State of Tennessee v. Cassie Kristin Chapman
Appellant, Cassie Chapman, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of theft over $1,000 and one count of aggravated burglary. She pled guilty to the charges and agreed to a three-year sentence for one count of theft, a two-year sentence for the second count of theft, and a three-year sentence for aggravated burglary. The plea agreement specified that one two-year sentence for theft and the sentence for aggravated burglary would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the three-year sentence for aggravated burglary would run consecutively to the theft sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the theft sentences. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to incarceration. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alejandro Guana v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alejandro Guana, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree murder which resulted in a life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel and trial court errors. Specifically, he submits that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) failing to investigate and interview the State’s witnesses, leaving him unprepared for cross-examination; (2) conceding that the Petitioner’s actions were intentional, abandoning any viable defense; (3) failing to call an expert witness on his intoxication at the time of the shooting and failing to present a defense of diminished capacity; (4) failing to preserve his request for a mistrial and offer proof regarding a memorial service for the victim which took place during the sentencing phase of the Petitioner’s trial; and (5) failing to ask for individual voir dire of any particular juror. As for appellate counsel, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance by counsel’s failure to pursue the memorial service issue and the omission of a jury instruction on accomplice testimony on appeal. Finally, he alleges trial court error regarding the trial court’s failure to give the instruction on accomplice testimony and the failure to declare a mistrial based upon the memorial service. Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin Gunn
Benjamin Gunn (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of possession of cocaine, one count of possession with intent to sell 14.175 grams or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana, and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court merged the two convictions for possession of cocaine. The trial court also merged the conviction for possession with intent to deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana into the conviction for possession with intent to sell 14.175 grams or more of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eight years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver 14.175 grams or more of marijuana. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jimmy Yarbro v. State of Tennessee
Jimmy Yarbro (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to theft of property of $10,000 or more and burglary. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of eight years, with restitution and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the Petitioner serve his sentence in confinement. The court also ordered restitution of $17,000 in increments of $200 per month beginning sixty days after the Petitioner’s release. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: A. W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child A.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found A.W. to be an unruly child. A.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding A.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. A.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. A.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that A.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. A.W. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: M. R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the minor child M.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found M.R. to be an unruly child. M.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding M.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. M.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. M.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that M.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. M.R. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Wayne Webb v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Larry Wayne Webb, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for forgery and identity theft, for which he is serving an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range III, career offender. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Tyrone Greer v. State of Tennessee
Gregory Tyrone Greer (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of reckless aggravated assault by a Madison County jury. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Eimile A.M.
This case is before us once again after remand to the Trial Court for specific findings relative to the Trial Court’s termination of the parental rights of Christopher M. (“Father”) to the minor child Eimile A.M. (“the Child”). Upon remand the Trial Court entered its findings of fact. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the Child. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was not proven of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 for willful failure to visit or willful failure to support. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In re: T. W.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child T.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found T.W. to be an unruly child. T.W. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding T.W. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. T.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. T.W. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that T.W.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. T.W. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re: B. R.
This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child B.R. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found B.R. to be an unruly child. B.R. some time later filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss regarding the order finding B.R. to be an unruly child, citing constitutional, procedural, and jurisdictional defects. The Juvenile Court denied the petition to vacate. B.R. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We reversed the Circuit Court on appeal, and remanded for the Circuit Court to hear the appeal of the denial of the petition to vacate. B.R. filed an amended petition to vacate and later a motion for summary judgment. The State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that B.R.’s claims could not be redressed by a Tenn. R. Juv. P. 34 petition to vacate. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. B.R. appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Leigh Czerniak v. Anthony Kyle Czerniak
Petitioner in a divorce proceeding filed a motion to disqualify the trial court alleging that the court made comments and exhibited conduct at a hearing which indicated that the court was biased against her and that she could not receive a fair trial. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion to disqualify. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Morrow Elliott, et al v. Michael R. Morrow
In this real property dispute, the plaintiffs, three siblings, brought a complaint against the defendant landowner, a fourth sibling, alleging that he was trespassing on an approximately 15-acre parcel of land deeded to them by their mother and requesting that the trial court declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the disputed acreage. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that despite an ambiguity in the relevant deed, the parties’ mother intended to convey the disputed acreage to the defendant as part of a larger 28.33-acre parcel in 1988. The plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Reid R. Crumpton v. Patricia G. Grissom, et al
Reid R. Crumpton (“Plaintiff”) sued Patricia G. Grissom (“Affiliate Broker”), Ashley Carpenter, and Mary Bea Corbitt (“Managing Broker”) in connection with a real estate sales contract for real property containing both a house and a business. The Managing Broker filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, in part, that she was not personally involved in Plaintiff’s purchase of the real property at issue and had no knowledge of the details of the transaction, and, therefore, could not be held liable for the actions of the Affiliate Broker. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order granting the Managing Broker summary judgment and making its judgment final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker. We find and hold that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 62-13-101, et seq. creates a duty on the part of the Managing Broker, and that the Managing Broker failed to show that she met the standard of care sufficient to satisfy her duty. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Managing Broker, and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia v. State of Tennessee
In this post-conviction proceeding the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The petitioner also alleged that his plea was involuntary and unknowing because the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(J). The post-conviction trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We conclude that the record fully supports the post-conviction court’s findings that trial counsel advised the petitioner he would be deported upon pleading guilty and that his guilty plea could have an adverse effect upon his ability to return legally to the United States. We also agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(J) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the proof shows that the petitioner was aware his guilty plea would result in his deportation and could adversely affect his ability to return legally to the United States. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Warren | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Lawrence D. Ralph, Jr.
The Defendant, Lawrence D. Ralph, Jr., was convicted by a Warren County jury for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act; driving with a revoked license, fifth offense; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon; reckless driving; and evading arrest. The Defendant received an effective sentence of eight years in confinement. The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court, and subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. After concluding that we lacked jurisdiction, we dismissed the appeal. See State v. Lawrence D. Ralph, No. M2010-00195-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 766941 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 4, 2011). The Defendant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court granted the Defendant a delayed appeal to appeal issues raised during trial and in his motion for new trial. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and that his sentence is excessive and violates double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Gross
The defendant, David Wayne Gross, appeals the sentencing decision denying him an alternative sentence. The defendant pled guilty to violating a habitual traffic offender order, two counts of theft over $1000, two counts of identity theft, two counts of forgery, and theft under $500. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received an effective four-year sentence and was allowed to petition the court for an alternative sentence. A hearing was held, after which the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in incarceration. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of alternative sentencing. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antone D. Redeemer
The Defendant, Antoine D. Redeemer, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order revoking his effective eight-year community corrections sentence for his aggravated burglary and robbery convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentences and ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Westgate Smoky Mountains at Gatlinburg v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al.
The claimant is a licensed time-share salesperson who sold time-share interests at a resort owned by Westgate in Gatlinburg, Tennessee. When resort management terminated the business relationship, the claimant filed for state unemployment benefits with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The initial agency decision, the Appeals Tribunal, and the Board of Review affirmed an award of benefits to the claimant, concluding that a time-share salesperson is not a licensed real estate agent and therefore is not subject to the Tennessee Employment Security Law’s exclusion for services performed by a “qualified real estate agent.” Westgate sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that a time-share salesperson is a “licensed real estate agent” and that the claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a “qualified real estate agent.” The Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s findings, and Westgate appealed. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the chancery court. |
Sevier | Supreme Court | |
Zoyle Jones v. State of Tennessee
The issue presented in this case is one of first impression: whether cabinet-level state executive officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims arising out of statements made while performing their official duties. An employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) was disciplined for double-billing claims for his job-related travel expenses to both the state and a private organization. After the TDOC Commissioner responded to media inquiries about the employee’s demotion for violating the state’s travel billing policy, the employee sued the State of Tennessee and the TDOC for defamation. The State moved for summaryjudgment, asserting that the TDOC Commissioner had an absolute privilege to make the allegedly defamatory statements to the media. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State’s motion. Upon review, we hold that the State is absolutely immune from the employee’s defamation claims that relate to the TDOC Commissioner’s statements in response to media inquiries about the employee’s demotion. This ruling allows cabinet-level officials to perform their governmental duties free from legal harassment and uninhibited by the fear of potential lawsuits arising out of their job-related speech. It also furthers the vital free-expression principle that the public has a right to receive critical information from the government and its public officials, who must be free to speak with complete candor about matters of public importance. The judgment of the Claims Commission is reversed. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Scott Riley
The Defendant-Appellant, Patrick Scott Riley, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. He previously entered a guilty plea to burglary and received an eight-year suspended sentence. On appeal, Riley argues that the trial court unreasonably conditioned his community corrections sentence on the requirement that he “get off any and all opiates or other medications that have any addictive qualities” within sixty days of the September 5, 2012 sentencing hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the issue challenging the conditions of his community corrections sentence is waived by Riley’s failure to timely appeal the trial court’s initial order. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Riley’s community corrections sentence and ordering his original eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dominc Eric Frausto
The Defendant, Dominic Eric Frausto, was convicted by a Union County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the State did not prove the corpus delicti, (2) the trial court erred in failing to comply with Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 24 during jury selection, and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum in the range. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Jackson Coffelt v. State of Tennessee and Jerry Lester, Warden
The Petitioner, Billy Jackson Coffelt, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1983 conviction for robbery by the use of a deadly weapon and resulting life sentence after being found to be a habitual criminal offender. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Martin, Jr.
The Defendant, Charles Martin, Jr., pled guilty to one count of kidnapping, as a Range II, multiple offender, with an agreed upon eight-year sentence. The trial court determined the manner of service, and the Defendant was placed in the Community Corrections Program and ordered to serve 180 days in confinement. A violation warrant was filed. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement based upon the Defendant’s commission of new crimes and his consumption of alcohol while at a local grocery store. The Defendant appeals the order of total incarceration. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dean v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Dean, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |