Percy Lee Palmer v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Percy Lee Palmer, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellant concedes on appeal that the trial court's judgment is correct. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laura Johnson v. Clover Bottom Development Center, et al.
An employee of Clover Bottom Development Center appeals the summary dismissal of her action under the Tennessee Handicap Act. The employee alleged she was the victim of discrimination due to her medical limitations. The trial court dismissed the action finding the employee failed to show she sustained an adverse employment action, an essential element of her claim. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Ann (Gallahaire) Cartwright v. Robert Howard Cartwright, Sr.
This is a divorce case involving the classification and division of marital property. The parties signed a prenuptial agreement. After they married, the parties operated a cattle and farming business, which was conducted in the wife’s name only. After three years of marriage, the wife filed a petition for divorce. A trial was held primarily on issues related to property distribution. The husband argued that the cattle and farming equipment was purchased with his separate funds and therefore was his separate property under the prenuptial agreement. The husband also alleged that the wife had discarded or destroyed numerous items of his separate property. The trial court found that the cattle and farming equipment was marital property and divided it equally, and declined to find the wife responsible for the items that had been discarded or destroyed. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Johnnie Mae Hall and Theresa Diane Jones, Co-Administrators for the Estate of Billy Wayne Jones, Deceased v. Andrew Stewart, et al.
This is a wrongful death case. On appeal, Ms. Theresa Diane Jones (Ms. Jones) and Ms. Johnnie Mae Hall (Ms. Hall) contend that two erroneous admissions of evidence unfairly influenced the jury’s award of damages for the wrongful death of Mr. Billy Wayne Jones (Mr. Jones). The jury found that Mr. Jones suffered damages in the amount of $100,000 but also found that he was 49% at fault. The jury’s verdict resulted in a net recovery of $51,000. Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall request a new trial of the action they instituted against Fullen Dock & Warehouse, Inc. (Fullen Dock), whose employee ran over Mr. Jones with a bulldozer, resulting in his death. Specifically, Ms. Jones and Ms. Hall argue that the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting evidence of Mr. Jones’s prior medical history during the cross-examination of their own medical expert and of Mr. Jones’s prior guilty plea and conviction for cocaine possession six years prior to his death. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Jackson, Jr., v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Joseph Jackson, Jr., of two counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial judge imposed two twenty-year sentences to be served concurrently. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, which was dismissed by the habeas court without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he could not have been convicted for these two criminal attempts under statutory law and the underlying judgment is therefore illegal and void. Finding no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Elliott v. Randstad Employment Services, Inc., and Ward North American Insurance Company
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Terry Hambrick v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' |
Unicoi | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rodney L. Marlowe v. Town of Oliver Springs
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals a finding of non-compensability due to a lack of causation. We affirm. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tina Lynn Wyatt v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (25) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee appeals from a judgment of non- compensability. We affirm. |
Carter | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Wanda Spires v. Watson Supermarkets, Inc. and the PMA Insurance Group, their Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court dismissed the employee's complaint. On appeal, the employee contends that the evidence supports a determination that she suffered a compensable aggravation of her preexisting degenerative disc disease. The employer contends that the trial court properly found that the employee did not sustain a compensable injury and that an award of costs, including discretionary costs, is appropriate. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Haskell E. Sutton v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the Trial Court and |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
C & W Asset Acquisition, LLC, as Assignee of Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation v. Donald H. Oggs
In this suit for breach of contract, the assignee of a loan agreement alleged that the defendant was in default of the agreement and requested judgment for monies advanced, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The defendant denied owing the debt. The trial court found the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of proof and dismissed the case. Upon our determination that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court, judgment in favor of the defendant is affirmed. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re M.L.P.
B.R.P. (“Father”) was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person’s child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Patrick Nash
The appellant, John Patrick Nash, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury of six counts of sexual contact with a victim under the age of thirteen. On August 23, 2005, he pled no contest to an amended indictment charging two counts of aggravated assault and retiring the other four counts of the original indictment. He received sentences of six and four years respectively, to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of ten years as a standard offender and placed on community corrections. In October 2005, the appellant failed a drug test after testing positive for cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, and a violation of community corrections warrant was filed. Following a hearing on January 9, 2006, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the appellant was ordered to serve his underlying sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his community corrections sentence. After careful review, we find no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sonya Blake, Widow of Terry Blake v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in finding Terry Blake was an employee of Southside Baptist Church within the meaning of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of his fatal injury on April 29, 2004. In our view, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Blake was an employee, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Weakley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Charles W. Darnell D/B/A European Service Werks v. Johnny W. Brown, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action immediately following a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenyale Pirtle v. Tennessee Department of Correction
Upon review under common-law writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed disciplinary actions against Petitioner/Appellant by the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm in part and remand. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Glenda White v. Fort Sanders-Park West Medical Center
Plaintiff sued her former employer on grounds of breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherry Floyd McAlister
The defendant, Sherry Floyd McAlister, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario L. Smith
The defendant, Mario L. Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and vandalism over $1000, a Class D felony and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of nine years and two years, respectively, in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his attempted second degree murder conviction. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Michael Chubb - Concurring
I join with the majority in concluding that the State’s special instruction submitted to the jury constituted reversible error. I write separately only to note the following additional reasons for finding the instruction was error. The special instruction, in its entirety, is as follows: The court instructs you that in a sexual abuse case you may convict the defendant on the basis of the victim’s testimony alone. Corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not necessary. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Michael Chubb
The appellant, David Michael Chubb, was convicted by a jury in the Sumner County Criminal Court of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the conflict of interest when it was revealed at trial that the appellant’s trial counsel had previously represented the mother of the minor victim; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit a videotape into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion for a bill of particulars; (4) whether the trial court erred in charging a special jury instruction requested by the State; (5) whether, according to the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant; and (6) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery based upon an improper instruction, affirm the drug related convictions, and remand for a new trial on the aggravated sexual battery and attempted aggravated sexual battery charges. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen McKim
We accepted this extraordinary appeal in order to (1) determine the effect of a district attorney general’s consideration of an irrelevant factor in deciding whether to grant pretrial diversion and (2) clarify when an interlocutory appeal from a denial of pretrial diversion should be granted. In this case, the defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide following the death of his daughter after the defendant left her in his car on a hot summer day. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general’s office denied diversion, in part on the basis of its judgment that diversion of a negligent homicide “appears to be an aberration of the law.” The trial court refused to overturn the prosecutor’s decision, and the defendant applied for permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied permission, and the defendant then applied to the Court of Criminal Appeals for permission to pursue an extraordinary appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the defendant’s application. We granted review and hold that the district attorney general abused his discretion when he relied upon an irrelevant factor in denying pretrial diversion. The trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of the defendant’s application for pretrial diversion is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Melissa Ann Layman - Concurring and Dissenting
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Anderson | Supreme Court |