Thomas Marlin Roberts, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, et al.
W2023-01577-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kasey Culbreath

Homeowners removed underground storage tanks found on their property. After finding evidence of petroleum contamination where the tanks had been located, the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation began an extensive cleanup process. The Department subsequently issued a cost-recovery order against the homeowners to recoup its expenditures. The homeowners petitioned for review of the cost-recovery order to the Underground Storage Tanks and Solid Waste Disposal Control Board, which upheld the order. The homeowners appealed this initial ruling to the Board and the order was again upheld. The homeowners then appealed the Board’s final ruling to the trial court, which reversed the Board’s judgment. The Department and the Board now appeal. Because we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for transfer to the proper court.

In Re Conservatorship of Sylvia Carlyle Brainard
W2024-00031-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathleen N. Gomes

After two sets of relatives filed competing petitions for the appointment of a conservator over the respondent, the parties entered into an agreed order and settlement agreement that provided that the respondent was not in need of conservator, but that the parties had certain obligations that were subject to review by the court and guardian ad litem going forward. Months later, appellants filed a petition to set aside the agreed order on the basis that appellees had not complied with its terms; appellees responded with a motion to dismiss appellants’ petition on the basis that they had not alleged proper grounds to set aside the parties’ agreement. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order stating that “[a]ll outstanding orders should be set aside and all petitions and the case dismissed” without explanation. Because we cannot review the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal without an adequate explanation, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. James Lee Simmons, Jr.
W2024-00404-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph T. Howell

James Lee Simmons, Jr., Defendant, pleaded guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of the registration law, and resisting arrest. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the manner of service of Defendant’s nine-year sentence was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered the sentence to be served in confinement. Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jamie P. Dennis v. State of Tennessee
M2024-00670-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry J. Wallace

The Petitioner, Jamie P. Dennis, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for attempted rape of a child and attempted incest. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Petitioner’s trial counsel and appellate counsel provided him with effective assistance of counsel. The Petitioner bases his ineffectiveness claims on trial counsel’s failure to present a specific defense related to criminal attempt as a lesser included offense, failure to request reclassification of his prior conviction offenses to establish the appropriate sentencing range, and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the same issues on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Ashley Ledford and Brandon Stepp
E2023-01455-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan Spitzer

Defendants, Ashley Ledford and Brandon Stepp, were convicted by a Campbell County jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse and neglect of a child under the age of eight resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court imposed effective twenty-one-year sentences for each Defendant. On appeal, Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out-of-court statements and by consolidating Defendants’ cases, and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendants. Defendants also assert that they are entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Eric Martell Small v. State of Tennessee
W2024-00609-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

Petitioner, Eric Martell Small, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was coerced, involuntary, and unknowing. Following our review, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. James Allen Worley
M2023-00867-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Justin C. Angel

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, James Allen Worley, challenges his convictions and sentences for four counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child on multiple statutory and constitutional grounds. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 1) admitting the forensic interview of the child victim on the grounds of the forensic interviewer’s lack of requisite experience and improper authentication by the victim, 2) denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement on the ground that they occurred during an impermissibly lengthy warrantless detainment, and 3) excessively sentencing the Defendant to consecutive terms on all counts. After a thorough review of the record and consideration of the parties’ arguments, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms in counts 1 through 5. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Claudine Desjardins v. Kelly Wilson et al.
M2023-00745-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

The appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute. Because the appellant’s brief falls well short of the requirements of both the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court, we dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Russell Lenard
E2024-00752-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Ross Dyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Andrew Freiberg

The defendant, Russell Lenard, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement.  Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the revocation and the disposition of the defendant's probation.

State of Tennessee v. William Darnell Britton
M2023-01779-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mark J. Fishburn

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, William Darnell Britton, for one count of first-degree premeditated murder. Thereafter, a jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years at one hundred percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error (1) in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his inflammatory rap lyrics and videos and (2) in its jury instructions. After review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s rap lyrics/videos and that this error was not harmless. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on “first aggressor proof” in conjunction with the self-defense instruction and that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Standifer
M2023-01133-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William A. Lockhart

Anthony M. Standifer (“Defendant”) filed an application for judicial diversion and entered a guilty plea to Class C felony2 possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. On December 10, 2015, the trial court entered a probation order deferring entry of judgment pending Defendant’s successful completion of one year of supervised probation and three years of unsupervised probation. Following a June 28, 2023 probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of probation. The trial court revoked probation, terminated judicial diversion, and without a sentencing hearing sentenced Defendant. The court then entered a judgment of conviction finding Defendant guilty of Class C felony “attempt poss. Sch. I controlled with intent to” and sentenced Defendant to serve three years in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the termination of judicial diversion but reverse the judgment finding Defendant guilty of attempted possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; an offense to which Defendant did not plead guilty. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment finding Defendant guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of controlled substance and for sentencing of Defendant for that offense.

State of Tennessee v. Timothy Ronald Cunningham
E2024-00521-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

Defendant, Timothy Ronald Cunningham, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault while under an order of protection, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and domestic assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years of confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. George Cleave
W2023-01590-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

Defendant, George Cleave, was convicted by a jury of theft over $1,000, but less than $2,500, a Class E felony. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I offender to two years, suspended to supervised probation with credit for time served and ordered Defendant to pay $2,500 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his theft conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the restitution amount because it was unsupported by any proof. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant’s conviction but reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and remand for a new restitution hearing consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony Wayne Foust
E2024-00346-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Zachary R. Walden

A Campbell County jury convicted Defendant, Anthony Wayne Foust, of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of incarceration to be served as a career offender at 60 percent service. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State failed to preserve evidence in violation State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); and (3) the trial court erred in limiting Defendant’s closing argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Hinson
W2024-00236-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bruce Irwin Griffey

Defendant, Christopher Hinson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence because it failed to consider any consequences other than a full revocation and placed no findings or reasons for its decision on the record. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re Remington G.
2021-00680-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial.

State of Tennessee v. Luke Jackson
E2023-01617-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry A. Steelman

Defendant, Luke Jackson, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a fifteen-year sentence as a Range III
offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) he did not fully understand the details of his plea
agreement and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts that he was
unaware that he would be sentenced outside of his range and that he entered the plea out
of fear and lack of medical treatment while incarcerated. Following our review of the entire
record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Keion Hayes
M2024-00352-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dee David Gay

The Defendant, Keion Hayes, pleaded guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2018) (subsequently amended) (voluntary manslaughter); 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery).  The Defendant received an agreed-upon, eighteen-year sentence.  The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

James Henry Whitaker, II v. Viktoria Moor
M2022-01721-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J.B. Cox

Following their divorce, a mother informed her children’s father of her desire to move to Germany with the children. The father filed a petition opposing the move. The court found that the relocation was in the children’s best interest and modified the permanent parenting plan accordingly. On appeal, Father contends the evidence preponderates against some of the factual findings and that the court erred in weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that relocation was in the children’s best interest, we affirm.

Preston Garner Et Al. v. Southern Baptist Convention Et Al.
E2024-00100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge David R. Duggan

The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James W. Grubb Et Al. v. Joe D. Grubb Et Al.
E2023-01358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse.

Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al.
M2021-01511-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Michael W. Binkley

This appeal arises from a slip-and-fall incident at an apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee. On a rainy morning at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex, owned and operated by Mid-America Apartments, LP, Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the way back to his apartment. Mr. Trentham sustained serious injuries and filed a premises-liability lawsuit alleging that MAA had been negligent in maintaining the pedestrian bridge. Mr. Trentham asserted that his slip-and-fall was caused by a microbial growth on the bridge that MAA should have known about and should have addressed. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Trentham, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. MAA disputes the holding of the lower courts that it was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. We hold that, because the microbial growth on the pedestrian bridge amounts to a “general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence,” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004), MAA was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the bridge at the time of Mr. Trentham’s fall. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Robert L. Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP et al. (dissenting)
M2021-01511-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Sarah K. Campbell
Trial Court Judge: Michael W. Binkley

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.
Premises owners “are not insurers of their patrons’ safety.” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). That refrain has been part of Tennessee’s tort law for nearly a century. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Nichols, 118 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. 1938). Accordingly, to impose a duty on a premises owner to remedy or warn against unsafe conditions created by others, a plaintiff must establish that the premises owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Until today, constructive knowledge required proof either that (1) the unsafe condition had existed long enough for a reasonable premises owner to discover it, or (2) a similar condition had occurred in the past, making it reasonably foreseeable that it would occur again. See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 765–66. The majority opinion creates a third category that has no footing in our existing precedents. It holds that premises owners also owe entrants a duty to protect against an unsafe condition on the property when it is “reasonably foreseeable that an unsafe condition [will] arise” on the premises “without proper maintenance.” The majority’s holding is contrary to Blair and other binding precedents, creates confusion for premises owners and lower courts, and exposes premises owners to expansive new liability. I respectfully dissent.

Bobby Junior Lovin v. State of Tennessee
E2024-00234-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge Zachary R. Walden

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Junior Lovin, of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial lawyers were ineffective by failing to (1) advise him on the range of punishment he could receive if convicted; (2) investigate the case and present witnesses at trial; (3) advise him so he could make an informed decision regarding a guilty plea; and (4) advise him of his right to testify, which deprived him of the ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision whether to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Ryan Reese Leath
M2024-00441-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Don R. Ash

The Defendant, Ryan Reese Leath, pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), third offense with the trial court to sentence him.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after the service of six months in confinement.  The trial court ordered that the DUI sentence be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for theft of property valued over $10,000.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.