Opinions
State of Tennessee v. Claude David Merritt
The Defendant, Claude David Merritt, entered an "open" guilty plea to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-218(d). The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Russell Lenox Hamblin
The defendant, Russell Lenox Hamblin, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years for each of the first two convictions and to twelve years for the third conviction. All the sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the sale and purchase of automobiles; the trial court abused its discretion in allowing his credibility to be impeached; and he was improperly sentenced. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Hall v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Hall, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence for his conviction of possession with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a schedule II controlled substance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie L. Dozier
A Macon County jury convicted the Defendant, Jackie L. Dozier, of three counts of sexual battery, three counts of incest, and one count of attempted sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years, ordering the defendant to serve two years of his sentence in jail and the rest on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal; (2) imposed consecutive sentencing; and (3) imposed a period of confinement in excess of one year as part of a sentence of split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the evidence supports the defendant's convictions, but the trial court erred when it sentenced the defendant. As such, we affirm the defendant's convictions, but we reverse the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing and order the defendant's sentences to be served concurrently. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason E. McLean
Appellant, Jason E. McLean, was charged with first degree murder after he shot and killed eighteen-year-old Sean Powell. At trial, the jury found appellant not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of reckless homicide, a lesser-included offense. The trial court denied appellant's request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to the four-year maximum sentence. It then suspended all but ninety days and ordered appellant to serve eleven years and two-hundred and seventy-five days on probation. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying judicial diversion; (2) sentencing appellant to the maximum sentence in the applicable range; and (3) ordering a lengthy probationary period. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
SNPCO Inc., d/b/a Salvage Unlimited vs. City of Jefferson City, et al
The question before this Court is whether the grandfather clause of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b)(1) protects the owner of newly annexed city property from the enforcement of a citywide ordinance prohibiting the sale and storage of fireworks. Interpreting section 13-7-208(b)(1) strictly against the landowner, we hold that the grandfather clause does not apply because the ordinance is not a "zoning" restriction or regulation, i.e., the ordinance does not regulate the use of property within distinct districts or zones pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan. Accepting the facts alleged in the landowner's amended complaint as true, the landowner is not entitled to an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance against its preexisting fireworks business. We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the landowner's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Prestige Land Company vs. Brian Mullins Excavating Contractors, Inc.
Prestige Land Company ("Developer") owned land upon which it intended to build a commercial shopping center. An estimate to complete the project was obtained. Thereafter, the project was opened up for bidding. Brian Mullins Excavating Contractors, Inc. ("Contractor") bid on the project. Although contractor's bid was significantly lower than the next lowest bid, it was only 10% lower than the estimated costs of construction. Contractor was unaware that it had made a unilateral mistake in its bid. Contractor was awarded the project. Eventually, contractor was unable to complete the project because it ran out of money due to its unilateral bidding mistake. Developer sued for breach of contract, and contractor filed a counterclaim for fraud and other claims. The trial court awarded contractor a judgment for $101,357.05. Finding no clear and convincing evidence of fraud by developer, we vacate the judgment for contractor and enter a judgment for developer in the amount of $128,326.56. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of David Holt Ralston, Deceased by John A. Ralston, Personal Representative v. Fred R. Hobbs, et al.
The personal representative of a decedent's estate filed This action to rescind twelve deeds, all of which were executed by the decedent's attorney-In-fact without the decedent's knowledge and for which the decedent received no consideration, or alternatively for damages. the attorney-In-fact conveyed the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter. the personal representative alleges that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty In making the transfers. the trial court agreed, and rescinded the conveyances for property still owned by the attorney-In-fact and awarded monetary damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of property subsequently conveyed to innocent third parties. the attorney-In-fact appeals claiming, inter alia, the personal representative lacks standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate involving real property, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the trial court erred In finding that the durable power of attorney did not authorize him to transfer the property. We have determined the personal representative has standing to maintain This action and the action was timely filed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter for no consideration to the decedent. We also affirm the rescission of the deeds to property the attorney-In-fact still owns and the award of damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of the real property that has since been conveyed to innocent third parties. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Janson Pope v. Sayuri Pope
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court's division of property and award of alimony and attorney's fees to Husband and asserts that the manner and conduct of the hearing violated her right to procedural due process. We reverse the judgment in part and remand the case for the court to classify the parties' property, to value and divide the property it determines to be marital property, and to redetermine the amount of attorney's fees to Husband. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Rainwater, et al. v. Sumner County, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa L. Weaver, et al. v. Travis K. Pardue, et al.
This appeal arises out of a primary care physician's alleged negligent and tortious treatment of a longtime patient. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, questioning the credibility of the patient's allegations and holding in part that the physician's alleged conduct could not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., et al vs. Jennifer L. Lund - Concurring
I concur in the decision to vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. I agree that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) controls the outcome of this appeal. I further agree that the issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs intentionally caused the delay in the prompt service of the summons. I further agree that the record before us shows that Plaintiffs did make at least some attempts to serve Defendant. This being so, I agree that Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that Plaintiffs intentionally delayed service of the summons. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., et al vs. Jennifer L. Lund
Carter County -Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County. With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Beal v. Nashville Electric Service a/k/a Electric Power Board of Nashville and Davidson County
Employee had been absent from work on paid sick leave for an extended period of time when employer conducted an investigation and learned that he was working as a real estate agent. An administrative law judge conducted a hearing and recommended termination. The Board unanimously upheld the ALJ's findings and terminated employee. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Nicholson v. Lester Hubbard Realtors, et al.
After plaintiff appealed from general sessions to circuit court, the circuit court entered an order requiring her to file a formal complaint. The circuit court then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. We find no error in the trial court's decision to require plaintiff to file a formal complaint, but we reverse its determination that the amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Ray Kennedy v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Steven Ray Kennedy, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the court should have given him fifteen days to file an amended petition that conformed to the statutory requirements or appointed counsel to assist in presenting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition by the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lou Ella Sherrill, et al. v. Bob T. Souder, M.D., et al.
This litigation involves a claim of medical malpractice against the two defendants, a physician and the corporation operating his clinical practice, alleging negligence in the prescription of a drug. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds that the suit was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The question before the Court is the propriety of summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Although the trial court properly concluded that the cause of action accrued more than a year before the suit was filed, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the limitations period. Because the suit was not time-barred as a matter of law, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
Dexter F. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, appeals from the post-conviction court's order denying his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doyle Benton
The Defendant, Doyle Benton, pled guilty and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years' confinement for criminal conspiracy to sell schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony; to five years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony; and to three years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule III narcotics, a Class D felony; all to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of five years' confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentences are excessive in length and that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Anthony Bailey v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner John Anthony Bailey filed the present petition for post-conviction relief in 2009 seeking relief from convictions entered in 1995 and 1996. Petitioner acknowledged that his petition was not filed within the one year statute of limitations; however, he asserted that due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arthur A. Winquist, et al vs. James A. Goodwin, et al
This case was precipitated when defendants blocked plaintiffs' use of an existing driveway. Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to use the driveway and that defendants would be required to restore the driveway as well as the excavations damaging plaintiffs' lots. On appeal, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry A. Ridley vs. James G. Neeley, et al
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
84 Lumber Company vs. R. Bryan Smith, et al - Concurring
I agree with so much of the majority opinion as affirms the trial court’s judgment against Allstate Building System, LLC. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s decision (1) to reverse the judgment in favor of 84 Lumber Company against R. Bryan Smith and (2) to grant summary judgment to Mr. Smith. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
84 Lumber Company vs. R. Bryan Smith, et al
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Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Danny E. Rogers vs. Steven Payne, et al
This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, which he filed after he was convicted by the prison disciplinary board of participating In security threat group activity. after reviewing the record, the trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals |