State of Tennessee v. Mariet L. Patrick
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Mariet L. Patrick, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony, possession of .5 ounces or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-417. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Boris Darrell Fry
A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Boris Darrell Fry, of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard, Range I offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Lee Melvin v. Wendy Ann Melvin
Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s order awarding him no visitation with the parties’ children, its classification and award of property to Mother, and the award of attorney’s fees to mother. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand to the trial court to set visitation. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Eric Garvin, Jr.
In 2007, the Defendant, John Eric Garvin, Jr., pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, but the trial court suspended the entry of his judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for a term of three years. The Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his diverted sentence by, among other things, possessing a Schedule II drug, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and driving on a suspended license, second offense. The Defendant pled guilty to each of these offenses and admitted violating the terms of his diversion. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of two years for his reckless aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine additional years for the offenses he committed while on diversion, ordering those sentences to be served consecutively to his two-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his total effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Daniel Pack
The Defendant-Appellant, Steven Daniel Pack, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Coffee County to driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for driving under the influence, third offense, all of which was suspended after service of 180 days in confinement. In regard to the driving on a revoked license conviction, Pack was sentenced to six months, all of which was suspended after service of 60 days in confinement. These sentences were to be served consecutively. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pack reserved as a certified question of law whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop and detention of the defendant as required by the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Mallory v. Jim Keras Chevrolet
Appellant appealed the trial court’s order granting a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Jefferson County, Tennessee v. Margaret Smith
Jefferson County, Tennessee filed a petition against Margaret Vance Smith, seeking to recover possession of the unexecuted marriage license issued to David (“Davy”) Crockett and Margaret Elder by the county’s clerk in 1805. The action was filed pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-504, which prohibits the destruction of, tampering with, or fabrication of government records. The trial court entered a final judgment against Mrs. Smith, ordering the immediate return of the marriage license to Jefferson County. Mrs. Smith appealed. We affirm as modified. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan D. Malone v. James P. Malone
This is a divorce case. The husband appeals, challenging the trial court’s determinations regarding the classification of property and the valuation and distribution of the marital assets. Wife raises additional issues concerning the property classification and attorney fees. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Lazar v. J.W. Aluminum
An employee settled his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or the employee’s independent medical examiner. After the employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) (2008). The chancery court declined to use the impairment rating of the treating physician or the independent medical examiner. The court further declined to base its increased award on a rating from an independent medical evaluation of the employee conducted after the settlement by a physician listed in the Medical Impairment Rating registry of the Tennessee Department of Labor. The chancery court instead awarded additional permanent partial disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. The employer appealed. We affirm the chancery court. |
Madison | Supreme Court | |
James E. Stem v. Thompson Services, Inc., et al
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(3)(3) (2008) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appeal involves a dispute regarding the type and amount of temporary benefits an employee working two jobs is entitled to following an injury at one of the employee’s jobs. After sustaining a work-related injury that required the employee to discontinue one but not both of his jobs, the employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County. After the trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits, the employer appealed and asserted that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits because he continued to work at his second job. We conclude that the employee is entitled to temporary partial, rather than temporary total, disability benefits and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of these benefits. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Richard L. Hollow, Trustee v. Beulah Butler, ET AL.
Richard L. Hollow, Trustee (“Plaintiff”) sued Beulah Butler with regard to a boundary line dispute. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the common boundary line between Plaintiff’s real property and Ms. Butler’s real property is as shown on a September 17, 2003 survey prepared by Plaintiff’s surveyor, James Ogle, and that Ms. Butler had not proven adverse possession, laches, or gross laches. Ms. Butler appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Clara Jean West, by and through Janet L. Harvey, Conservator; and Estate of Robert Stokes West, by and through Janet L. Harvey, Administrator, v. Regions Bank
This appeal involves a claim against a bank for conversion. The decedent signed a durable power of attorney appointing his nephew as his attorney-in-fact. Both the decedent and the nephew had accounts at the defendant bank. Using the power of attorney, the nephew endorsed checks made payable to the decedent and deposited them into his own bank accounts at the defendant bank. By the time the decedent died a few months later, the nefarious nephew had almost completely depleted the decedent’s estate. The estate of the decedent and the decedent’s wife filed this lawsuit against the bank. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, based on the statutory immunity granted to banks for recognizing a power of attorney in T.C.A.§ 45-2-707(d). The plaintiff now appeals, arguing that the immunity statute is inapplicable because her claim arose under the UCC, T.C.A. §§ 47-3-307 and 47-3-420. We reverse, finding that T.C.A. § 45-2-707 is inapplicable to the transactions at issue in this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Steele
A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Joseph Steele, for rape of a child less than thirteen years of age. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment because the State had allegedly lost or destroyed a videotape of the victim’s interview with Michigan Children’s Services. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictment, and the State now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Defendant’s indictment without discussing the relevant factors required by State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider and make findings of fact regarding whether dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment is appropriate in light of Ferguson. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Erik Guerrero
A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Erik Guerrero, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed proof of the Defendant’s gang membership to be admitted into evidence at trial; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed a recorded telephone conversation between the Defendant and a co-defendant to be admitted into evidence at trial; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the Defendant’s statements made at the scene of the crime to be admitted into evidence at trial; and (5) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the natural and probable consequences rule. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Carpenter v. David Metler, State Farm Insurance & Cortese Tree Specialist, Inc.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal for a non-final judgment entered by the trial court. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Osborne
Appellant, Danny Osborne, pled guilty to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a schedule II controlled substance, and criminal impersonation. As a result, he received a two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Appellant was subsequently released to probation. One month later, a warrant was issued for violation of probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of the original sentence in confinement. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where there was substantial evidence to support the revocation of probation. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Rodney Butler
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant of solicitation of a minor to commit rape of a child, a Class B felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; and indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years, two years, and six months, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the solicitation of a minor conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlie B. York
A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie B. York, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law with a prior DUI conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, fifteen days of which were to be served in jail, with the remainder on probation. For the implied consent violation, the trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the mandatory minimum sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nelson Troglin v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to 23 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury, instructing the jury to reach a verdict before the July 4th holiday, and in failing to sentence him in open court; (2) that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion to recuse and his motion for funds to obtain a ballistics expert; and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County v. David Douglas Ollis
Driver of a sedan was given citations for not having the certificate of public convenience and license necessary to operate a taxicab. The citations were upheld by the general sessions and circuit courts. Driver appeals, claiming that his sedan is not a taxi and that the lower courts did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Michael Bane v. State of Tennessee
In 1990 a Shelby County jury convicted, the Petitioner, John Michael Bane, of felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1993). After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again imposed a sentence of death, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s imposition of this sentence. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his original trial and at his resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury; and (3) the death penalty is unconstitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddie Frank Graves v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of three petitions for writ of certiorari for review of his disciplinary conviction for assault while incarcerated at the South Central Correctional Facility. The trial court dismissed the action based on Petitioner’s failure to adhere to the statutory verification requirements in his petitions. Petitioner appealed. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald Thomas v. Rivergate Auto Parts, et al.
An individual took his automobile to an auto parts company, apparently to sell it for parts. The individual alleged that he had electronics and baseball cards in the automobile that were stolen at the auto parts company. The trial court dismissed the complaint without making findings of fact, and the individual appealed. The record contains the exhibits introduced at trial but no transcript of the proceedings or deposition testimony. Without a record of the proceedings from the lower court to review, we are unable to reverse the trial court or provide the appellant with the relief he seeks. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Morris v. Trucy Bloodworth
Inmate filed a legal malpractice action against the attorney who represented him in the direct appeal of his criminal conviction for aggravated robbery. Three years later, the trial court dismissed the inmate’s lawsuit for failure to prosecute. We affirm the result reached by the trial court because the denial of the inmate’s petition for post-conviction relief precludes his claim for legal malpractice. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Brown v. Columbia Precast, LLC, et al.
An employee was promised 10% ownership interest in the company he worked for if he stayed with the company for six years. When the time came to transfer the employee’s 10% interest to him, however, the parties learned that the tax laws then in effect made the transfer impractical at that time. The parties therefore decided to delay the transfer. The parties entered into a contract the following year which the employer interpreted to mean that the employee was giving up his 10% ownership interest in exchange for a raise in his salary plus 10% of the company’s net profits each year. The employee claimed he did not give up his 10% ownership interest and sued the company and former majority owner for his 10% interest when the company was sold a few years later. The trial court concluded the employee did not give up his 10% ownership interest by signing the later agreement and awarded the employee 10% of the company’s net profits for the years following the employee’s termination plus 10% of the ultimate purchase price. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |