Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services denied an application for adoption assistance payments because the adoptive children did not meet federal eligibility criteria.  The adoptive family petitioned for judicial review.  And the chancery court reversed.  We conclude that the administrative agency’s decision was based on an erroneous interpretation of federal law.  So we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

This appeal arises from a premises liability action filed by Bonnie S. Bodine (“Plaintiff”) against an incorrect defendant. After learning that she had sued the wrong defendant, Plaintiff waited over four months to file a “Motion to Correct Misnomer,” requesting that she be permitted to “replace” the correct defendant in the action. This motion was not heard until five months later, after the defendant asked the trial court to place the case on the docket for both Plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to correct misnomer and subsequent motion to alter or amend, citing Plaintiff’s “extreme lack of due diligence.” Plaintiff appeals. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

The Defendant, Stephen Jacob McKinney, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eightyear sentence with the method and manner of service to be left to the trial court’s determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant was ineligible for probation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 35-303(a), which includes vehicular homicide by intoxication as one of the conviction offenses for which probation is not available. The trial court, therefore, sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction at thirty percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not construing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a) in conjunction with Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-213(b)(2)(B), which provides that a defendant convicted of a first offense vehicular homicide by intoxication must serve a mandatory minimum sentence of forty-eight hours of incarceration before release from confinement on probation. The Defendant contends that the statutes are not in conflict if the release from confinement in the vehicular homicide statute is interpreted as release on parole. Based on our review, we conclude that the clearly worded intent of the legislature, as expressed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a), was to remove vehicular homicide by intoxication as an offense for which probation is available. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves claims against the State of Tennessee asserted by a husband and wife. The claimant husband suffered injuries when his car collided with a Tennessee state vehicle parked in the roadway. He gave written notice of his claim to the Tennessee Division of Claims and Risk Management. The Division did not resolve it, so the Division transferred the claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission. The husband and wife then filed a complaint with the Claims Commission. The complaint contained a loss of consortium claim by the wife that was not in the written notice the husband gave to the Division of Claims and Risk Management. The Claims Commission complaint was filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss the wife’s loss of consortium claim as time-barred because she did not give the Division of Claims and Risk Management written notice of her claim within the limitations period. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The claimants appeal, relying on the holding in Hunter v. State, No. 01-A-01-9210-BC00425, 1993 WL 133240 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1993), that a complaint filed with the Claims Commission within the statute of limitations fulfills the requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-402(a)(1) that claimants give timely written notice of their claim against the State to the Division of Claims and Risk Management. We reject this argument, overrule Hunter v. State, and affirm the Claims Commission’s dismissal of the wife’s claim for loss of consortium.

An employee sought a reasonable accommodation from her employer when she began experiencing increased difficulties with her debilitating rheumatoid arthritis. The employer was unable to provide a reasonable accommodation and, after concluding that the employee’s disability rendered her physically unable to perform the essential functions of her job, the employer removed the employee from her position and placed her on paid sick leave. The employee then resigned and sued the employer for discriminatory discharge under the Tennessee Disability Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer after determining that the employee was not qualified for the position and that the employee did not suffer an adverse employment action due to her voluntary resignation. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bradley Dwight Bowen, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s revocation of his effective nine-year split confinement sentence for convictions for child neglect and possession of methamphetamine. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, a former employee contends that there existed good cause as to why he resigned from his employment such that he should be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. The Commissioner’s Designee found that no good cause existed as to why the employee terminated his employment and therefore determined that he was not entitled to benefits. The employee then filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court thereafter affirmed the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision. On appeal, we conclude that there is substantial and material evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, for which he is serving a twelve-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 102(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns an issue of whether a modular home violates a subdivision’s restrictive covenants. Katie Price (“Price”) wanted to place a modular home on her property in Fort Loudon Estates subdivision. Cathy McKeehan (“McKeehan”), a longtime resident of Fort Loudon Estates, sued Price in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”). McKeehan alleged that Price’s modular home violated a subdivision restriction against temporary structures. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Price. McKeehan appeals. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Price’s home is not a temporary structure. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Price’s modular home is not prohibited by the subdivision’s restrictions. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Jeremy Jones, Petitioner, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. State v. Jeremy Jones, No. W2015-01528-CCQA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 7654954 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2017). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s lack of communication and trial strategy. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because appellant did not timely file a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B recusal appeal and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.