State of Tennessee v. Michael Lewis
Appellant, Michael Lewis, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for child abuse. Appellant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court. The State filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant toTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 and an application for stay. This Court granted the appeal and found that the trial court improperly granted the new trial, reinstating Appellant’s convictions and sentence. State v. Michael Lewis, No. E2008-02141-CCA-R9-CD, 2009 WL 4017158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 20, 2009). On remand, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Appellant appeals to this Court, seeking resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the indictment was valid; (2) whether the verdict form was invalid; (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony from Tonya Hickman and Rhonda Sills about statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Appellant’s children at the sentencing hearing; and (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to issues 1-5. However, we determine that the trial courtimproperly ordered Appellant to serve his sentence consecutively to a sentence for civil contempt. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that Appellant’s sentence is to be served concurrently to his sentence for civil contempt. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodreigors Jefferson
A Shelby County jury convicted Rodreigors Jefferson (“the Defendant”) of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to eighteen years, six months. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and that the trial court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement factor. Following a careful review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Pettigrew
The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Pettigrew, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes, and Celine Hayes as an individual v. Loudon County, Tennessee, et al.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death. The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Scott M. Craig v. David Mills, Warden - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In July 1998, a Bradley County jury convicted Scott M. Craig (“petitioner”) of two counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated kidnapping and assessed a twentyfive thousand dollar ($25,000) fine on one of the aggravated rape convictions and twenty thousand dollar ($20,000) fines on each of the other convictions, for aggregate fines of sixtyfive thousand dollars ($65,000). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years for the aggravated rape convictions and a consecutive eight-year sentence for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-three years. On July 27, 1998, judgments were entered reflecting each conviction and sentence; however, these judgments did not reflect the fines imposed by the jury, nor did these judgments reflect imposition of any sexual offense surcharge. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-709 (2010). |
Morgan | Supreme Court | |
Jacqueline G. Furlong v. Kevin Keane Furlong
Kevin Keane Furlong (“Husband”) is the estranged husband of Jacqueline G. Furlong(“Wife”). Wife secured an order of protection in Sevier County that generally prohibits Husband from committing any untoward act against Wife and having any contact with her. As later amended in the Knox County Circuit Court (“the trial court”), the order also states that Husband could come to the marital residence to repair Wife’s automobile. In addition, the court identified two dated time periods, and, with respect to each period, specified which of the parties would have the use of the “inside” of the marital home and when they would have that use, and which would have the use of the “outside,” i.e., presumably the parties’ realty surrounding the house, and when. When Husband came to the residence to repair Wife’s automobile at 7:10 p.m., which, according to the order of protection, was arguably ten minutes beyond the time within which the vehicle was to be repaired, Wife filed a motion asking that he be held in contempt for not repairing the vehicle and for coming about her outside the allowed time frame. The trial court held Husband in criminal contempt, sentenced him to ten days in jail, and extended the order of protection for five years. He was not to be released from jail unless and until he complied with a statute requiring him to post a bond in the minimum amount of $2,500. He served his sentence and obtained a stay of the bond requirement pending appeal. Husband appeals challenging the finding of contempt as well as the constitutionality of the statutory bond requirement. The Tennessee Attorney General ade an appearance on appeal to support the constitutionality of the statute. We reverse, in its entirety, the last order of protection and judgment of criminal contempt entered by the trial court on November 23, 2010. It is held for naught. In view of our reversal, we do not find it necessary or appropriate to reach the constitutional issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rebecca Ann Galyean
The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Ann Galyean, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, two counts of vehicular assault by intoxication, a Class D felony, and two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions for driving under the influence into the conviction for vehicular homicide. The Defendant-Appellant received an effective eleven-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant-Appellant’s blood analysis tested positive for “less than 0.25 µg/ml” of Tramadol; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial based on the removal of Defendant-Appellant’s mother from the courtroom during trial; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions; however, we conclude that the trial court erroneously sentenced her beyond the statutory maximum for vehicular assault. Therefore, we modify the Defendant-Appellant’s sentences for vehicular assault to four years, the maximum in the range, and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Triangle American Homes v. Samuel B. Harrison, et al
In this indemnity case, Jere Krieg (“Builder”), through Triangle American Homes, Inc., initially filed a complaint for attachment and damages against Samuel and Lauren Harrison (collectively “the Harrisons”) relating to the construction of a modular home. When the Harrisons filed a counterclaim, arguing that Builder had failed to perform pursuant to their contract, Builder brought a third-party complaint against All American Homes of Tennessee, LLC (“Seller”), alleging that Seller should indemnify Builder. Builder and the Harrisons entered into a settlement agreement. In the remaining suit for indemnification, Seller argued that Builder was not entitled to indemnity because the damages and losses sustained by Builder were a result of Builder’s actions. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that Builder was entitled to damages in the amount of $45,000 and attorney fees in the amount of $45,000, for a total award of $90,000. Seller appeals. We modify the award of attorney fees to $18,084 and affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shawn Merritt
The petitioner, Shawn Merritt, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition to set aside his guilty pleas. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to inform him of the lifetime supervision requirement attending his convictions of rape of a child, rendering his pleas involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leroy Jackson, Jr. v. Purdy Brothers Trucking Co., Inc., et al
This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer (“truck”) collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated (“PBTCI”) and Loudon County Trucking (“LCT”), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking (“PBT”). Mr. Jackson’s truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively “Trucking Company”) for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 1 The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court’s final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Turner
The defendant was indicted for a murder that occurred nearly ten years prior to his arrest. The defendant’s theory of the case implicated two other men as the individuals responsible for the murder. These men previously had been tried and acquitted of the murder. Over the objection of the defendant, the State introduced evidence of the prior acquittals of the other men. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of first degree murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the evidence of the acquittals of the other parties was irrelevant and that the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Kristie Jackson v. Williamson & Sons Funeral Home, et al
In this negligence case, Kristie Jackson sued Williamson & Sons Funeral Home (the “Funeral Home”) for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress following the burial of her mother, Edna Louise Lewis. Ms. Jackson alleged that the Funeral Home was negligent in failing to delay the burial after learning that she objected to the arrangements that had been made and that the Funeral Home’s actions caused her emotional distress. The Funeral Home moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the Funeral Home had affirmatively negated an essential element of Ms. Jackson’s claim by showing that it did not owe a duty to her under the circumstances of the case. Ms. Jackson appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James G. Watson v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The petitioner, James G. Watson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he failed to receive statutorily mandated pretrial jail and good behavior credits toward his sentences, which rendered his confinement illegal. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dexter Johnson v. David Sexton, Warden
The petitioner, Dexter Johnson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, receiving an effective life sentence in the Department of Correction. In the instant petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner alleges that his convictions are void based upon the State’s failure to provide a factual basis to support the pleas. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that nothing in the petition would support a finding that the convictions were void. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court erred in its summary dismissal. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nelson Troglin v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, at the motion for new trial, and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Bradford Stewart
Charles Bradford Stewart, Appellant, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for one count of reckless endangerment, one count of vehicular assault, one count of failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and two counts of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of reckless aggravated assault and one count of vehicular assault, both Class D felonies. Appellant pled guilty to failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility. The trial court merged the convictions for reckless aggravated assault and vehicular assault into one conviction for vehicular assault and sentenced Appellant to twelve years in incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on Community Corrections. The State appealed. On appeal, the following issue is presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court imposed an improper sentence by allowing Appellant to serve a sentence of split confinement. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that as a Career Offender sentenced to twelve years, Appellant was statutorily ineligible for a CommunityCorrections sentence. Accordingly,the matter is reversed and remanded for resentencing. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Ray Tipton
The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Ray Tipton, was convicted by a Washington County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to a twenty-two year term of imprisonment for each conviction, with two sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective forty-four year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Tipton raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the three counts of aggravated rape should be merged into a single conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing an emergency room physician to testify regarding the effect of intoxication on a man’s ability to ejaculate; (4) whether the sentence length for each conviction was excessive; and (5) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry Nichols v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Green v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Alvin Green, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty-six years, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
This is an appeal from an administrative hearing wherein the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners suspended a physician’s medical license for one year and imposed other conditions after finding that, among other things, the physician had violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12) (2010). Upon review, the trial court affirmed the Board’s ruling; however, because the Board failed to articulate the applicable standard of care in its deliberations, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board was required to articulate the standard of care in its deliberations. Therefore, we vacate the ruling of the trial court to the extent that it affirms the Board’s decision that the physician violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 63-6-214(b)(1),(4), and (12). However, rather than reversing the Board’s decisions, we are remanding the matter to the Board and instructing it to conduct deliberations based on the existing record and articulate the applicable standard of care as required by the statute. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Joseph Edward Rich, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners - Dissenting
The majority asserts that the Board must “articulate what the standard of care is in its deliberations.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-214(g)(2010). To this end, the majority today has found “the standard of care” to be unambiguous. I also find this language to be unambiguous. My reading of Tennessee Code Annotated section 63-6-214(g), however, compels a different conclusion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
James L. Lessenberry v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James L. Lessenberry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for nine offenses: rape, a Class B felony; incest, a Class C felony; four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies; and three counts of attempted rape, Class C felonies. Under the plea agreement, he is to serve twelve years for rape as a violent offender and six years as a Range I offender for each of the remaining convictions, with all sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a previous drug conviction for which the trial court revoked his five-year community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying his post-conviction claim that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marceline Lasater v. Kenneth J. Hawkins, et al.
A contract for the sale of a sixty-four acre tract of land provided that a vacant house on the tract and the lot immediately surrounding it would automatically revert to the seller if the buyers did not install a water line across the property within a year of the contract’s execution. The same condition was set out in the warranty deed. The buyers failed to install the water line, but the seller, a Texas resident, did not immediately attempt to retake possession of the house and lot. Five years after the contract was signed, the seller filed a “notice of automatic reverter of title,” followed by a declaratory judgment suit to quiet title and to recover damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the seller, ruling that the contract and the deed created a fee simple determinable and, therefore, that ownership of the disputed property reverted to her by operation of law one year after the contract of sale was executed. A hearing on damages resulted in an award to the seller of about $142,000 in compensatory damages, which included income that the buyers had collected from renting out the house prior to the filing of the notice of reverter. Buyers contend on appeal that the estate created by the contract of sale was not a fee simple determinable, but rather a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, a form of future interest under which the property does not revert to the seller until the seller takes some action to retake possession of the property. Such an interest would result in a much smaller award of damages against the buyers under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract of sale created a fee simple determinable, but we modify its award of damages to correct an error. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Tyson Foods (Re: Sandra Gibson) v. Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Workers' Compensation Division
Employer filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari to challenge the order of the Tennessee Department of Labor, issued pursuant to the Request for Assistance protocol, that it provide temporary disability and medical workers’ compensation benefits. Upon the motion of the Departmentof Labor,the trial court dismissed the petition on two grounds: that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision and that the employer possessed another adequate remedy at law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6238(b)(6). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deangelo M. Radley
The defendant, Deangelo M. Radley, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2006), and attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2), concerning the legality of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |