James E. Fleenor v. Grand Piano and Furniture Company 03S01-9905-CV-00061
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. G. Richard Johnson
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Grand Piano and Furniture Company (hereafter "Grand Piano") has appealed an award to James E. Fleenor of 8 per cent disability to the body as a whole. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Fleenor sustained a compensable injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). James E. Fleenor, age 47, has a 5th grade education. His tested I.Q. is 49 and he reads at a 2nd grade level and can do arithmetic at the 1st grade level. He began work at Grand Piano in 1995. He had worked as a furniture mover for most of his life. He drove a truck for Grand Piano and loaded and delivered furniture. He had hurt his back approximately 15 years before when a co-worker dropped the end of a couch; and while he had pain in his back for many years, he testified that the pain at Grand Piano became worse than the pain he had working for previous employers. He told his supervisor at Grand Piano that the work was "getting to me." He never had any specific incident at Grand Piano that caused sudden pain. He testified, "the more I worked, the more I picked up, the worser it got. And I just, I just had to give it up." 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Brenda K. Bascko v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A.J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc. 03S01-9907-CV-00083
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben W. Hooper
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellants, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and A. J. Metler Hauling & Rigging Company, Inc., contend that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that there was a causal connection between the fatal heart attack suffered by Richard I. Bascko and his driving a tractor-trailer rig. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). This case was tried upon stipulations and depositions of medical doctors. As relevant to this decision, the stipulations are as follows: 1. Richard I. Bascko died on October 15, 1993 while driving a tractor-trailer rig for A.J. Metler. The truck was found at 2:48 a.m. on October 15 and Mr. Bascko was unresponsive over the driver's wheel. 2
Harris vs. Chern M1998-00250-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
We granted this appeal to determine the standard to be applied in ruling upon a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 motion to revise a grant of partial summary judgment based upon evidence beyond that which was before the court when the motion was initially granted. For the reasons stated below, we reject the newly discovered evidence rule applied by the trial court and set forth in Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). We adopt a test requiring the trial court to consider, when applicable: 1) the movant's efforts to obtain evidence to respond to the motion for summary judgment; 2) the importance of the newly submitted evidence to the movant's case; 3) the explanation offered by the movant for its failure to offer the newly submitted evidence in its initial response to the motion for summary judgment; 4) the likelihood that the nonmoving party will suffer unfair prejudice; and 5) any other relevant factor. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for application of this standard.
Davidson
Supreme Court
State vs. Harris M1998-00325-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers
We grant permission to appeal as requested by Kenneth Bryan Harris in order to review the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court had erred in making the following rulings: (1) overruling the State's motion to enter a nolle prosequi on an indictment for aggravated assault; (2) dismissing a superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault; and (3) reversing the district attorney general pro tempore's rejection of the defendant's application for pretrial diversion on the original indictment. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed each ruling and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. After careful consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred in overruling the State's motion for a nolle prosequi on the original indictment. We conclude also that the trial court erred in dismissing the superseding indictment for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. Moreover, because the superseding indictment contains a count charging Harris with an offense for which pretrial diversion is not available, we need not consider the question of pretrial diversion. Based on these conclusions, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for proceedings on the superseding indictment.
A petition for rehearing has been filed on behalf of the Beckom appellants pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 39. After consideration of the same, the Court is of the opinion that the petition should be and the same hereby is denied at the cost of the Beckom appellants. Enter this 24th day of May, 2000.
Davidson
Supreme Court
Dotson vs. Blake, et al W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.
Weakley
Supreme Court
Dotson vs. Blake, et al W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Weakley County, which refused to permit the jury in a personal injury case to allocate fault to tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. We granted review to decide whether fault may be attributed to tortfeasors who cannot be held liable because of a statute of repose. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the courts below erred in not allowing fault to be assigned to the tortfeasors who successfully asserted a statute of repose to the claims against them. Accordingly, for the reasons explained hereafter, the lower courts are reversed.
Weakley
Supreme Court
State vs. Carl McKissack W1999-01136-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
