Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Taivaun Marquise Mallory
The Defendant, Taivaun Marquise Mallory, appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received a sentence of twelve years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a firearm recovered after a traffic stop and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyler Christian
A Knox County Jury convicted Defendant, Tyler Christian, of two counts of carjacking and one count of driving on a revoked license. The trial court merged the carjacking convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years’ confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the trial court’s decision to supplement the pattern jury instructions with definitions of “force” and “violence,” and the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for new trial. After review, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rikiya Joy Parks
Defendant, Rikiya Joy Parks, appeals her Hawkins County Criminal Court jury convictions for aggravated child neglect, making a false report, and child abuse, challenging the admission of photographs of the minor victim, the admission of what she claims was improper character evidence, the exclusion of printed screenshots of Facebook messages, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley William Havens
A jury convicted Defendant, Stanley William Havens, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) and of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08% or higher (DUI per se), and it found that this was Defendant’s third DUI offense for enhanced sentencing. The offenses were merged, and Defendant was assessed a fine and sentenced to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement, with a release eligibility of 75%. Defendant appeals, challenging: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the redacted video of the traffic stop; (3) the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror for cause; (4) a statement during voir dire that he asserts constitutes prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) his sentence. We affirm and remand for entry of a corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Keith R. Prather v. Yvonne R. Prather
The parties obtained a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). On appeal, the wife disputes the Trial Court’s calculation of her portion of the husband’s military retirement pay. Upon our review, we determine that the Trial Court miscalculated the wife’s portion given that it calculated her portion based on the parties’ date of informal separation, rather than the date of the husband’s retirement from the military. In doing so, the Trial Court misclassified marital property as separate property. We, accordingly, vacate the Trial Court’s classification of the husband’s military retirement pay as partially separate property acquired during the marriage and the Trial Court’s division of the entire marital estate, insofar as the Trial Court’s improper classification of this marital asset affects the equitable division of the marital estate as a whole. We remand this cause to the Trial Court for it to properly classify the husband’s military retirement pay as marital property acquired during the months of the marriage, recalculate its division of this marital asset, and re-access its division of the entire marital estate in light of its reclassification and recalculation of its division of this marital asset. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Coblentz et al. v. Tractor Supply Company
In this appeal, we consider whether a retail store purchaser of products can be a “statutory employer” of the product vendor’s injured employee under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation statutes, potentially secondarily liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, and also protected under the exclusive remedy provision. Resolving this issue requires us to answer a threshold question: whether the term “subcontractor” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113(a) includes a product vendor who engages in only the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise. We hold that it does not. We hold that the term “subcontractor” in section 50-6-113(a) refers to a person or entity that performs labor or services for another; section 50-6-113(a) does not apply to a pure vendor-vendee relationship. To determine whether a vendor-vendee arrangement that includes services beyond the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise is governed by section 50-6-113(a), we adopt a version of the “predominant purpose” test often utilized in connection with the Uniform Commercial Code to ascertain whether a contract is predominantly for the sale of goods or services. In this case, there was an arrangement between a product vendor and the defendant retail store that required the vendor’s sales employee to perform services other than ancillary delivery of purchased merchandise. Applying the predominant purpose test, we hold that the predominant purpose of the arrangement was for the product vendor to sell merchandise to the retail store. Any additional services rendered were incidental to the vendor’s sale of merchandise to the retail store. Accordingly, the relationship between the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant retail store was one of vendor-vendee, not principal-subcontractor, and is outside the ambit of section 50-6-113(a). For that reason, the defendant retail store is not the plaintiff’s statutory employer for purposes of section 50-6-113(a) and is not shielded from the plaintiff’s injury claims by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion. |
Lincoln | Supreme Court | |
Abdoulaye Mamadou v. Gatti, Keltner, Bienvenu & Montesi, PC
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Carol Edwards v. Peoplease, LLC, et al.
In this appeal, we clarify the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases. We also explain when an aggravation injury is compensable under Tennessee workers’ compensation law. Plaintiff Jo Carol Edwards sought medical coverage and disability benefits after a work-related accident aggravated her pre-existing arthritis. Following a lengthy administrative process, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims awarded Ms. Edwards medical coverage and disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed. Ms. Edwards appealed. We hold that the standard of review for factual findings in Workers’ Compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence shows otherwise. The standard of review for factual findings applies regardless of whether the finding is based on live testimony or deposition testimony. We also hold that an “aggravation” injury under workers’ compensation law does not require proof of a permanent change or a permanent worsening of conditions to be compensable. Instead, an aggravation injury is compensable when an employee shows, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation injury primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. This means that an employee must show that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the aggravation. Then, the employee must prove, by a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation contributed more than fifty percent in causing death, disablement or need for medical treatment. Applying these definitions to the record before us, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Board, and reinstate the award granted by the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in its December 12, 2023 Order. |
Supreme Court | ||
Cynthia Allen West v. Roderick Jay West
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Levi Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andrew Levi Jefferson, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions in Coffee County Circuit Court case numbers 40579, 42946, 43169, and 43688. Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, for which he is serving an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to (1) investigate evidence tampering by a police officer; (2) file several motions to suppress; and (3) adequately explain the plea agreement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lee Adams, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of attempted second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Kendrick v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and first degree premeditated murder, for which he is serving two consecutive life sentences. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon (1) trial counsel’s conflict of interest stemming from representing two other suspects at the same time he represented Petitioner; (2) trial counsel’s failure to compel the same two suspects to testify at trial; (3) trial counsel’s failure to consult or call as a witness a firearms expert; (4) trial counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation and prepare for trial; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors. Petitioner also asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to inquire about trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to adjudicate Petitioner’s request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”). Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Hester Ayers v. John Robert Ayers
This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
MARK KLEINMAN v. RHONDA LAWSON
This appeal concerns the trial court’s findings of six counts of criminal contempt against Mother following a contentious, years-long custody battle. Due to the lack of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
CATHERINE AMANDA MULLIS v. SAI CHATTANOOGA N, LLC
After discovering that the roof of her new car leaked, the owner returned to the dealership several times for repairs, but the leaks persisted. Later, when she began feeling sick, the owner suspected that mold growing in the car was the cause. The ownersued the dealership claiming, among other things, that negligent repairs led to the mold growth and caused her health issues. The dealership moved for summary judgment, asserting that the owner could not prove causation. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Mar-Kee Mosley
Petitioner, Tony Mar-Kee Mosley, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude that Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interest of justice does not warrant a waiver of the notice requirement. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as untimely. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Felix Mandiel Leach
The Defendant, Felix Mandiel Leach, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell or to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance as a Range II, multiple offender and received a twelve-year sentence to be served on probation. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Patton
Defendant, Anthony M. Patton, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, to correct a clerical mistake in the judgments entered against him. He asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to apply pretrial jail credit to the second of two consecutively imposed sentences, arguing that he is entitled to receive such credit on both sentences. He also argues that his plea agreement is void as a result. The State responds that the trial court correctly applied jail credits to Defendant’s first sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Harold Clark
Defendant, Jimmy Harold Clark, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of one count of rape of a child under the age of thirteen. The jury imposed the maximum fine of $50,000, and the trial court imposed a forty-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress his statement and that his sentence was excessive. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dewayne Harris v. Steve Upton, Warden
In 2018, a Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dewayne Edward Harris, of joyriding, carjacking, and aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Harris v. State, No. M2023-00681- CCA-R3-PC, 2024 WL 4164998, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2024), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2025). The Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Lee Teague
The Defendant, Robin Lee Teague, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing material that depicted a minor engaged in sexual activity, a B felony based on his possession of more than 100 images, and two counts of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor for exchanging material that included a minor engaged in sexual activity, a Class C felony. The plea agreement contemplated the trial court determining the sentence, and it sentenced him to twelve years for the B felony and six years for each of the C felonies. The trial court then ordered that all the sentences run consecutively to each other for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing, in part because it used Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(10) to enhance his sentence, which he asserts is forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. After review, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied 40-35-115(b)(10) to order consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction but remand the case for a new sentencing hearing during which the trial court will reconsider whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mohamed Miray
Mohamed Miray, Defendant, was indicted for and convicted of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant was identified and charged in part based upon a match to DNA found at the scene of the murder. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that his DNA was not properly in the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) because he was acquitted of a charge for which he was required to give a DNA sample when arrested and that his DNA should have been removed from the database as a result of the acquittal. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted by a jury and filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Bryan Hibdon v. Danielle Goynes
A father petitioned a Tennessee court to modify its previous parenting plan. The father lived in Tennessee, but the mother and the child lived in Arkansas. Claiming Tennessee was an inconvenient forum, the mother moved to transfer the case to Arkansas. The court denied the transfer request. Later, the court entered a default judgment against the mother as a sanction for her failure to appear for her deposition. After hearing proof, it adopted the father’s proposed parenting plan. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the parenting plan. She also challenges the court’s denial of her transfer request, its refusal to set aside the default judgment, and the adoption of a modified plan. We conclude that the court erred in modifying the parenting plan without conducting a best interest analysis. So we vacate the adoption of a modified plan and remand for further proceedings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kelly, et al. v. Thomas A. Stewart
This appeal concerns the garnishment of an inherited Individual Retirement Account. Advanced Hearing Aid Group, LLC (“AHAG”), Gary Kelly, Kenneth Kelly, and Matthew Kelly (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) filed an application for writ of garnishment in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas A. Stewart (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs sought to collect a judgment against Defendant stemming from a lawsuit over AHAG. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to garnish an IRA that Defendant inherited from his mother (“the Inherited IRA”). Defendant is both a fiduciary and beneficiary of the Inherited IRA. Defendant filed a motion to quash, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) and its exemption of certain retirement plans from garnishment. The Trial Court held that, while the Inherited IRA was exempt from garnishment initially, it lost its exempt status because Defendant made prohibited transactions from the Inherited IRA to a disqualified party, a revocable trust of which Defendant is a 50% or more beneficiary (“the Revocable Trust”). Defendant appeals, arguing that he essentially transferred the funds to himself, which all sides agree is permitted. We hold, inter alia, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-105(b) never applied to the Inherited IRA in the first place. We hold further that, even if the Inherited IRA had once been exempt, it stopped being exempt after Defendant’s prohibited transactions. We affirm as modified. Pursuant to AHAG’s operating agreement, AHAG is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal, the amount of which the Trial Court is to determine on remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |