State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson - Dissenting
The majority concludes that there was insufficient evidence that victim Crain was “put in fear.” The majority concludes that Mr. Crain disavowed being “in fear.” I simply disagree. Witness Kevin Young, Mr. Crain’s assistant who came from inside the store, testified that Mr. Crain told him he was being robbed and to call the police, which Mr. Young did. Mr. Crain described how a man jumped into his truck and ordered him to the front of the truck. Mr. Crain described that he was “angry” this was happening to him. He did not like being “backed into a corner at all.” Mr. Crain offered no resistance and somehow exited the truck. Still angry about what was happening, Mr. Crain attempted to close the door and lock the defendant inside. When the defendant saw Mr. Crain’s attempt or “caught him,” the defendant threatened to shoot Mr. Crain. Mr. Crain believed the defendant was armed and saw the defendant reach for his pocket or belt line. Mr. Crain testified “there was too much things going through my mind at the time to actually mentally get a good picture.” Mr. Crain could not identify the defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Dotson
The defendant, Andre Dotson, appeals from his 2005 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions on two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of robbery. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in joining four indictments for trial, (2) in severing, on the morning of trial, the charges against a co-defendant, (3) in excluding the co-defendant’s pretrial statement as evidence offered by the defendant, (4) in failing to hold that the evidence was insufficient to support three of the convictions, (5) in denying the defendant’s motion to allow him to sit with his attorney at the counsel table, (6) in failing to instruct the jury as to the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, and (7) in sentencing the defendant as a multiple offender on two convictions and as a persistent offender on two convictions. We reverse one conviction of robberybut affirm the court’s judgments, as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dewayne Alston
The appellant, Anthony Alston, was indicted with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver and felony possession of cocaine. The appellant pled guilty to the charges, but agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two convictions and imposed a sentence of nine years for possession with intent to deliver more than .5 grams of cocaine. Further, the trial court ordered the nine-year sentence to run consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on Community Corrections at the time of the current offense. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobbie Jane T. Hagewood v. American Casualty Company
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Builders Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Paul Simms
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeal Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 29, 2003, the appellant, Paul J. Simms, fractured his ankle at a construction site in Spring Hill, Tennessee. The trial court determined Mr. Simms' injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment. Mr. Simms has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's holding. Mr. Simms also alleges the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Jack Russell, the subcontractor whom Mr. Simms claims employed him on the day of his accident, because Mr. Russell invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial. After carefully considering the evidence adduced at trial, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Yates Services, L.L.C. v. Donald E. Black, Jr.
This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined the employee, Donald E. Black, Jr. (Black), had sustained a work-related injury resulting in a permanent partial disability amounting to 26% of the body as a whole, and awarded temporary total disability and future medical benefits. The employer, Yates Services, L.L.C. (Yates) has appealed and contends that the trial court erred (1) by allowing Black to present his evidence first at trial, (2) by holding that Black sustained a gradual back injury caused by his employment, and (3) by finding that Black had given adequate notice of his injury to his employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Rico Walls
The petitioner pled guilty to three counts of selling cocaine over .5 grams within 1000 feet of a school. He was also convicted in a jury trial of a fourth count for the same offense. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to fifteen years for each conviction to run concurrently. The petitioner was unsuccessful on his direct appeal and appeal of a certified question. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that his rights of equal protection were violated. The post-conviction court denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Eva Friedman Weisberger Philip J. Cooper v. Estate of Eva Friedman Weisberger
This is a petition for attorney’s fees in probate. The petitioner attorney was retained to represent the estate in the underlying probate action. After his duties were essentially completed, the representatives of the estate hired new counsel for the estate. The petitioner attorney then filed a petition for attorney’s fees, asserting that there had been an oral contract for 3% of the estate’s assets. The estate’s representatives objected, contending that there had been no agreement on attorney’s fees, and that the amount of the fee requested was excessive. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the parties had entered into the agreement as asserted by the attorney, and that the fee agreement was reasonable at the time it was made. Therefore, the trial court enforced the fee agreement and entered a judgment in favor of the petitioner. The estate now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry L. Perkins
A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of reckless homicide and one count of abuse of a corpse. The trial judge imposed a three year sentence and a one year sentence, respectively, and it ordered the sentences run consecutively. The trial court determined that the Defendant should receive probation on time served for the three year sentence and probation effective immediately for the one year sentence, in part because the Defendant had already spent sixteen months in jail before trial. The State appeals contending the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant because the trial court mistakenly believed it was required to place the defendant on probation. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca Lee Bradshaw Owings v. William Albert Owings
This is a post-divorce petition to modify child support. When the parties divorced in 1995, the mother was granted custody of the parties’ two children, and the father was ordered to pay child support. The father was self-employed. In 2003, the mother filed the instant petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that the father’s income had increased since the divorce. The mother sought to prove the amount of the father’s income by submitting into evidence his bank |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Kay Brister Davis v. John W. Davis
This is a divorce case. After ten years of marr iage, the parties separated. Subsequently, their marital home was destroyed in a fire. The husband then executed a quit claim deed on the home to the wife. Consequently, the insurance proceeds on the home were paid to the wife, with none distributed to the husband. Both parties then filed for divorce. During the trial, the husband testified that the wife persuaded him to quit claim his interest in the home to her so that she could deal with the insurance company and sell the land on which the home stood. The husband sought a share of the insurance proceeds and the proceeds from the sale of the land. The wife alleged that the husband quit claimed his interest in the home to her as a gift. At the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the trial court held, inter alia, that the home was a marital asset, despite the existence of the quit claim deed, and granted husband a share of the proceeds from the insurance and the sale of the land. The wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that, by executing the quit claim deed the husband did not intend to make a gift of his interest in the property to the wife. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Kay Brister Davis v. John W. Davis - Dissenting
It is difficult for this member of the Court to believe that husband, who had been married twice before, did not understand the effect of a deed or that he was “duped” by wife into conveying his property. The more likely scenario is that husband was fearful that wife would gain an interest in his business and that he agreed to convey the residential property in exchange for her acquiescence not to seek such an interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bradley Copeland v. Tony Parker, Warden
The Petitioner, Bradley Copeland, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court erred when it re-sentenced him to a longer effective sentence than he received for his original convictions, and that his guilty pleas were constitutionally defective. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Ann McNeilly
A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, MaryAnn McNeilly, of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be suspended after serving ten days in confinement; imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine; ordered that she perform one hundred hours of public service; and suspended her driver’s license for one year. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the trial court should have suppressed her statement to a police officer; (2) that the trial court improperly allowed the State to replay a videotape of the appellant’s stop for the jury; (3) that the trial court improperly admitted the appellant’s blood test results into evidence because the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense witnesses to testify about the appellant’s character; (5) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (6) that her sentence is excessive; and (7) that these cumulative errors denied the appellant her right to a fair trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction but modify her sentence to reflect that she is to serve five days in confinement and remand the case for entry of an amended judgment. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Ann McNeilly - Dissenting
I join with my colleagues in all respects, save one, I would affirm the sentence as imposed. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Louis Tyrone Robinson v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Louis Tyrone Robinson, proceeding pro se, presents a Rule 3 appeal from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition.” Robinson seeks post-conviction relief in five separate cases arising from crimes which occurred during a period between August 1989 and October 1992. The post-conviction court denied Robinson’s motion on the following grounds: (1) that the motion failed to present a new claim of constitutional error under the limited circumstances set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117; (2) that no postconviction petition had ever been filed in four of the five cases; (3) that the statute of limitations had expired for post-conviction relief; and (4) that Robinson’s claims had been previously addressed. Because the Appellant failed to comply with the statutory requirements for appealing the denial of a motion to reopen, this court is without jurisdiction to review the issue. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Audra Lynn Johnson
The Appellant, Audra Lynn Johnson, entered a best interest plea and reserved for appeal a certified question of law: whether the trial court possessed territorial jurisdiction to try the out-of-state defendant. We conclude that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristi Lyn (Jackson) Hollandsworth v. James Jeffrey Jackson
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody of the parties’ child upon finding no material change of circumstances had occurred. We affirm in part and remand. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Evans v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant, Michael Evans, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Evans’ petition was summarily dismissed by the post-conviction court upon grounds that it was time-barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Evans contends that application of the statute of limitations in this case serves to deny him his right to due process. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and because Evans has failed to establish any ground which would support a tolling of the statute. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Burris
The Appellant, Carlos Burris, was convicted by a Madison County jury of misdemeanor possession of cocaine. On appeal, Burris argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio George
The defendant, Antonio George, was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror who had a pending criminal case; (3) the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of the lead investigating officer; (4) the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offenses of theft and robbery; and (5) the trial court erred by not giving a curative jury instruction regarding a comment made by the prosecutor. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge against the defendant. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny J. Postles
The defendant appeals from his jury convictions of criminal trespass (Class C misdemeanor), assault (Class A misdemeanor), aggravated burglary (Class C felony), aggravated assault (Class C felony), and theft (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant received an effective sentence of five and one-half years incarceration plus two jail terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days. Issues presented on appeal are the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of the consolidation of offenses from two indictments involving separate dates with a single victim. After review, we have concluded that the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that the defendant waived the severance of the offenses issue. The judgments from the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Williams, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to have him undergo a mental evaluation prior to trial. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to meet his burden that: (1) his counsel was deficient in her performance, and (2) he was prejudiced in his claim of ineffective assistance. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harvey S. Burns v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Harvey S. Burns, 1 pled guilty to selling less than one-half gram of cocaine. At the guilty plea hearing, the Petitioner accepted a sentence of thirteen years as a Range III, persistent offender. The Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, and after being appointed counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyree Robinson
The appellant, Tyree Robinson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Brown, Morris, and Courtney Perry were accomplices as a matter of law; the trial court abused its discretion in allowing hearsay statements; and the trial court erred in responding to a jury question. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |