Lawrence Freeze v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Lawrence Freeze, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled nolo contendere to aggravated sexual battery and rape, both Class B felonies, and received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the court erred in denying his petition because he was denied effective assistance of counsel, which resulted in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel’s failure to be prepared for trial left him with no choice but to accept the agreement. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamar Mandell Cullom
Appellant, Lamar Mandell Cullom, was convicted in Count I of the indictment of casual exchange of a controlled substance as a lesser-included offense of the indicted offense of sale of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone. He was convicted in Count II of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days and fifteen years, respectively. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and testimony of a law enforcement officer that allegedly implied that appellant had a prior criminal history. Following our review, we affirm appellant’s convictions. However, we remand for entry of a single judgment form indicating merger of the convictions. The judgment form should reflect that appellant is a Range II, multiple offender and that the mandatory minimum period of incarceration for appellant’s range is twelve years. The judgment form should also note that the “conviction offense name” is “violation – drug-free zone,” not “violation – drug-free school zone.” |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy S. Moore
The Defendant, Jeremy S. Moore, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his convictions for two counts of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 and ordering him to serve the remainder of his effective six-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Justin Feaster
The defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment. After determining that the separate convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault did not violate double jeopardy, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. A divided panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding no double jeopardy violation. This Court granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether due process safeguards prohibit the retroactive application of the double jeopardy standard adopted in State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012), which was decided after the date of his offenses. The defendant argues that the former double jeopardy standard set out in State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996), should apply. Because our ruling in Watkins cannot be classified as “unexpected” or “indefensible” by reference to prior law, due process does not preclude its retroactive application. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Tennessee Department of Transportation v. William Ernest Jones, Sr., et al.
This appeal concerns the measure of incidental damages in a condemnation proceeding. The State appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions for directed verdict and remittitur of incidental damages. Taking the strongest legitimate view of the evidence offered by the landowners, we find that the award of incidental damages was properly supported, and therefore, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Parrott v. Lawrence County Animal Welfare League, Inc., et al
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Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Lee-Concurring
I respectfully agree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. Certainly, the better practice in all convicted felon in possession of a handgun cases is to have a pre-trial written stipulation agreeing that at the time of the offense the defendant had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. However, I write separately to emphasize that a formal stipulation to a defendant’s status as a convicted felon is not necessary to establish the predicate felony. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Preston Rucker v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Preston Rucker, seeking post-conviction relief, argued that trial/appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to call a certain witness to contradict the victim's testimony and failed to request a jury instruction regarding the kidnapping charge against the petitioner. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner failed to show that counsel was ineffective. We have carefully reviewed the matter and affirm the order denying relief to the petitioner. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerald Jefferson
The defendant, Jerald Jefferson, was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to confinement for twenty-five years. On appeal, he argues that this court should utilize a plain error review to consider his claims that the trial court erred in its jury instructions regarding eyewitness testimony and admission by silence, that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument, and that the aggregate effect of trial errors entitles him to a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Scott Lee
The defendant, Scott Lee, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder in the perpetration of attempted robbery; two counts of attempted second degree murder, Class B felonies; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony; and felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of life plus forty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to keep his prior convictions listed in Count 6 of the indictment from being heard and seen by the jury, and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Conservatorship For Mary N. Ayers
This appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding in the Putnam County Probate Court. The trial court appointed co-conservators over the Respondent’s property and person. We vacate the trial court’s final order and remand for the entry of an order that complies with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Mary V. Williams v. Gibson County, Tennessee
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant county alleging, inter alia, racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, which motion the trial court granted in part and denied in part. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s remaining claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, disposing of the remainder of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals. Due to significant procedural shortcomings in plaintiff’s appellate brief, we are unable to reach the merits of her appeal. We therefore affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Price
Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the defendant, Kevin Price, appeals, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Cohn Law Firm, et al. v. YP Southeast Advertising & Publishing, LLC, et al.
Plaintiff law firm and lawyer brought suit against defendant advertising companies alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and misrepresentation. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because the parties' contracts included a forum selection clause that provided all litigation arising from the contracts would take place in the state of Georgia. The trial court found the forum selection clause enforceable and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in enforcing the forum selection clause because the contracts are adhesion contracts and unconscionable. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles E. Jones, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, alleging that DNA testing of glass shards found at the crime scene would have resulted in a more favorable verdict or sentence. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Perceiving no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Lenz
Appellant, Larry Lenz, pleaded guilty to five counts of theft: two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, Class C felonies; two counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; and one count of theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, a Class E felony. He received the agreed-upon effective sentence of twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender, to be served at forty-five percent release eligibility. The trial court denied appellant’s request for alternative sentencing pursuant to the Community Corrections Act, and he appeals the denial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwight Miller v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Dwight Miller, was convicted of first degree murder in 2001 and was sentenced to life in prison. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he now challenges his conviction and sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call three potential alibi witnesses at trial. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mousen Aden v. Brenda Jones Warden
The petitioner, Mousen Aden, appeals the denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or holding a hearing after finding that the indictment was valid, the judgment was not facially void, and that the petitioner's sentence had not expired. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his indictment was invalid because it did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction to enter a proper judgment and failed to provide him with adequate protection from double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hanna (John) Nazi, et al. v. Jerry's Oil Company, Inc.
The trial court determined that Appellant Hanna (John) Nazi executed the contractual documents between the parties as the owner/proprietor of the Handy Peddler and that he was liable for a judgment in favor of Appellee Jerry‘s Oil Company, Inc. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Robert W. Mills v. Nita D. Mills, et al.
This case involves various causes of action related to the administration of an estate, specifically, the executor‘s action in failing to fund a residuary trust. The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that no assets remained in the estate to fund the residuary trust, the expiration of the statute of limitations, and laches. Although we rely on different grounds, we affirm the trial court‘s order granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alex Friedmann, et al. v. Marshall County, TN, et al. - Concurring
I concur with the majority Opinion’s ruling, but I write separately to address only the attorneys’ fee issue. Over the years, two schools of thought apparently developed regarding the “willfulness” standard under the Public Records Act attorneys’ fee provision. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(g). One school of thought adopted the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of bad faith, which includes phrases like “the conscious doing of a wrong,” “dishonest purpose,” and “moral obliquity.” See Capital Case Res. Ctr. of Tenn., Inc. v. Woodall, No. 01-A01-9104-CH-00150, 1992 WL 12217, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1992) (no. perm. app. filed) (holding that Section 10-7-505(g)’s “knowing and willful” standard is synonymous with “bad faith,” without defining “bad faith”); Contemporary Media v. City of Memphis, No. 02A01-9807-CH-00211, 1999 WL 292264, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (citing Capital Case Res. Ctr. but defining “bad faith” by quoting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gabriel V.
Mother and Father were married to other people when the Child was conceived. Mother divorced her husband, but Father returned to his wife and children after the Child was born. Father initiated court proceedings in an effort to be named the Child’s primary residential parent and to obtain parenting time. The court performed a best interest analysis and determined that Mother was better suited to be named the primary residential parent. By the time of trial, Mother was living in California, and Father was living in Tennessee. The court awarded Father parenting time during the majority of the summer and shorter periods throughout the year, for a total of about ninety-six days per year. Father appealed, contending the court erred in its best interest analysis and in failing to award him more parenting time with the Child. Father also challenged the court’s calculation of child support and credits to which he is entitled. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all regards except for its calculation of child support and credits to which Father is entitled. The case is remanded for a recalculation of Father’s child support obligation and arrearage, as set forth herein. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alex Friedmann, et al. v. Marshall County, TN, et al.
The trial court ordered the Marshall County Sheriff’s Office to produce the public records requested by Appellant but declined to award Appellant any attorneys’ fees. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an order awarding Appellant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g). |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
In re Gavin G.
This appeal arises from the termination of Father’s parental rights. After Father had not seen the child for over a year-and-a-half, Mother and her husband petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, the chancery court found that Father had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit him. The court also found that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father appeals the court’s determination that he abandoned the child and that the termination of his rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Administrative Management Resources, LLC v. James G. Neeley
A staff leasing company filed this petition for judicial review of the administrative decision of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”). In its decision, the Department determined that the company had illegally transferred employees from one entity to another to acquire a lower unemployment insurance premium rate. We affirm the chancery court’s decision finding substantial and material evidence to support the Department’s determination. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |