Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

This is a direct appeal in a capital case.  The defendant had one prior trial.  In the second trial, a Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of robbery, and aggravated robbery.  He was sentenced to death plus a consecutive eighteen years of incarceration.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentence.  We now consider the appeal on automatic review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1).  We hold the following: (1) based on sequential jury instructions given in the first trial, the first jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the felony murder count, so double jeopardy principles did not bar retrial on the felony murder count; (2) alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial did not trigger double jeopardy protections anddid not bar retrial of the defendant; (3) because the State did not have a duty to preserve the defendant’s vehicle, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence from the vehicle; (4) the trial court did not err under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for rape and assault of the victim; and (5) the trial court did not err under Rule 404(b) in admitting evidence of the defendant’s escape attempts and corroborating evidence of homemade shanks in his cell.  We hold further that imposition of the death penalty is not arbitrary, given the circumstances of the crime; that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that the State proved one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt; that the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that the aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  As to the remaining issues raised by the defendant, we agree with the conclusions of the Court of Criminal Appeals and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of the intermediate court’s decision.  We affirm the convictions and the sentence.

A decedent’s son brought an action for unlawful detainer against the decedent’s widow in general sessions court in an effort to take possession of property left to the son in the decedent’s will. After the general sessions court dismissed the son’s case, he requested a de novo appeal in circuit court. The son prevailed in the circuit court proceeding, and the widow appealed. Because the widow did not occupy the property pursuant to a landlord-tenant contract, the son does not have a cause of action for unlawful detainer. We, therefore, conclude that the circuit court erred in awarding possession of the property to the son. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Russell Wheeler, Jr., of attempted aggravated statutory rape, attempted solicitation of a minor, and disorderly conduct. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his attempted aggravated statutory rape and attempted solicitation of a minor convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions and in ordering a sentence of confinement without requiring a psychosexual evaluation or properly considering the appropriate factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated statutory rape and disorderly conduct. However, we vacate the defendant’s conviction for attempted solicitation of a minor because the defendant was convicted of a crime which does not exist. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

The trial court declined to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff, NuLife Ventures, LLC (“NuLife”), regarding its claims that the defendant, AVACEN, Inc., f/k/a AVACEN Medical, Inc. (“AVACEN”), had been competing with NuLife and soliciting NuLife’s affiliated sellers to do the same in violation of the parties’ written agreements. NuLife has appealed. Determining that NuLife demonstrated sufficient evidence of a threat of irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Saint Thomas Health alleging negligence per se and invasion of privacy through the unauthorized access and disclosure of her confidential medical records relating to the birth of her child at Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“Midtown Hospital”) in violation of Tennessee’s Patient’s Privacy Protection Act. Saint Thomas Health responded by filing a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 for failure to plead facts stating a claim with particularity. Specifically, it argued the claims should be dismissed because the complaint failed to address how Saint Thomas Health could be held liable for unauthorized access and use of the plaintiff’s medical information from a separate and distinct entity, Midtown Hospital, when the complaint did not allege that an employee or agent of Saint Thomas Medical engaged in such conduct. Alternatively, relying on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), Saint Thomas Health claimed the action was barred by the statute of limitations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The trial court granted the motion on both grounds and dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. In her appellate brief, Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court’s application of the statute of limitations but ignores the trial court’s dismissal of her claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 provides that the appellant’s brief shall contain “[a] statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues presented for review with appropriate references to the record” as well as “an argument” setting forth the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented. Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(6) and (7). Additionally, Rule 6(a)(4) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals requires the appellant provide a written argument in regard to each issue on appeal that includes “[a] statement of each determinative fact relied upon with citation to the record where evidence of such fact may be found.” A party’s failure to comply with these rules “waives the issues for review.” Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with these rules by, inter alia, failing to set forth an argument or facts relevant to the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01, which was an independent basis for dismissal. As a consequence, the issue is waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an action regarding life insurance proceeds. As part of a permanent parenting plan, both parents were to insure their respective lives for $300,000 until the child support obligation was completed, with the children named as the sole beneficiaries to the policies and the other parent named as trustee for the benefit of the children. The Trial Court granted summary judgment finding that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance policy but that they were only entitled to the portion of the proceeds equivalent to the remaining child support obligation. With the defendant’s concession on appeal that the children had a vested interest in the life insurance proceeds, that a constructive trust was appropriate, and that the most recent permanent parenting plan was controlling, the only issues before this Court involved the amount of life insurance proceeds to which the children were entitled and attorney’s fees. We modify the amount of the Trial Court’s judgment and hold that the children are entitled to the entire $300,000 life insurance proceeds per the agreed permanent parenting plan. We affirm the Trial Court’s denial of attorney’s fees. Additionally, we deny the mother’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant, Andre Bowen, and his co-defendant, Anthony Olivo, for two counts of first-degree, felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) and attempted especially aggravated robbery (Count 3). The grand jury also indicted the defendant for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm  by a convicted felon (Counts 4 and 5). After a joint trial, the jury acquitted the defendant on Count 1 but found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first-degree, felony murder in Count 2, attempted especially aggravated robbery in Count 3, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in Counts 4 and 5, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of seventy-two years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and argues the trial court erred in sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court’s order establishing a permanent parenting plan on solely procedural grounds. We affirm the decision of the trial court and award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this frivolous appeal.

Petitioner, Larry Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “ensure the enforcement of a plea agreement promising concurrent service of Petitioner’s state and federal sentences.” Upon review, we conclude that the petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations applicable to post-conviction proceedings. However, because we are unable to determine from the record whether due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand the case to the
post-conviction court for a determination of whether due process tolling applies.

The Appellant, Tandy Tomlin, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury of eight counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation to commit rape of a child, and one count of solicitation to commit aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged two of the rape of a child convictions and sentenced the Appellant to consecutive sentences of thirty years for each rape of a child conviction, ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction, ten years for the solicitation of rape of a child conviction, and five years for the solicitation of aggravated sexual battery conviction, for a total effective sentence of 245 years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court erred in sentencing, and that his right to a fair trial was violated when he was escorted into the courtroom through a security door by a uniformed officer in view of the jury pool. Upon review, we conclude that the State adduced insufficient evidence to sustain the Appellant’s conviction of rape of a child in count 7 and reduce the conviction to aggravated sexual battery with an accompanying sentence of ten years to be served consecutively to the remaining sentences. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

The defendant, Nicholas Grassia, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, to withdraw his guilty pleas to charges of aggravated kidnapping and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, arguing that the pleas were the product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the defendant failed to establish manifest injustice requiring that he be allowed to withdraw his pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.