William Perry v. Ricki Perry
W2001-01350-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Martha B. Brasfield
We granted this appeal to determine the correct standard to be applied in modifying a temporary, open-ended award of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that a substantial and material change in circumstances must be shown in order to extend, or otherwise modify, such an award. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

State of Tennessee v. Evelyn Holly
W2002-01200-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

Defendant, Evelyn Holly was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial. Defendant now challenges her conviction arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing her statement to the police. Defendant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence showed that she and the victim, Ronald Kyles, were engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing and requests this court to reduce her conviction to voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for second degree murder.

State of Tennessee v. Voss Johnson
W2002-01487-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Voss Johnson, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, and one count of second degree murder. Defendant now appeals his convictions arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for second degree murder based on a theory of criminal responsibility. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Dianna Dawn Mcgahey v. Davis Lee Mcgahgey
W2003-01051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon

Mary Guess v. Sharp Manufacturing Co. of America,
W2002-00818-WC-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. Redonna Hanna
W2002-00821-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The petitioner, Redonna Hanna, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of first degree murder. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the trial court's instructions as to criminal responsibility. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. We affirm the dismissal.

Ray Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell Utility District
E2002-00395-SC-S09-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
The plaintiffs brought suit against Hallsdale-Powell Utility District for nuisance and inverse condemnation after their homes were flooded with raw sewage on two occasions. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the utility district on the plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation, holding that no taking of their properties had occurred. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment. The intermediate appellate court held that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient facts to overcome summary judgment by showing that the sewage backup into their homes had caused a permanent loss of market value. We hold that a governmental defendant must perform a purposeful or intentional act for a taking to exist. Because such an act was not shown in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In Re: The Estate of Lowell Frazier
E2002-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This appeal concerns two separate suits filed in the Chancery Court for Campbell County in connection with the administration of the Estate of Lowell Frazier. The first suit was brought by Sam Lough, individually, and also, along with his wife, Debbie Lough, as parents and guardians of Matthew Lough, and Darryl Herron and Elizabeth Herron, as parents and guardians of Chelsea Herron. It sought to establish a lost or spoilated will of Mr. Frazier, which was dated January 30, 1998 ("the first will"). The second suit was brought by Matthew Lough and Chelsea Herron by and through their guardian ad litem, appointed in the first case, contesting a later will dated May 24, 2000 ("the second will"). The cases were consolidated below and the suit seeking to establish the first will was tried first. Under an agreement of the parties, the first case must be decided in favor of the minors before they would have standing to contest the second will. After a plenary trial a jury found as to the first case that the Plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lowell Frazier did not destroy the first will. Thereupon, the second trial was had before the same jury, which found against the second will on the ground that due execution was not proved and that Glenda Faye Smith, who was the sole beneficiary of the second will, and at the time it was executed was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Frazier, did not overcome the presumption of undue influence over Mr. Frazier by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Smith raises a number of issues, many of which merit a critical examination, but our review of the record persuades us that the issue which contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict in the first case is the dispositive issue in this appeal. We find that the Court was in error in not directing a verdict in her favor in the lost will case and reverse the judgment rendered therein. This results in the Plaintiffs not having standing to pursue the second case, which is reversed and dismissed.

Adana Carter v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company
E2002-01779-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
The trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment in favor of the employer and held that the injury did not occur within the course of employment. The employee contends she was required to make the trip in question and was on a special mission and that the usual rule of noncompensability in going to or coming from work did not apply. The judgment is reversed as the injury occurred on the return trip which was a special errand or mission for the benefit of the employer.

State of Tennessee v. Johnnie W. Reeves
M2002-02371-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie W. Reeves, of two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less. The trial court imposed two concurrent twenty-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs of the victim's injuries. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. David D. Harris
M2002-00382-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The Defendant, David D. Harris, pled guilty to seven counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court on June 16, 1999. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year sentences, to be served consecutively. The trial court suspended the sentences and ordered the Defendant to serve three consecutive eight-year terms on supervised probation. The State appealed, and this Court reversed the portion of the sentence that ordered the Defendant to serve twenty-four years of probation on the three consecutive eight-year sentences, holding that a probationary sentence for aggravated robbery is contrary to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(a). Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Upon re-sentencing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three eight-year prison terms and ordered that the sentences run consecutive to each other and consecutive to a sentence that the Defendant is currently serving in Williamson County. The Defendant appealed the trial court's re-sentencing order and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erroneously denied his request for a new sentencing hearing and; (2) whether the trial court erroneously denied the Defendant's request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, for a reduced sentence. After a through examination of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant's request for a new sentencing hearing; however, because we conclude that the trial court erroneously believed that it was without the authority to impose concurrent sentences, we reverse and remand for it to determine whether the three sentences should run consecutively or concurrently.

John Wilcox v. State of Tennessee - Order
E2002-01600-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State engaged in a vindictive prosecution and failed to perform testing on evidence which would have supported his claim of self-defense. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

State of Tennessee v. Vernon Lamar Bryant
E2002-01234-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of attempted reckless homicide, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated assault conviction, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years for aggravated assault and six years for aggravated burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. The defendant contends that the trial court improperly merged the attempted reckless homicide conviction into his aggravated assault conviction. Also, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. We conclude, following plain error review, that attempted reckless homicide is not a recognized crime in Tennessee. We reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction for attempted reckless homicide. Further, we conclude that the jury instruction regarding flight was not error, and the trial court correctly sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender. We affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault.

State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Leach, Jr.
M2001-01421-CCA-R3-DD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The defendant, Robert L. Leach, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The felony murder convictions were merged into the premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon the finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As to victim Sarah McBride, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felonies; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death; and the murder was knowingly committed by the defendant while committing or attempting to commit robbery or aggravated rape. As to victim Jean Poteet, the jury found the same three aggravating circumstances and the additional aggravating circumstance that the victim was seventy years of age or older or was particularly vulnerable due to a significant handicap or significant disability, physical or mental. The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape convictions. In this appeal, the defendant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the constitutionality of the death penalty, and the application of certain capital case procedures. We conclude that no harmful error exists, and we affirm the convictions and sentences. The case should be remanded, though, for correction of clerical errors by which the judgments for Counts 5 and 6 have respectively been switched to Counts 6 and 5.

James Tate v. Glenda Tate
M2002-01749-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
This appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court's property division between divorcing parties. As part of its division of the marital property, the trial court ordered that Husband transfer a home, which was his separate property, to Wife. The trial court also awarded Wife $4,500.00 as her interest in a Mercedes automobile which the parties purchased for $15,000.00. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Donovan Davis v. Ray Maples
M2002-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
An inmate brought this action to seek judicial review of the Board of Paroles decision to deny him parole. Because a prisoner has no liberty interest in early release, we affirm the dismissal of the due process claims brought herein. We affirm dismissal of that portion of the petition that alleges that the denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious, but specifically hold that Mr. Davis may pursue administrative appeal of that denial. We reverse dismissal of the claim that the Board's decision to defer Mr. Davis's next meeting with the Board for eleven years is not arbitrary and capricious, and remand that claim for further proceedings.

Janice Darnell v. Royal and Sunalliance,
M2002-00617-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, Chancellor
In this case of first impression, the employee contends the trial court erred in setting aside a court approved settlement as being contrary to law and grounded on mistake of fact. As discussed below, the panel has concluded there was no mistake as to an existing fact and that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(2) does not authorize an employer or its insurer to obtain reconsideration of a lump sum award of permanent partial disability benefits.

Cora Jean Earls v. Calsonic Yorozu Corporation, Inc.
M2002-01309-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to notice, permanency, causation and extent of permanency, (2) the trial court erred in the application of Tenn. Code Ann. __ 5-6-27(3) and 5-6-241; (3) the trial court erred by delegating its adjudicatory function to the Clerk and Master, and (4) the trial court erred in assessing discretionary costs against the defendant. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the award of permanent partial disability benefits should be reduced to one based on two and one-half times the employee's medical impairment rating, or 3 percent to the body as a whole.

00521-COA-R3-JV
00521-COA-R3-JV
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown

Ernest W. Sipe v. F. Raymond Porter
E2002-02938-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Ernest W. Sipe ("Plaintiff") sued F. Raymond Porter, M.D. ("Dr. Porter") regarding Dr. Porter's medical care of Gladys Louise Sipe. Plaintiff filed his expert's affidavit. Plaintiff's expert then was deposed. During this deposition, defense counsel questioned Plaintiff's expert about portions of Ms. Sipe's medical record that Plaintiff's expert had not reviewed previously. Dr. Porter then filed a motion for partial summary judgment. After his deposition, Plaintiff's expert reviewed all of the previously unreviewed records, and Plaintiff then filed a supplemental affidavit of his expert. The Trial Court applied the rule of cancellation and found that Plaintiff's expert's opinions were contradictory and that his testimony as an expert witness should be cancelled and disregarded as competent proof in this case. The Trial Court then granted Dr. Porter's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

Sheryle Hydas vs Herman Hydas
E2002-02943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this divorce action the Trial Court valued marital and non-marital property and divided marital property. Husband appealed the Trial Court's decision on these issues. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Ronald B. Finch
M2002-01050-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The Appellant, Ronald B. Finch, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated rape. As a result of these convictions, Finch was sentenced to concurrent thirty-year sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Finch raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and (2) whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery McCraney
W2003-00011-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Moore

This is an appeal by permission, pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Jeffery McCraney, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for various narcotics charges arising out of the search of his motor vehicle. The trial court suppressed the evidence obtained as a result of that search, ruling that the search of the Defendant’s vehicle was unconstitutional. The State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court. We granted the State permission to appeal, and the State asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’ s Motion to Suppress. We hold that the trial court did not err by granting the motion because the search of the Defendant’s vehicle violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

State of Tennessee v. Marcus Thompson
E2001-02521-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The appellant, Marcus Thompson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of one count of conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and one count of selling and delivering cocaine. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and fines totaling $150,000. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including speedy trial, sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but reduce the amount of the appellant's fines to a total amount of $50,000.