State of Tennessee v. Kiara Tashawn King
The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft of property over five hundred dollars. The trial court imposed concurrent, Range I sentences of five years and one year and six months, respectively, all to be served on probation. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences and by denying her application for judicial diversion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the application for permission to appeal in order to clarify the appropriate standard of appellate review for the grant or denial of judicial diversion. We hold that when the trial court places on the record its considerations for the grant or denial of judicial diversion, the determination should be given a presumption of reasonableness on appeal and reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In the absence of appropriate considerations on the record, the appellate court should either remand for reconsideration or perform a de novo review. After our own de novo review of this record, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to judicial diversion. |
Marshall | ||
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Leon Knowles
The Defendant, Joseph Leon Knowles, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to attempt to commit aggravated child abuse of a child under six years old, a Class B felony, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by failing to apply certain mitigating factors relative to remorse, assisting the police, and his not having a substantial intent to violate the law and by denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Duclair
Appellant, Steve Duclair, was named in a presentment by the Sullivan County Grand Jury in September of 2008 for two counts of the sale of one-half a gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and two counts of the delivery of one-half a gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. The grand jury later named Appellant in a second presentment charging Appellant for one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and one count of delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine, two counts of delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine, one count of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, and one count of delivering one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court merged the convictions for the sale of cocaine with the convictions for the delivery of cocaine. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifteen years at 100 percent. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court committed error while dismissing the alternate juror at the conclusion of the trial; (3) whether the trial court committed error by asking Appellant where he was from during voir dire; (4) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury; (5) whether Appellant’s sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment; (6) whether the assistant district attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (7) whether the Drug-Free School Zone Act is unconstitutional. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; the trial court properly instructed the jury; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant; the Drug-Free School Zone Act is not unconstitutional; the trial court did not violate Appellant’s right from self-incrimination during voir dire; the trial court did not err in dismissing the alternate juror; and the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Coffey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Johnny Coffey, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly petition the trial court for a State-funded psychiatric expert to assist the defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Norma Simpson, Ind. and next of kin of J. W. Simpson v. Faye Fowler
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 31-1-105 to set aside certain transfers by decedent to his long-term companion, which transfers were allegedly made with intent to deny his surviving spouse of her share of his estate. From the totality of the circumstances, and applying the factors outlined by this Court in Finley v. Finley, 726 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s award of $8,500.00 in insurance proceeds to the surviving spouse for decedent’s funeral costs, but that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s award of a $28,000.00 bank account to the surviving spouse. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda Jan Metzinger v. Ronald Wayne Metzinger
This appeal involves the classification and division of Husband’s $66,000.00 personal injury settlement in a divorce proceeding. The trial court classified the settlement as marital property, it deducted $13,400.00 for what it found to be “legitimate expense[s] of the marriage” paid by Husband, and it awarded Wife one-half of the balance, or $26,300.00. We reverse the trial court’s award to Wife. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keenan D. Singletary
Keenan D. Singletary (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years’ incarceration and ordered the Defendant to pay $174 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mindy Dodd v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Mindy S. Dodd, appeals the denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, she contends that she presented newly discovered evidence that may have affected the outcome of her trial and that the error coram nobis court erred in denying her petition. Because the petition was not filed within the statutory limitations period, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rashe Moore v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a written motion requesting jury instructions on lesser-included offenses and that this failure resulted in prejudice because it precluded appellate review of the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on any lesser-included offenses. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to trial counsel’s failure to file a written motion requesting an instruction on lesser-included offenses of especially aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carroll Marie Stovall, et al. v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, et al.
Appellant medical providers appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint for failure to strictly comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122(d)(4). Because we conclude that the trial court had good cause to grant an extension, within which to file a certificate of good faith, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Austin, et al v. Jacob Wilds, Jr., et al
Kathy Austin, Vickie Shipley, and Sherry Foshie (“Plaintiffs”) sued their brothers, Jacob Wilds, Jr. and James Wilds (“Defendants”), seeking to have certain deeds from their mother set aside due to alleged undue influence and/or duress. After a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Greene County (“Trial Court”) entered its order rendering judgment in favor of Defendants after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to prove the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to show that the subject deeds were procured through undue influence. Plaintiffs appeal. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Rashe Moore v. State of Tennessee-Concurring In Part, Dissenting In Part
I concur with the majority opinion except for one issue. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnapping constitutes reversible error in this post-conviction case. Such a failure to charge a lesser-included offense is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when no reasonable jury would have convicted the petitioner of the lesser-included offense. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 126 (Tenn. 2008). |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Adams
The Defendant, Danny Adams, was convicted by a jury of simple assault. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for that conviction, including an argument therein of inconsistent verdicts. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, and although the evidence is sufficient, we must reverse the Defendant’s conviction because an incorrect mental state was included in the jury charge. Moreover, we cannot deem the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessica Root
The Defendant, Jessica Root, appeals the trial court’s nine-year sentence to her open plea of guilt to vehicular homicide by intoxication, contending (1) that the trial court failed to consider applicable mitigating factors and a sentencing practices report; (2) that she should have received the minimum sentence; and (3) that the trial court improperly denied all forms of alternative sentencing. Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
RCK Joint Venture, (A Joint Venture Comprised of River Road Construction, LLC, Creative Homes, LLC and Keystone Homes of TN, INC.) v. Garrison Cove Homeowners Association, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation
The only issue in this appeal is whether two property owners in a subdivision are entitled to an award of attorney fees for prevailing in a third-party action brought against them by the homeowners association to enforce restrictive covenants. The association argued that the property owners were not entitled to attorney fees because they did not prevail on every issue that came up during litigation, because the attorney fee provision in the restrictive covenants could be read to mean that no such award could be made if additional damages were not also awarded, and because they did not personally pay their own attorney fees. The trial court agreed with those arguments and denied the motion for attorney fees. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for a determination of the amount of the attorney fee award. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
RCK Joint Venture, (A Joint Venture Comprised of River Road Construction, LLC, Creative Homes, LLC and Keystone Homes of TN, INC.) v. Garrison Cove Homeowners Association, A Tennessee Nonprofit Corporation - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority. I do not believe that the fact that fees are available to the Pattons requires that they be awarded under the particular facts and circumstances of this case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Hutcherson v. Wallace Jackson Hutcherson
This is a contract interpretation case involving the proper apportionment of proceeds from the sale of several properties owned by the parties as tenants in common. When Husband and Wife divorced in 2005, a marital dissolution agreement was incorporated into their Final Decree of Divorce. In pertinent part, the agreement required the parties to sell six properties and split the proceeds therefrom. The agreement listed each of the properties with a dollar amount beside it. The agreement provided that Wife could be compelled to accept an offer for a particular property so long as her share of the proceeds equaled the dollar amount listed with that property in the agreement. The sum of the amounts listed with the properties at issue was $565,800. Real estate values declined substantially after the agreement was entered, and the properties were finally sold together for $322,287.71 in 2012. Following the sale Husband filed a motion seeking an equal division of the sale proceeds. Wife answered, insisting that the agreement entitled her to $565,800 and that she was therefore entitled to all of the sale proceeds, less Husband’s expenses related to the properties. During a bench trial, the court found the agreement ambiguous and therefore considered parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Based on its findings, the trial court determined that the parties intended to split the sale proceeds equally. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the agreement entitled Husband to reimbursement for one-half of his expenses on the properties, which the parties stipulated to be $156,270.48. In its final accounting, the trial court awarded $234,834.09 to Husband and $87,453.62 to Wife. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven R. Bryson
The Defendant-Appellant, Steven R. Bryson, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2011). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bryson argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court committed plain error in its jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Jay Davis
The Defendant, Devin Jay Davis, was convicted by a Chester County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse and neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated child abuse and neglect, the jury’s verdicts in count one and count two are fatally inconsistent, and his convictions violate double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cassidy Aragon v. Reynaldo Aragon
This post-divorce case concerns parental relocation. Father sought to relocate to Arizona, citing family ties and increased career opportunities. The parties agreed that Father spent substantially more time with the child than Mother; however, Mother objected to the relocation, arguing that the move had no reasonable purpose. The trial court agreed with Mother and entered a parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent. Because the trial court made no best interest finding regarding either the proposed relocation, or the parenting plan, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and Remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Michael James Little, Jr. v. Rhonda G. Little
The trial court determined that no material and substantial change in circumstance had occurred and denied Father’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stevie R. Dickson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Stevie Dickson, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Petitioner entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Osmond Hines v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jason Osmond Hines, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief for his conviction of second-degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to properly impeach the State’s witnesses and adequately present a theory of self-defense. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry R. Shouse
Appellee, Jerry R. Shouse, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury with one count of driving under the influence and one count of violation of the open container law. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the warrantless seizure was arbitrary and oppressive. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress by written order. The State filed a notice of appeal on the same day that the order of nolle prosequi was entered. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine based on the recent decision of State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), the trial court properly granted the motion to suppress where the actions of the officer were not authorized under any exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cordell Remont Vaughn
A Perry County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, charging him with first degree murder. After Defendant’s first trial, this court reversed a jury’s verdict that found Defendant guilty of first degree murder. State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 586-87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Pursuant to a second jury trial, Defendant was again found guilty of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for new trial. The State filed a Rule 10 application for an extraordinary appeal with this court, which was granted. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s granting of a new trial. State v. Vaughn, No. M2011-00067-CCA-R10-CD, 2012 WL 1484191 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 25, 2012) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012). On May 31, 2013, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced Defendant again to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was not sufficient to support his first degree murder conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the toxicology report; and (3) whether his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction of first degree murder; we reverse the sentence of life without possibility of parole and remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of first degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals |