Rick Williams vs. Angela Williams
E2002-01995-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: James W. Mckenzie
The Trial Court in this divorce action, granted the parties a divorce and divided marital property. The husband appeals, seeking additional marital property. We affirm.

James Kyzer vs. Patty Blackburn
E2002-02254-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: C. Van Deacon
This is a custody dispute between James Christopher Kyzer, the father of Haleigh Sharee Kyzer, d.o.b. 10/6/93, and the child's maternal grandmother, Patti Blackburn, which arose after Haleigh's mother, the ex-wife of Mr. Kyzer, was killed in an automobile accident. The Trial Judge awarded custody to the father upon his finding that "there has been no showing of substantial risk of harm to the child." We affirm.

Carolyn Mitchell Brown vs. John Hilyee Watson, Jr.
E2004-01229-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
The Trial Court annulled Brown's marriage at the insistence of her conservator. On appeal, we affirm.

Elizabeth Ann Croley v. Levi Strauss & Co.
M2001-01481-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr.J.
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee slipped and fell on a wet floor as she was entering the workplace. The chancellor, who had presided over the trial in this matter, left office before rendering a decision. The employee contends that the chancellor did not have jurisdiction to decide the case because the 6 day time period provided under Tennessee Code Annotated _ 17-1-34(b) for judges who have vacated office to conclude pending cases had expired prior to the entry of an order by the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court ordering the former chancellor to conclude the case. The employee also contends that the trial court erred: 1) in finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that her work-related accident caused a permanent right shoulder injury; and 2) by designating a faxed copy of an order as the original. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding as to causation. We also find that the trial court did have proper jurisdiction in this case and did not err in designating a faxed copy of an order as the original when the original order was lost. Accordingly, the panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR.J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J. and JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP.J., joined. Wm. Landis Turner, Hohenwald, Tennessee, for the appellant, Elizabeth Ann Croley. Patrick Alan Ruth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Levi Strauss & Co. MEMORANDUM OPINION Mrs. Elizabeth Ann Croley was 62 years old at the time of trial. She completed the 8th grade in school and had no vocational training. She is married with grown children and has legal custody of a grandchild. She had not worked outside the home for 8 or 9 years prior to starting work for Levi Strauss on March 22, 1993, where she operated a machine that placed rivets on blue jeans. On September 9, 1993, Mrs. Croley slipped and fell on a wet floor as she was entering the Levi Strauss plant. According to Mrs. Croley, she reported to the nurses' station where she told the plant nurse her shoulder, elbow, and neck were hurting. She signed an Employee Report of Injury form indicating primary injuries to her right elbow and hip with secondary injuries to her back and neck. She did not indicate an injury to the shoulder on the form. She chose Dr. Jeffrey T. Adams, orthopedist, from a panel of three physicians offered by Levi Strauss. Later that same day, Dr. Adams examined her and found neck pain and tenderness in her lower back. She had a normal neurologic exam of her upper and lower extremities. When asked whether there was any concern about Mrs. Croley's shoulder in the course of his examination, Dr. Adams responded: "No, she had full motion of her shoulders at that time. She really _ her main complaint was in her neck and in her lower back, [those were] her two areas of peak complaints." Dr. Adams prescribed muscle relaxers, physical therapy and placed her on work restrictions. Mrs. Croley continued working for Levi Strauss until November 7, 1993, when she took sick leave for unrelated medical problems. On April 28, 1994, Levi Strauss terminated her employment when she did not return to work after being released to return to work by her gynecologist. Dr. Adams treated Mrs. Croley until September 8, 1994. During that time she underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation which indicated symptom magnification, MRIs, an EMG conduction study and a psychological evaluation. According to Dr. Adams, she initially started getting better and then "her symptoms suddenly changed gear and got progressively worse and markedly magnified." He concluded based on these tests that there was a psychological component that carried her symptoms to this point. Dr. Adams stated that the only reference to shoulder pain during his treatment of Mrs. Croley did not involve the shoulder joint, but referred to the back of the neck and shoulder blade. In Dr. Adams' opinion, Mrs. Croley did not sustain a rotator cuff tear or other significant shoulder trauma from the September 9, 1993 fall: No. She had no signs of a rotator cuff tear. I saw her hours after her injury, and she could pick her arm up all the way over her head (indicating). With a complete rotator cuff tear, you are extremely -2-

Charles Head v. James Gibson
M1999-00656-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
This is an appeal from a judgment granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. that the uninsured motorist coverage offered to the plaintiffs was not implicated under the circumstances of this litigation. We affirm.

Dennis J. Hughes v. State of Tennessee
M2001-02454-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

Dennis J. Hughes appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims on appeal that the lower court erred in (1) denying his claim that his constitutional rights were abridged by the state's failure to disclose evidence against him prior to trial as part of the bill of particulars, and (2) ruling that he could not impeach the prosecutor from the conviction proceedings with the prosecutor's own alleged prior bad acts. Because we are unpersuaded of reversible error, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Charlotte McCall v. National Health
M2001-03166-SC-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
We granted interlocutory appeal in this workers' compensation case, and in the companion case of Shelton v. ADS Environmental Services, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. These cases present the following issues: whether the trial court has the authority to initiate temporary benefits pre-trial and, assuming the trial court has this authority, whether it must hold a full evidentiary hearing prior to initiating temporary benefits. After careful examination of the workers' compensation statutes and the applicable case law, we hold that the trial court has the power to initiate temporary workers' compensation benefits prior to trial and that it may do so without first holding a full evidentiary hearing.

State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Brewer
M2002-01982-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

The defendant appeals her sentence of three years imprisonment for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. The defendant argues she is a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. The record supports the defendant's assertion that she is entitled to an alternative sentence. The defendant is sentenced to three years in split confinement, with thirty (30) days incarceration and the remainder on supervised probation. We remand this judgment to determine if the defendant continues to hold full-time employment. If the defendant is employed full-time, she is to serve her thirty (30) days in periodic confinement.

State of Tennessee v. James Mario Starnes
M2002-01450-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Starnes pled guilty to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, Starnes received concurrent sentences of ten years, nine months for attempted second degree murder and twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery. Starnes now appeals his especially aggravated robbery conviction, contending that the evidence is insufficient to establish his guilt for that offense. Because the error complained of was waived as a matter of law by Starnes’ plea of guilty, this issue is not reviewable upon direct appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 

Thomas J. McKee v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00071-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The petitioner, Thomas J. McKee, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed (1) to request a mental evaluation for him; (2) to make a contemporaneous objection to the state's improper closing argument; and (3) to object to the inclusion of the phrase "moral certainty" in the jury's instruction on reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

Carlos Castillion vs. Sarah Castillion
E2002-01310-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
In this divorce case, the husband questions on appeal the valuation of marital property and distribution made by the Trial Court. We affirm the Trial Court.

Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing v. Commissioner of Revenue
M2000-03091-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Claudia C. Bonnyman
In this use tax case, we address the issue of whether or not the plaintiff should receive a credit under Tennessee law for sales tax it paid to the State of Alabama on the purchase of photocompositions used in printing telephone directories that were later distributed in Tennessee. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-203(a) (1998), a use tax is levied at the rate of six percent (6%) of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state; provided, that there shall be no duplication of the tax. (Emphasis added). To avoid duplication of the tax, Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-507(a) (1998) provides a credit for like taxes paid to other states on tangible personal property. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the plaintiff was not owed a credit for sales tax paid to Alabama for the photocompositions, since there was no "like tax" paid on the telephone directories. We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to a credit because the cost of the photocompositions on which the Alabama sales tax was paid is included in the cost of the directories on which Tennessee is seeking to impose a use tax. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and grant summary judgment to the plaintiff.

State of Tennessee v. Charles Eugene Jones
E2001-01639-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant, Charles E. Jones, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a weapon. For these convictions, the trial court classified the defendant as a Range I standard offender and ordered him to serve an aggregate one year sentence, consisting of concurrent sentences of one year for his possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for his possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, and thirty days for his unlawful possession of a weapon conviction. The state agreed to suspend the two latter sentences, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years of probation and one year of incarceration, which was to be suspended after the defendant served ninety days in the county jail. The defendant now appeals his sentence, alleging (1) that the trial court erroneously modified his plea agreement with the state after it had been submitted to the trial court for approval, (2) that the trial court improperly denied his request to serve the entirety of his sentence on probation, and (3) that the trial court improperly weighed and applied various enhancement and mitigating factors. After reviewing the record, we find that none of the defendant's allegations merit relief and therefore affirm the defendant's sentence.

Hoover, Inc. v. Metro Nashville Board of Zoning Appeals
M2001-00924-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This is the fourth appeal from a zoning board's denial of a conditional use permit. In April 1992, the petitioner stone processing company filed an application with the respondent zoning board for a conditional use permit to operate a rock quarry. After years of litigation, the board issued findings of fact and denied the petitioner's application. The application was denied in part because the reclamation plan in the petitioner's proposal used water as fill material, contrary to the specification in the applicable ordinance that solids be used as fill material. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because reclamation plans using water as fill material had been approved in the past. The trial court denied the writ and upheld the board's decision. The stone processing company appealed. We affirm, finding that the board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and that material evidence supported the board's decision.

State of Tennessee v. Shani Carr
M2002-02261-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

The defendant, Shani Carr, appeals as of right from her three-year jail sentence imposed by the Coffee County Circuit Court following her guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony. She contends that the trial court should not have sentenced her to incarceration based upon the need for deterrence because the record is devoid of proof for such need. We agree, reverse the trial court's sentence of incarceration, and sentence the defendant to split confinement.

Mill Creek Associates v. Jackson Foundation
M2001-02811-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This is an unjust enrichment case. The plaintiff design firm was contacted by the defendant foundation to develop designs and a budget for the construction of a science theater. The chief designer of the firm worked on the project and presented a proposal to the foundation. The foundation neither accepted nor rejected the design firm's proposal. Instead, the foundation hired the design firm's chief designer. Part of the designer's duties with the foundation was to work on the science theater project "in house." The foundation refused to pay the design firm a fee for its work on the project. The design firm then sued the foundation on a theory of unjust enrichment for the work performed on the project while the chief designer was still at the firm. The trial court found that since the project was never completed, the preliminary designs did not confer a value on the foundation and, consequently, the foundation had not been unjustly enriched. The design firm now appeals. We reverse, finding that the work performed by the design firm constituted a benefit to the foundation, and that it would be unjust for the foundation to retain that benefit without paying the design firm for the value of the benefit.

David Norman v. Melissa Norman
M2002-01084-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court's denial of Husband's petition to reduce child support and alimony. The trial court found there was no significant variance of fifteen percent (15%) to modify child support. The trial court also determined that there was no justification for a decrease in alimony payments. The trial court reserved the issues relating to unclean hands and attorney fees. The parties raise multiple issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we vacate in part, reverse in part and remand.

Jeffrey Camporal v. Richard Ford
M2002-01409-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
This case involves a dispute arising from a Promissory Note executed by and between the Appellant/Maker and Appellee/Payee. Specifically, Appellant asserts that he signed the Note in a representative capacity and, therefore, he is not personally liable on the Note. The Circuit Court of Franklin County granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, entering a Judgment against Appellant for principal, interest, and costs. Appellant appeals from this Judgment. We affirm.

Is, As Stated In The Opinion, And As It Is Stated In Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2D 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
05-00-024-CC
Trial Court Judge: A. Andrew Jackson

Is, As Stated In The Opinion, And As It Is Stated In Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2D 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
05-00-024-CC
Trial Court Judge: A. Andrew Jackson

05-00-024-CC
05-00-024-CC
Trial Court Judge: A. Andrew Jackson

Rudy Ochoa v. Peterbilt Motor Company
M2002-00410-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's findings as to compensability and extent of vocational disability. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Terry L. Hill and Stacey Billingsley Cason, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Peterbilt Motors Company William Joseph Butler and E. Guy Holliman, Lafayette, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rudy Ochoa, Jr. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Ochoa, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for an allegedly work related injury by accident. The employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 4 percent to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Bobby William Smith v. Findlay Industries,
M2002-01315-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. Richard McGregor, Special Master
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the trial court erred in denying his motion for post-judgment interest. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment denying interest should be reversed and the cause remanded for an award of interest from the date of entry of the original judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Barry H. Medley and Frank D. Farrar, McMinnville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby William Smith Patrick A. Ruth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Findlay Industries/ Gardner Division MEMORANDUM OPINION In the first appeal of this case, this court affirmed the judgment but remanded the cause to the trial court for a determination of the employee's compensation rate. On remand, the trial court corrected the employee's correct compensation rate to $287.58. The judgment was satisfied shortly thereafter. However, the employee 's motion for post-judgment interest was denied. The employee has appealed contending he should be awarded interest. We agree. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Nutt v. Champion Intern. Corp., 98 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tenn. 1998). The issue before us is one of law and we have reviewed it accordingly. The Workers' Compensation Act expressly requires that it be given "equitable construction" and declares itself to be a remedial Act. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-116. Workers' compensation laws must be construed so as to ensure that injured employees are justly and appropriately reimbursed for debilitating injuries suffered in the course of service to the employer. Story v. Legion Ins. Co., 3 S.W.3d 45, 455 (Tenn. 1999). In a workers' compensation case, if an appeal is taken, interest must be computed from the date the judgment was entered by the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. 5-6-225(g) (1) (22 Supp.); McClain v. Henry I. Siegel Co., 834 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. 1992). We find no merit in the appellee's contention that the statute is abrogated by the fact that the judgment was modified by the previous appeal. Construing the statute as required, its language is plain. By it, the claimant is entitled to interest from the date of entry of judgment by the trial court until the judgment was paid. The requirement encourages employers to pay disability benefits in a timely fashion. Moreover, the determination of the correct compensation rate could and should have been known to the employer from its own records; and the employer should have paid benefits at that rate. By failing to do so, the employer accepted the risk of having to pay interest. For those reasons, the judgment of the trial court disallowing interest is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. Costs are taxed to the appellee. ___________________________________ JOE C. LOSER, JR. -2-

Delivetrick Dewon Blocker v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00036-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Scott Benn
E2001-01958-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bevil

The defendant, Scott Benn, who was originally charged with felony murder and aggravated child abuse, was convicted of one count of aggravated child abuse. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of felony murder and aggravated child abuse; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence; and (3) that the sentence is excessive. Although the trial court erred by failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses, the error can be classified as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.