In re Robert Lee Vogel, BPR #023374
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Supreme Court | ||
Charles E. Webster, et ux. v. The Estate of P. H. Dorris, et al.
Plaintiffs purchased a home from two of the Defendants; one defendant was the contractor whose construction company built the home and the other was his wife, who had marketed the home for sale. Before and after the closing, Plaintiffs identified several defects which they desired to have corrected; some defects were remedied while others were not. Plaintiffs brought suit and, following trial, the court awarded judgment for $2,000 in favor of Plaintiffs against the construction company for breach of contract and judgment for $40,184 against the estate of the contractor and the construction company for breach of warranty; the court held that the contractor’s wife was not liable for either judgment in her individual capacity. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting that contractor’s wife was liable as partner or joint venturer with the other Defendants for breach of contract and implied warranty of workmanship and that the court erred in its award of damages and in failing to award prejudgment interest. We modify and affirm the judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Mamie D. Fuller v. Joan C. Banks, et al.
This is a premises liability case. Appellant had rented property from Appellees for approximately one year when Appellant was injured as a result of a fall when the railing along the stairs of the premises allegedly collapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees based upon its conclusion that Appellees had negated the essential element of Appellant's claim that, in order for Appellees to have been negligent in the accident, any defect in the stairs or supporting structure must have existed at the time of the execution of the lease. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Janet Wynn Snyder v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A.
This case involves the trial court's award of litigation costs, inclusive of attorney's fees, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) (Supp. 2015), upon granting the defendant's Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant in the amount of $10,000, the statutory maximum, against the plaintiff and her surety. The plaintiff appeals the portion of the ruling holding the surety liable for the $10,000 judgment of litigation costs in the event the principal fails to satisfy the judgment. Having determined that the surety's cost bond explicitly referred to “costs” as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-120 (2009), rather than as defined in subsection -119(c), we reverse the trial court's judgment as to the surety. We affirm the trial court's judgment against the principal and remand for enforcement of that judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis Orlando Harmon
Appellant, Louis Orlando Harmon, stands convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; possession of tools used to interfere with anti-theft security devices; and driving while his license was suspended. He was sentenced to six years for the theft of property offense, to a consecutive term of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of tools offense, and to a concurrent term of six months for the driving offense. On appeal, he argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing an Academy Sports and Outdoors loss prevention officer to testify about the identification of appellant and his vehicle by other employees of the store. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brett Patterson v. State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee (“the State”) appeals the decision of the Tennessee Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”) awarding Brett Patterson (“Patterson”) $439.10 for arts-and-crafts supplies that Patterson was required either to mail out of the prison or donate pursuant to a policy of the Turney Center Industrial Complex (“Turney Center”) where Patterson is an inmate. We find and hold that the Claims Commission does not have jurisdiction over intentional torts, and as no negligence was alleged or shown, the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction over this case. We, therefore, vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and dismiss this case. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Dwayne Williams v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Dwayne Williams, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eight years in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, and following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to file a motion to suppress and failed to investigate a potential plea offer; and (3) he was denied a full and fair hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his first counsel. After our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andra Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andra Taylor, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon, for which he is serving an effective fourteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel in the conviction proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Thomas
The defendant, Mario Thomas, appeals the sentences imposed for his guilty pleas to the offenses of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, and possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence. The defendant's sole allegation of error is that the trial court should not have ordered his convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery to run consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Blankenship Bonding Company v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, appeals the judgment of the Henderson County Circuit Court forfeiting a $3,000 bail bond in the case of criminal defendant Edward Hunt. On appeal, appellant argues that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Code sections 40-11-139(c) and 40-11-203(a). Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Jackson v. Barry Walker
This appeal involves an allegedly unsafe building in the City of Jackson. After a hearing, the City of Jackson’s environmental court ordered the property owner to demolish the building. The property owner appealed to circuit court. After another hearing, the circuit court declared the property a public nuisance and also ordered it demolished. The property owner appeals. He argues that the City of Jackson failed to follow the correct procedures under the city code, and therefore, he should not be required to demolish the structure. Discerning no merit in this assertion, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Katarina R. Long
The appellant, Katarina R. Long, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was granted judicial diversion with the requirement that she complete three years of probation and pay $20,000 restitution. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the amount of restitution when it was clear that she did not have the ability to pay it. Because we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeal, we must dismiss it. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Lee Carnett v. PNC Bank, NA
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant-bank to halt foreclosure proceedings. When the bank did not answer the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court denied the motion for default judgment and, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint. We affirm the denial of plaintiff‟s motion for default judgment but vacate the dismissal of his complaint. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Eric Tidwell v. Alicia Ann Tidwell
This appeal results from a divorce proceeding between Christopher Eric Tidwell (“Father”) and Alicia Ann Tidwell (“Mother”). On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income for child support purposes, the trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony to Mother, and the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mother. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us, we affirm the trial court’s determination of Mother’s income, vacate a portion of the awarded rehabilitative alimony, and modify the award of attorney’s fees. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacey Green
The Defendant, Stacey Green, appeals from his convictions for aggravated robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence relating to a victim’s pretrial identification of the Defendant in a photographic lineup and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kyle Kernan v. Beverly J. Kernan Nabors et al.
Post-divorce, a guardian was appointed for two minor children while their mother received treatment for substance abuse. The guardian, the half-brother of the minors, sought child support from both parents. The guardian alleges, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by adjusting for tax deductions before calculating the mother's gross income for child support due and by allowing her credit for support in kind and purchases of necessities. We affirm the trial court's findings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Randy L. Fielder v. Southern Health Partners et al.
The plaintiff filed the instant action regarding injuries he allegedly received while in the custody of the Robertson County Detention Center. The trial court dismissed the action sua sponte based on multiple grounds, including untimeliness pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking alteration of the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the request by a handwritten notation supplied on the face of the motion. The plaintiff appealed. Having determined that there is no valid, final order in this matter, we conclude that the appeal must be dismissed due to this Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Cecilia Thompson v. Kroger Limited Partnership I
An employee sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder. She was able to return to work in a transitional modified job and settled her claim within the one and one-half times impairment cap. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer offered her a permanent job with accommodations for her medical restrictions. The employee did not accept the position and was terminated. She sought reconsideration of her settlement. The trial court found that the employer had acted reasonably and that the employee had a meaningful return to work. The trial court, therefore, declined to award additional benefits. The employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Hardin | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re Donna R.
Father of a child who was determined to be dependent and neglected shortly after her birth had his parental rights terminated on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent – failure to support; failure to provide a suitable home and wanton disregard; failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and persistence of conditions. Father appeals, asserting that the evidence does not sustain the trial court’s findings relative to those grounds as well as the holding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father failed to appeal or argue one of the grounds for termination and, consequently, has waived that issue; the ground is thereby final and we decline to review the other grounds. Upon our review of the record, there is clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Regina K. Deal v. Robert C. Tatum
At issue is the ownership of real property. Plaintiff and Defendant divorced in 2001. In February 2005, they purchased a home as “tenants in common with right of survivorship.” Seven months later, in September 2005, Defendant transferred his interest in the property to Plaintiff by quitclaim deed. In March 2009, Plaintiff quitclaimed her interest in the property to Defendant. Neither quitclaim deed was recorded until a dispute arose in September 2014 following which Plaintiff commenced this action to set aside the 2009 quitclaim deed based on fraud. Plaintiff contends Defendant fraudulently induced her into conveying the property by assuring her that he would refinance the property and give Plaintiff her share of the equity within one year. Defendant insists he purchased the property outright for $9,000, a payment Plaintiff admits receiving. At trial, Defendant objected to evidence of a purported oral agreement based on the statute of frauds. The trial court ruled the defense had been waived and that evidence of an oral agreement was admissible based on equitable estoppel, an exception to the statute of frauds. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ordered that Plaintiff’s name be put back on the deed so that “both of you . . . own the property together.” Both parties appeal. The trial court summarized the testimony of the witnesses and discussed some relevant legal principles; however, it made few findings of fact, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law identified by the trial court fail to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its decision. Although, we do not have a clear understanding of the basis for the trial court’s decision, it appears that the trial court’s ruling was based on equitable estoppel, which is significant because equitable estoppel is not a basis for affirmative relief. Because equitable estoppel is not a basis for the relief granted and the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, we vacate the judgment and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact that include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa A. Green v. William Phillip Green
In this divorce case, the wife proceeding pro se appeals the division of marital property and the trial court’s denial of her request for alimony. She also appeals the trial court’s award of court costs. She elected not to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence. Because the wife’s first two issues are factual in nature, the lack of transcript or statement of evidence prevents us from reaching the substance of the issues raised by the wife. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in assessing court costs. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also find that the appeal is frivolous. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Fit2Race, Inc., et al v. Janson Miles Pope, et al.
Defendants in a federal civil conspiracy case that was voluntarily dismissed filed a malicious prosecution case in state court against the plaintiff and his attorney. The plaintiff and his attorney filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The defendants appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a lawsuit, the dismissal does not constitute a “favorable termination” for purposes of satisfying the third element of a malicious prosecution lawsuit. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al.
The former administrator of an assisted living facility appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, and common law. Plaintiff contends he was fired in retaliation for initiating an internal investigation and submitting an internal report to his supervisors concerning an incident that arose when the son of an elderly resident observed an old bandage stuck to the bottom of his mother’s foot, which was revealed when her sock was removed in order to check the dressing for a wound on her ankle. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims are legally deficient because there was no neglect or illegal activity to report, and that Plaintiff grossly overreacted after being informed that an old bandage was found on the ball of a resident’s foot in a sock when the resident’s wound, which was on her ankle, was properly dressed and bandaged. Defendants also rely on the fact that Plaintiff did not file a qualifying internal or external report of neglect until after he was fired. The trial court summarily dismissed the TPPA claim stating “leaving a bandage in a sock, where a patient’s wound is in fact otherwise sufficiently bandaged, is not illegal activity as defined by the statute. Leaving the bandage in the sock is not ‘abuse and neglect’ as defined in the statute.” The court dismissed the common law whistleblower claim because Plaintiff did not show that Defendants engaged “in illegal conduct or in any way . . . posed a threat to an important public policy of the State when all that was done was to leave an old bandage in a patient’s sock.” Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his claims under the TPPA and common law. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Magdi Mikheil et al v. Nashville General Hospital at Meharry et al.
In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner. Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Richmond v. Vanguard Healthcare Services, LLC et al - Dissenting
The majority Opinion concludes that a reasonable juror (1) could not find that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe the presence of the soiled bandage was connected to “illegal activity,” as required by the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), and (2) could not find that Mr. Richmond could demonstrate that his termination for reporting the incident violated any clear public policy under his common law claim. Because I conclude that a reasonable juror could conclude that Mr. Richmond had reasonable cause to believe that the presence of the soiled bandage stemmed from neglect of the patient, I must respectfully dissent. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals |