State vs. Ramsey
03C01-9708-CR-00361
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller

State vs. Franklin
03C01-9706-CR-00219
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

State vs. Robinson
03C01-9710-CR-00430
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner

State vs. Creekmore
03C01-9712-CR-00535

Donna Lee Stephen v. R. C. Leamon and Conditionaire Company, Inc.
03SO1-9707-CH-00091
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Howell N. Peoples,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this claim for death benefits, the claimants contend the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that the decedent was an independent contractor and that the defendant, Leamon, was not a statutory employer. At the conclusion of the trial, the chancellor made the following findings and conclusions: "The issue in this case is whether Mr. Stephens, Mr. Raymond Stephens, was an employee or independent contractor. In resolving that issue, the Court has placed primary reliance upon the testimony of Kim Ray, Leon Evans and WilliamLevon Stephens, because those are the witnesses who were most intimately involved in the work that was performed by Raymond Stephens. "It's undisputed, based on the testimony of these witnesses that Mr. Raymond Stephens did perform services for Conditionaire Company. In particular, he installed duct work for heating and air systems. He would perform that work in accordance with plans and specifications that were provided by Conditionaire. "He was not directly supervised in the performance of his work. There was no one on a daily basis, or even an hourly basis, who reviewed his work or the method in which he did his work. The work that he did was reviewed from time to time and, upon completion of the assigned work, was reviewed by Mr. Kim Ray and by Mr. Leon Evans on behalf of Conditionaire. The purpose of that review was to ensure that the work complied with the plans and specifications and with the applicable codes. "Mr. Stephens was at times provided with time frames within which the work was to be done, but he was not given a specific time to report to work each day and a specific time to terminate work each day. He was not directed as to when he could eat or when he could take breaks. Primarily, he provided his own tools; however he did from time to time use ladders and a vacuum cleaner that were provided by 2

Jacob E. Carter v. Lumbermen's Underwriting
03S01-9610-CH-00095
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issues raised on appeal are: whether the evidence preponderates against the finding by the trial judge that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled; whether the trial court erred in apportioning the liability of the insurer at 25 percent and of the Second Injury Fund at 75 percent; and whether the trial court erred in limiting the insurer's liability to 25 percent of 4 weeks and imposing liability on the Second Injury Fund for the remainder of the weeks until the plaintiff reaches age 65. We affirm the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled and that the apportionment of this liability is on the basis of 25 percent to the insurer and 75 percent to the Second Injury Fund. We modify the apportionment of the liability at 25 percent of 4 weeks to the insurer and the remaining liability to the Second Injury Fund. We apportion the award in accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). The plaintiff has an extensive medical history as demonstrated by the medical evidence in this case, which consists of the depositions of five physicians, the report of physician, and the appearance of two physicians at trial. Additionally, the medical records of one physician were introduced by the Second Injury Fund. The medical evidence consists of physical evaluations and treatment, as well as a psychiatric evaluation. The plaintiff also presented a vocational expert's testimony at trial. 2

James Walker Hurst v. Scruggs, Inc.
03S01-9703-CH-00032
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). We find the record supports the finding that the plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled. We modify the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund.1 The trial court found the plaintiff was injured within the scope of his employment with the defendant on June 17, 1994. The plaintiff had two previous compensable injuries. On June 6, 1983, he was found to have a 6 percent disability to the body as a whole, and on October 8, 1993, he was found to have a 7.5 percent disability as a result of an injury. The trial judge found the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled from work following the injury of June 17, 1994 (this case). Further, the trial court found, and the record shows, the plaintiff met three out of four requirements for Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242, which would permit the trial court to exceed the multiplier caps of the statute and award recovery for 4 weeks. In this case, however, the trial court found the plaintiff was entitled to receive benefits until age 65 under the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-27(4). In fixing the disability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, the trial court found that the employer was liable for 32.5 percent of the injury to the plaintiff and the Second Injury Fund was liable for 67.5 percent. At the time the 1 This case was filed March 13, 1997 and has awaited the Supreme Court's decision in Bomely v. Mid-America Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998), which was filed May 26, 1998. 2

Ancro Finance vs. Consumers Ins.
02A01-9708-CV-00177
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers

Bradford/Jacqueline Roberts vs. City of Memphis
02A01-9806-CV-00155
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

State vs. Don Carter
02C01-9711-CC-00424

State of Tennessee vs. Charlene Hardison - Concurring/Dissenting
01C01-9705-CC-00196
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

I concur with a ll portions of Judge Lafferty’s op inion with the exception of the portion that reduces the period of confinem ent from six (6) months to ninety (90) days. I might agree with that ultimate result after a specific finding of facts by the trial court following the dictates of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. However, it is my opinion that the more appropriate disposition of this particular case is to remand it back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing which follows the specific requirements of the A ct. See State v. Ervin, 939 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) and cases cited therein.

State of Tennessee vs. Charlene Hardison
01C01-9705-CC-00196
Authoring Judge: Special Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

The defendant, Charlene Hardison, appeals of right from a ruling of the Williamson County Criminal Court in which the trial court imposed a sentence of six (6) months confinement in the Williamson County Jail for the offense of driving on a revoke d license. Also, the Williamson County Criminal Court consolidated an appeal of the defendant for violation of probation from the Williamson County General Sessions Court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court upheld the judgment of the General Sessions Court and ordered the defendant to serve six (6) months, less forty-five (45) days credit, as per her plea of guilty, to run concurrently with the sentence for driving on a revoked license. Af ter a review of the entire r ecord, brief s of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the revocation of probation, but remand the sentences as modified.

Roger Terry Johnson v. State of Tennessee
01C01-9705-CR-00172
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt

The appellant, Roger Terrance Johnson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wanda C. Tate, v. Sally Seivers and Carole Mitchell, L'Argent Inc., v., Wanda C. Tate
03A01-9710-CV-00459
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

This is an action on a promissory note. In 1993, plaintiff, Wanda Tate, sold her women's clothing store to the defendants, Sally Seivers and Carole Mitchell and their corporatin, L'Argent, Inc. (collectively "buyers"). Several months after the sale, the buyers, dissatisfied with some of the inventory sold to them, tendered less than the full payment amount called for by the promissor note they had signed in partial consideration for the sale. Tate rejected the partial payment and sued for recovery of the full amount due under the terms of the note. The buyers argued tha Tate had made material misrepresentations regarding some of the the inventory, resulting in the value of the inventory they purchased being substantially less than anticipated at the time of the sale.

Anna Lee Crisp, v. Irville C. Boring and wife, Wanda Sue Boring
03A01-9711-CV-00527
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

This is a boundary dispute. The plaintiff alleges that the location of the boundary line between her property and the adjoining land of the defendants is shown by a survey made by Sterling Engineering, Inc.

Phillip W. Twitty and Alice F. Twitty v. Young v. Kenton, Young, and Roy Edward Brown and Volunteer Realty Company of Knoxville, Inc.
03A01-9801-CH-00031
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick D. McDonald

On October 26, 1993, plaintiffs purchased an new residence in Oak Ridge from the defendants. Thereafter, the unfinished basement of the residence flooded on several occasions after heavy rainfall.

Yvette Porter Caira v. Ronald Stephen Caira
01A01-9709-CH-00508
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

This case is before us on appeal from the trial court’s decree of divorce and grant of child custody and support to the Appellee, Ronald Steven Caira. In bringing this appeal, Appellant raises two issues for consideration. 1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award primary custody of the minor children of this marriage with Defendant/Appellee. 2. Whether the trial court made an equitable property distribution of the debts, assets and retirement proceeds of this marriage.

Tracy Renee Miglin v. Daniel Walter Miglin - Concurring
01-A-01-9707-CH-00362
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The husband in this divorce case challenged almost every aspect of the trial court’s orders, including child custody, alimony, the division of marital property and the terms of an injunction imposed to prevent him from interfering with the wife’s authority over the children. We modify the injunction because we believe that its provisions are overbroad. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court.

Marvin E. Alexander, D/B/A Alexander Auctions & Real Estate Sales, v. John Hopkins and Rhonda Hopkins, Individually and D/B/A Richland Creek Sod Farm
01A01-9710-CH-00590
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

A licensed auctioneer and real estate broker filed suit against the defendant landowners for breach of an auction contract, because the defendants sold their land prior to the scheduled auction without his participation. The trial court held that the auctioneer was entitled to the anticipated commission amount. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the property owners are liable, but we modify the amount of damages.

Daniel Scott Bradley, et ux. LInda Bradley, v. Geneva Lynn McCord McLeod, et vir Rodrick McLeod
01A01-9702-CH-00062
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark

This case involves a dispute between two neighbors in the Fairview community of Williamson County concerning the use of a gravel driveway. Three years after purchasing a tract of land on which portions of the driveway were located, the property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Williamson County to quiet title to the portions of the driveway they believed to be on their property. Their neighbors responded that the driveway was their only access to a pubic road and that they had acquired a right to use the driveway by adverse possession. After the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ uncontested motion for summary judgment, the defendants filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion asserting that they had an “easement of presumption” to use the driveway. The trial court denied the post-judgment motion on the ground that the new defense had not been timely raised. On this appeal, the losing property owners take issue with the trial court’s decision to grant the summary judgment and to deny their post-judgment motion. We affirm the summary judgment.

R.S. Brandt, K.M. Lundin, M.I. Lundin, N.B. Lundin, and A.T. Wiltshire, Jr. v. BIB Enterprises, LTD., A Tennessee Limited Partnership, and Gregory Smith, Individually, and Virginia Abernethy
01A01-9708-CH-00431
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William B. Cain

This cases involves a d ispute over a limited partnership. BIB Enterprises, Ltd. (“BIB”) was formed on December 30, 1982 for the stated purpose of acquiring real estate, equipment and other personal property of a Bonanza Restaurant in Lawrenceburg, Tennessee. Defendant-appellant Greg Smith was named General Partner.

Michael G. Binkley, et ux., et al. v. Rodney Trevor Medling
01A01-9708-CH-00421
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

The captioned defendant has appealed from a judgment of the Trial Court which reads in full as follows: This cause came on to be heard on this the 23rd day of July, 1997, before the Honorable Allen W. Wallace, Chancellor, upon stipulation of the parties, certified copies of various documents, statement of counsel, and upon the entire record. From all of which the Court finds that the Defendant improperly opened a cul-de-sac located on Timberland Drive, New Johnsonville, Tennessee, and Lot No. D-6 of the Countrywood Estates Subdivision, Section IV, and further that the Defendant violated the restrictions and protective covenants of Countrywood Estates Subdivision, Section IV, as a street or driveway to unrestricted and non-conforming adjoining property, and particularly the 11.7 acre tract that was purchased by the Defendant.

Jon Hoscheit v. Johanna G. Hoscheit
01A01-9709-CH-00493
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This action began with a complaint filed by the appellee, Jon Hoscheit, (husband) seeking an absolute divorce from the appellant, Johanna G. Hoscheit (wife). After a bench trial, the court entered a final judgment granting an absolute divorce, custody of the parties' minor child to the father, dividing the marital estate and awarding alimony to the wife. From the judgment of the trial court the wife has appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brookridge Apartments., Ltd. v. Universal Constructors, Inc., et al. - Concurring
01A01-9709-CV-00523
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

Plaintiff appeals to this Court on the refusal by the Trial Judge to grant plaintiff relief pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Procedure, 60.02(1). The underlying action was dismissed on July 23, 1996 by the Trial Judge “for want of prosecution.” On July 18, 1997, plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 60, T.R.C.P. on the ground the judgment was entered because of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. The motion explained that the plaintiffs “former counsel William J. Hart, did not receive notice from the Court that the case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution pursuant to local Rule 37.02.”

John Anderson Kinard v. Linda Kinard
01A01-9606-CH-00265
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert E. Corlew, III

This appeal involves a divorce ending a long-term marriage. The husband filed suit to divorce his wife of thirty years in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County, and the wife counterclaimed for a divorce from bed and board. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, declared the parties divorced, divided the marital property, and awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the decision to declare the parties divorced, the division of marital property, and the failure to award her long-term spousal support and attorney’s fees. She also insists that the trial judge should have recused himself because of his prior professional association with the husband’s lawyer. We conclude that the trial judge was not disqualified from hearing this case. While we also find that declaring the parties divorced was proper, we have determined that the division of marital property and the spousal support award should be modified but that the wife should not receive an additional award for her legal expenses.