W & H LLC, et al v. Community Bank N.A. v. Willie Nelson
The trial court entered a final judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of the appellee. Appellants appealed. Due to deficiencies in the appellants' brief to this Court, we conclude that they have waived their issues on appeal. The appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Renee Pembroke (Cooley) v. Christopher Eugene Cooley
This appeal concerns a post-divorce modification of alimony. During the underlying divorce proceedings, the parties executed a marital dissolution agreement providing that the husband would make payments to the wife of $8,000 per month in transitional alimony for a period of five years followed by payments of $7,500 per month in alimony in futuro for a period of five years. The agreement provided that the alimony in futuro payments could be modified by either party ―upon a showing of a material, unanticipated change in circumstances.‖ The agreement was incorporated into the trial court‘s final decree of divorce entered in January 2005. In April 2014, the wife filed a petition seeking to increase and extend the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. After a trial, the Shelby County Circuit Court found a change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony and ordered that the husband continue to pay alimony in futuro of $6,200 per month beginning in January 2015 and continuing for a period of six years or until his retirement, whichever occurred later. The trial court also awarded the wife $30,000 as alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. On appeal, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court‘s finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances. We therefore reverse the trial court‘s modification of the husband‘s alimony in futuro obligation. Additionally, we reverse the trial court‘s award of alimony in solido for attorney‘s fees. This matter is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phillip Serpas
Appellant, Phillip Serpas, entered guilty pleas to two counts of unlawfully obtaining a prescription for controlled substances by fraud, Class D felonies, and one count of conspiracy to obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years each for the Class D felonies and one year for the Class E felony. The trial court held a hearing on the issue of alternative sentencing and ordered appellant to serve his effective two-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Marie Anderson Young
The trial court denied a personal representative's fee request after concluding that the request did not comply with a local rule setting a personal representative's fee as a percentage of the value of the estate. We reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Appellant's fee request “in light of all the relevant circumstances.” In re Estate of Schorn, No. E2013-02245-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1778292, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2015). |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
In re M.A.P. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C.P. (Mother) with respect to her three minor children, ages twenty-two months to six years at the time of trial. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds. The court found the same quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that termination of Mother‟s rights is in the children's best interest. Mother appeals. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In re Michael B.M., et al.
This action concerns a petition for custody filed by the maternal grandmother of three minor children. The juvenile court denied the petition, and the circuit court affirmed the denial on appeal following a de novo hearing. The maternal grandmother now appeals to this court. We dismiss the appeal in light of the adoption of the children during the pendency of this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
National Coal, LLC v. Brent Galloway
This action concerns a petition to set aside a tax sale as void for lack of notice to the original property owner. The purchaser of the property filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the original owner was not entitled to notice, that the petitioner received actual notice as the current owner, and that the petition was untimely. The petitioner countered with a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner received actual notice of the sale and that the time for filing such actions had passed. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnthan Tyler Ryan Tyree
In September 24, 2014, the Marshall County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Johnthan Tyler Ryan Tyree, for two counts of aggravated assault involving the use of a deadly weapon. The Defendant entered a best interest guilty plea to the charged offenses with sentencing reserved. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to four years and nine months in the Department of Correction for each count. The trial court merged Count 2 into Count 1, finding the two offenses arose from a single incident.The sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a Rutherford County sentence arising from criminal offenses committed while the Defendant was released on bail in this case. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following our review, we find no error in sentencing and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Coleman v. State of Tennessee
According to the allegations of the pro se post-conviction petition, the Petitioner, Timothy Coleman, pleaded guilty to initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and received a nine-year sentence. He alleged that the date of the judgment was March 7, 2014, and that no appeal was filed. He filed a post-conviction petition on July 6, 2015, alleging that due process required tolling of the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations due to his mental incompetency. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the case on the basis of the statute of limitations. He also contends that newly discovered evidence may establish his actual innocence of the offense. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Carrington H. et al.
We granted review in this case to decide (1) whether an indigent parent’s right to appointed counsel in a parental termination proceeding includes the right to challenge an order terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals must review any ground the trial court relied on to terminate parental rights when a parent fails to raise all grounds for termination on appeal. We hold that parents are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings. Nevertheless, this constitutional mandate does not require us to adopt a procedure by which parents may collaterally attack orders terminating parental rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we hold that appellate courts must review a trial court’s findings regarding all grounds for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests, even if a parent fails to challenge these findings on appeal. Having reviewed the record on appeal in accordance with these holdings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
In re Carrington H. et al - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
The Court has decided that an indigent parent has the right to assistance of counsel—but not the right to effective assistance of counsel—in a parental termination proceeding. I believe that the vast majority of lawyers provide competent representation as required by our Rules of Professional Conduct. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPCs 1.1 & 1.3. But in those rare situations where a lawyer makes a mistake or fails to do his or her duty to such an extent that the termination proceeding is not fundamentally fair, I favor providing the parent with an opportunity to seek relief. In my view, providing counsel for an indigent parent but not requiring counsel to render effective representation is an empty gesture. |
Maury | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Daetrus Pilate
Defendant, Daetrus Pilate, appeals his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and incest and also appeals his effective sentence of forty-nine years. Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by permitting the State to present evidence that violated the rules of discovery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting a prior consistent statement of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Defendant's arrest and giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) cumulative error requires reversal of the convictions; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (6) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John N. Moffitt
Defendant, John N. Moffitt, was convicted of reckless aggravated assault and sentenced to four years' incarceration to be served at 30 percent release eligibility. Defendant was also ordered to pay restitution and a $2,500 fine. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that his conduct must have caused serious bodily injury; that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's order of restitution; and that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range. Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence. However, we reduce the amount of restitution and remand this case to the trial court to determine Defendant's ability to pay restitution. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cornelius Banks
Defendant, Cornelius Banks, appeals his Shelby County convictions for one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one merged count of aggravated rape, one merged count of aggravated sexual battery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of 240 years. Defendant argues (1) that the indictment for one of the counts of aggravated rape was fatally defective and should be dismissed; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his kidnapping convictions violated double jeopardy; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider one of the witnesses as an accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated; and (4) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's sentences to be served consecutively. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick D. Deberry v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Frederick D. Deberry, appeals as of right from the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled (1) because he was in federal custody until 2014 and lacked access to Tennessee legal materials and (2) because his trial counsel and the trial court clerk failed to advise him about post-conviciton procedures after he inquired about such information. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Burley Alberts
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, John Burley Alberts, was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-522, and received an effective sentence of one hundred years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the Defendant’s car, and (2) that evidence obtained from a laptop computer recovered from his car should have been suppressed because officers did not acquire a search warrant prior to performing a forensic analysis of the computer. Because we conclude that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and that the Defendant has waived review of the second issue, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sylvia Folger v. Robert Folger
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sylvia Folger (“Wife”) sued Robert Folger (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, among other things, awarded Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, Wife raises a number of issues. Because of Wife's pronounced economic disadvantage relative to Husband, we modify the judgment of the Trial Court to increase the amount of Wife's transitional alimony, and remand this case for the Trial Court to award Wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido as well as her reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Nolan Excell Pippen, was convicted of public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor; and simple possession of marijuana, third or subsequent offense, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-310, -418. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for public intoxication; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana found in his pocket during a search incident to his arrest for public intoxication. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication and that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nolan Excell Pippen - concurring and dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for public intoxication as indicted, but I would uphold his conviction for simple possession of marijuana. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greg Layman v. Aaron Acor et al.
This action was originally filed in general sessions court against three defendants and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. Two of the co-defendants appealed to circuit court. The remaining co-defendant successfully sought to have the general sessions judgment set aside for insufficient service of process. Thereafter, the general sessions court transferred the claim against the one remaining co-defendant to circuit court to be consolidated with the pending appeal filed by the other co-defendants. The plaintiff subsequently voluntarily dismissed the action. One co-defendant filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court should not have allowed the plaintiff to voluntarily nonsuit the action. The circuit court denied the motion, and the co-defendant timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Mimi Hiatt v. Kevin L. Hiatt
This appeal concerns post-divorce matters. Mimi Hiatt (“Wife”) and Kevin L. Hiatt (“Husband”) divorced. Wife some years later filed a motion to modify the final decree of divorce in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to increase Husband’s child support and alimony obligations. Husband, in turn, filed a motion to recover claimed overpayments he made on the marital residence because Wife had transferred it to a trust. The Trial Court found, among other things, that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and declined to increase her spousal support for that reason. The Trial Court also ruled that Wife’s divestment of the marital residence constituted a “sale” under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“the MDA”) and awarded a judgment to Husband for payments he made on the mortgage after Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to the trust. Wife appeals to this Court. We hold that Wife’s transfer of the marital residence to a trust constituted a sale per the MDA, and we affirm the Trial Court in its award to Husband for overpayment. However, we find that Wife proved a substantial and material change in circumstances, and we remand for the Trial Court to determine an increase in Wife’s alimony in light of this change and all relevant factors. We find further that the Trial Court erred in declining to award Wife her attorney’s fees relative to alimony. As a final matter, we award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal related to the alimony issue, and remand for the Trial Court to determine Wife’s reasonable attorney’s fees related to the alimony issue on appeal. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, in part, and, reversed, in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason
A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kenny Thomason, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, claiming that the State failed to prove premeditation or that he possessed the weapon that killed the victim; instead, he asserts that the victim possessed the weapon and that she was killed during a struggle. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Thomason - dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority view that the evidence supports a verdict of first degree premeditated murder. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clifford Eric Marsh
The Defendant, Clifford Eric Marsh, pleaded guilty to fourth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504 (2012). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement at 75% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dale Qualls
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the election of offenses doctrine, articulated in Burlison v. State, 501 S.W.2d 801 (Tenn. 1973), and reaffirmed in State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993), requires the prosecution to identify a single incident of sexual battery in cases, such as this one, where the child victim testifies to repeated incidents of sexual contact occurring over a substantial period of time but does not furnish any specific details, dates, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual incidents of sexual battery. We hold, as have courts in other jurisdictions, that where a prosecution is based on such nonspecific or “generic” evidence, requiring the prosecution to elect a single specific incident is not possible. However, to prevent infringement upon the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict, the trial court must give a modified unanimity instruction which informs the jury that it must unanimously agree the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim in order to convict the defendant. Although the trial court did not have the benefit of this decision and therefore did not provide the modified unanimity instruction to the jury in this case, we conclude, based on the record in this appeal, that the omission of this instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment vacating the defendant’s convictions of sexual battery by an authority figure and reinstate the trial court’s judgment approving the jury’s verdict. |
Hardeman | Supreme Court |