Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This case is before us on an interlocutory appeal limited to a single claim: Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program (the “ESA Act” or the “Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-6-2601 to -2612, under article XI, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Home Rule Amendment” or the “Amendment”).  The trial court held that Plaintiffs had standing to pursue this claim and denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss on that basis.  The court held that the ESA Act is unconstitutional under the Home Rule Amendment and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.  The trial court then sua sponte granted Defendants an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Appeals granted their application for an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to the issue of standing and the issue of the constitutionality of the ESA Act under the Home Rule Amendment.  We hold that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their Home Rule Amendment claim and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that issue.  However, we hold that the ESA Act does not implicate the Home Rule Amendment such that the Act is not rendered unconstitutional by the Amendment, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that issue.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim under the Home Rule Amendment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment dismissing that claim, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and for consideration of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. 

This case arises from the 2009 seizure of Appellant’s property and the subsequent forfeiture of same. Appellant petitioned for judicial review, and the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, we conclude that because Appellant’s petition was not filed within sixty days of receiving notice of the forfeiture, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A)(iv), the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the forfeiture. Accordingly, we affirm.

In 2013, the Petitioner, Jonathan Schelfe, pleaded guilty to ten counts of rape of a child, eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, four counts of rape, two counts of solicitation of a minor, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years of incarceration.  The Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence with regard to four of his convictions, which the trial court denied.  This court affirmed the denial.  State v. Jonathan Schelfe, No. M2018-01604-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4071981, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 29, 2019), no perm. app. filed.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights, and the habeas court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition.  We affirm the habeas court’s judgment. 

This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. Amy Higgs (“Higgs”) individually and on behalf of her deceased son, Cayson Emmit Turnmire (“Cayson”), sued David Payne (“Payne”) for the negligent maintenance of his property in relation to Cayson’s death by drowning in Payne’s swimming pool. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”), Payne’s homeowners’ insurance carrier, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) against Payne and Higgs. Tennessee Farmers argued that, due to an exclusion in Payne’s homeowners’ insurance policy against claims “arising from or in connection with the swimming pool,” it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Payne. Tennessee Farmers and Higgs filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Tennessee Farmers’ motion and denied Higgs’ motion. Higgs appeals. Citing the concurrent cause doctrine, Higgs argues that Tennessee Farmers must defend and indemnify Payne as, apart from the pool, certain non-excluded causes contributed to Cayson’s death—namely, Payne’s failure to fence or gate his property. We hold, inter alia, that each of Higgs’ alleged non-excluded concurrent causes are bound up inextricably with Cayson’s tragic drowning in Payne’s pool, an excluded cause under Payne’s insurance policy. We affirm.

Following a bench trial, Ronald Wayne Gilbert (“Petitioner”) was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years’ incarceration. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Ronald Wayne Gilbert, No. E2017-00396-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2411835, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2018). Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition following the appointment of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping based on State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). Petitioner further argues that his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping constitutes plain error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A husband and wife divorced after a long marriage.  They disputed whether certain assets were marital or separate property and whether the wife was entitled to alimony.  The trial court found that the disputed assets were the husband’s separate property.  And it awarded the wife alimony in futuro, as well as attorney’s fees as alimony in solido.  Upon our review, we find the evidence preponderates against the finding that the assets are separate property.  So, with those assets included in the marital estate, we remand for a new property division.  And, because the division of marital property is a factor in awarding alimony, we vacate the alimony awards.  On remand, the court should consider whether alimony is still appropriate under its new property division and, if so, the type, amount, and duration of the award. 

The Defendant, James Stanley Radzvilowicz, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to aggravated assault and was sentenced by the trial court to four years, six months, with eight months in confinement before release on supervised probation.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for either judicial diversion or, in the alternative, full probation.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Appellee, a Sergeant with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department, sought judicial review of the Civil Service Board’s affirmance of the Sheriff Department’s decision to terminate her employment. On its finding that the Board failed to consider all relevant evidence presented, the trial court exercised its discretion to remand the case to the Board for rehearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). Appellant, Madison County, Tennessee, filed the instant appeal. We conclude that the trial court’s remand order is not a final, appealable order under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). As such, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

I respectfully disagree that the interests of justice are best served by granting a waiver of Petitioner’s untimely notice of appeal in this case. The notice of appeal, although only tardy by seven days, was nonetheless untimely. Petitioner has not sought waiver and offers no reason for such a break. Even after having an opportunity to reply to the State’s argument that this Court should dismiss the Petitioner’s untimely appeal, the Petitioner did not. There is simply no basis upon which this Court may find that the “interests of justice” merit a waiver of the untimely filed notice of appeal. See State v. Rockwell, 280 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (“If this [C]ourt were to summarily grant a waiver whenever confronted with untimely notices, the thirty-day requirement of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) would be rendered a legal fiction.”). Accordingly, I would find that the appeal should be dismissed.

In this seizure and forfeiture action, we do not reach the substantive issues because the order granting the forfeiture does not comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 for entry of judgments. Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 to take jurisdiction of the appeal for the limited purpose of instructing the trial court to enter an order on remand that not only complies with Rule 58, but also makes sufficient findings to enable this Court to make a meaningful review as required under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Vacated and remanded.

The petitioner, David Frazier, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of rape of a child, arguing that the trial court’s order denying habeas corpus relief does not contain sufficient factual and legal findings to facilitate appellate review. Discerning no error, we affirm.