals
Marlena Tilley vs. Gurpal Bindra W2001-01157-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim brought by the Appellants against the Appellee in the Circuit Court of Dyer County. The Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Following the deposition of the Appellants' expert witness, the Appellee filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Appellee's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for summary judgment. The Appellants appeal the grant of the Appellee's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for summary judgment by the Circuit Court of Dyer County. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Dyer
Court of Appeals
Charles Salsman vs. Texcor Indus. W2001-00730-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams
This appeal arises out of a petition filed in Tennessee to enroll a Texas judgment. In this case, the plaintiffs filed a petition to enroll the foreign judgment. While this was pending, the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer to assert a counterclaim. Three days later, before the trial court had ruled on the motion to amend, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, including a proposed order stating that no counterclaim had been pled. The trial court entered the proposed order. Subsequently, in response to the defendants' motion, the trial court vacated its earlier order of dismissal and granted the defendants' motion to amend to assert the counterclaim. In this interlocutory appeal, we affirm, holding under Rule 41.01(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure that the proposed counterclaim attached to the motion to amend is considered a "pleaded" counterclaim, thereby permitting the defendants to elect to proceed on the counterclaim despite the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Ragan/James Hinson vs. Kelli Gatton W2001-01763-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
Father filed a petition to increase visitation, for joint custody and other relief. The juvenile court modified visitation and ordered joint custody. Father appeals. We affirm.
CH-00-1455-1 CH-00-1455-1
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Harry Kradel. v. Piper Industries M2001-00338-SC-R23-CQ
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, this Court accepted certification of five questions of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning Tennessee's law of corporations. For the reasons given herein, we answer that the corporate statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, apply to determine the rights and remedies available against a corporation dissolved before that date and that section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed) applies to limit Piper's liability for post-dissolution claims. We further answer that Piper Industries, Inc. did comply with the dissolution statutes in effect before January 1, 1988, which require provisions to ensure the final distribution of corporate assets, but which do not require a corporation to establish a reserve fund for contingent claims arising more than two years after the dissolution. Finally, we answer that while the trust fund doctrine has been previously applied in Tennessee to solvent corporations, its application in this case is necessarily limited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-1-1013(a) (repealed).
The Defendant, Deadrick Pigg, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Davidson County of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine.1 After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict because the verdict was based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with evidence of past convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This matter is before us on the court’s own motion to correct errors associated with entries of an order on rehearing, opinion and judgment on October 15, 2001. A brief procedural history is in order to understand the basis for the court’s action in the instant order. On July 11, 2001, this court entered an opinion and judgment in this case. The defendant thereafter moved for rehearing, and we granted his motion on August 14, 2001. On October 15, 2001, we entered an order which addressed the merits of the defendant’s rehearing issue. That order also contained the following language, “The judgment previously entered is WITHDRAWN and is RE-ENTERED as of the entry of this order.” (Emphasis in original.) Although that order directed the withdrawal and reentry of the judgment, both the opinion and the judgment of July 11 were withdrawn and reentered on that date. The withdrawal and reentry of the opinion was in error. Moreover, that erroneous action prompted the accrual of additional costs.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Dean Byard M2000-01410-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman
Defendant appeals from a bench trial where he was found guilty of one count of assault and one count of aggravated assault. Sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction of aggravated assault. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is wholly unsubstantiated. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.
