Jack Osborne, et al. v. Michael Hardin
Jack Osborne, Margaret Howell, and Kathy Street (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Michael P. Hardin (“Defendant”) seeking to extinguish any right Defendant had to a right-of-way (“the Right-of-Way”) on real property located in Unicoi County, Tennessee. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Unicoi County (“the Trial Court”) entered a judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the Right-of-Way is for the benefit of both Plaintiffs and Defendant and neither may block or impede the other’s use of the Right-of-Way. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in setting aside a judgment by default and proceeding with trial, whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with trial in the absence of two of the Plaintiffs, and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the judgment by default, that Plaintiffs never objected to proceeding with trial in the absence of the two Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Prewitt, et al v. Kamal Brown
This appeal arises from a two-car accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained irreparable damage and that Defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was 100% at fault. Prior to the commencement of this action, the automobile insurance carrier for Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, paid the lien-holder of Plaintiff’s vehicle $7,852.57, the amount Allstate believed to be the fair market value of the vehicle. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant to recover the balance of the fair market value of her car and damages for loss of use. She also asserted a direct action against Allstate, alleging that Allstate reached a settlement with her lien-holder before exploring the full extent of her damages. The trial court dismissed the direct action against Allstate for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because Tennessee law does not permit a direct action against an insured’s insurance carrier “without first establishing that the insured . . . has become ‘legally obligated’ to pay damages.” Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Seymour v. Sierra, 98 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Following the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Allstate, the trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant upon the finding that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the fair market value was more than Allstate paid on behalf of Defendant. The court also summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for the loss of use of her car, because it could not be repaired and she never sought to rent a replacement vehicle. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Jo Robbins v. Robert Scholze Robbins
The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Robert Scholze Robbins, stated that the appellant was appealing from a final judgment entered on July 28, 2016. However, there is no final judgment in the proceedings below and the case remains pending in the Trial Court. As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephanie Lynn Ferguson
The Defendant, Stephanie Lynn Ferguson, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of vehicular assault in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that her effective sentence does not comport with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing. Specifically, she contends that the sentence imposed was not the “least severe measure necessary,” that the trial court ignored applicable mitigating factors, and that the court improperly determined she was a dangerous offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Radames Antonio Rivera
The defendant, Radames Antonio Rivera, was indicted for one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted tampering with evidence, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Spirit Broadband, LLC, et al v. Joseph Anthony Armes, et al
This case arises from the sale of the assets of a small cable television system. DirecTV program channels constituted the majority of the system’s programming. Three years after the sale, DirecTV stopped providing its programming signal to the cable system, claiming the signal had been obtained illegally. The buyer of the cable system filed suit against DirecTV for breach of contract and defamation. After reaching a settlement with DirecTV, the buyer filed this action against the seller of the cable system, seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud and a declaratory judgment that the promissory note the buyer had executed as part of the purchase was not yet due and payable. The seller filed a counterclaim, seeking payment of the promissory note. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the buyer’s claims against the seller. The court also dismissed the seller’s counterclaim under the doctrine of unclean hands. After a review of the record, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the seller’s counterclaim. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gale Marleen Krizka v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gale Marleen Krizka, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, in which she alleged that her counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness, failing to call witnesses, and failing to give an opening statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Bass
The Defendant, Robin Bass, was convicted of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, arguing that there was no proof that he intended to rob the victim or that the murder occurred during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the extrajudicial confessions used to convict him were uncorroborated. Following our review, the judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Property of Twyla Miles
This appeal involves an in rem forfeiture proceeding which was initiated after the appellant’s property was seized as proceeds of illegal drug sales. The appellant did not file a claim in the forfeiture proceedings. On appeal, she asserts that she was denied due process because she did not receive notice of the forfeiture proceedings. The record does not support the appellant’s assertion that she was not afforded adequate notice. We, therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court forfeiting the appellant’s interest in the seized property. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
E. Louis Thomas v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2008 conviction for first degree premeditated murder and his life sentence. He contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting the Petitioner’s confession, and (3) the habeas corpus court violated his due process rights by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Richardson
The defendant, David Richardson, appeals the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences upon remand for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re I.G.
This appeal pertains to an effort to set aside a default judgment. M.V. (Mother) filed a petition seeking a restraining order against M.A.G. (Father) and modification of their permanent parenting plan. Father was served with Mother’s petition. He did not file a response. Mother later filed a motion for a default judgment and mailed the same to Father. He did not respond or attend the noticed hearing. At the hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s proffered permanent parenting plan and awarded her attorney’s fees. The court mailed the final judgment to Father. Father then moved to set aside the judgment, claiming, in part, that he had not received Mother’s motion for default. The trial court denied his request after finding that the motion for default was mailed to Father’s address on file with the court and that Father had not asserted just cause as to why the final judgment should be set aside. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Lamont Farmer v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal arises from a prisoner’s disciplinary hearing. Keith Lamont Farmer (“Farmer”), an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), was convicted of a disciplinary offense. Farmer filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of the decision to discipline him. The Chancery Court for Bledsoe County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Farmer’s petition on the grounds that it did not state that it was the first application for the writ, and, that it neither was sworn to nor verified. Farmer appeals to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Wayne Utz
The Defendant, Jonathan Wayne Utz, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to a term of imprisonment of nine years and six months to be served at one hundred percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that “the sentence in this case is excessive and contrary to the law.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Earl Watts v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Earl Watts, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, for which he received an effective sentence of seventy-five years. On appeal, the petitioner argues trial counsel provided ineffective counsel by failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of waiving his right to testify, failing to call certain witnesses, and failing to file a motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding living in the “projects” and “on the streets.” Due to the cumulative effect of this allegedly ineffective representation, the petitioner requests a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Luis Napoleon Paz v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Luis Napoleon Paz, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Teddy Reece Ragan
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Teddy Reece Ragan, of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to a ten-year sentence to be served at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court improperly admitted the Defendant’s prior conviction for violation of the sex offender registry, and that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury with attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie N. Potts v. Tony Conatser
Father appeals the modification of a parenting plan, which changed the designation of primary residential parent to Mother and decreased Father’s parenting time. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for entry of factual findings in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Parker, et al v. James Mark Parker, et al
This appeal arises from a will contest. The witnesses to the will failed to sign the body of the will, but they signed the self-proving affidavit in the presence of the testator. After the will was admitted to probate in common form, the contestants filed a complaint challenging the validity of the will. The contestants later filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the decedent did not comply with the execution requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, because the witnesses did not sign the body of the will. The trial court granted the motion based on In re Estate of Bill Morris, No. M2014-00874-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 557970 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015), holding that a will is not validly executed if the witnesses sign only the self-proving affidavit. The executor appealed. While this appeal was pending, the General Assembly passed an amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which states that wills executed prior to July 1, 2006, satisfy Tennessee’s due execution requirements if the witnesses to the will signed the self-proving affidavit. In this appeal, both parties ask this Court to determine whether the newly enacted amendment applies and, if so, whether it comports with Tennessee’s constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. But for a few exceptions, we will not consider issues the parties did not present to the trial court. Because the General Assembly enacted this amendment while this appeal was pending, the trial court has not had the opportunity to consider these issues. In order to afford the trial court that opportunity, we vacate the judgment declaring the will invalid. Further, we remand to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition to admit the will to probate and to reinstate the amended complaint challenging the will, which will give the parties the opportunity to present these issues to the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Clear Water Partners, LLC v. Charles e. Benson, et al.
A purchaser of property filed a complaint against numerous individuals asserting intentional interference with its business relationships and tortious interference with its contracts based on the individuals' alleged misconduct aimed at preventing the development of the property the purchaser was attempting to acquire. The defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Tennessee Rules of Procedure 10.03 and 12.02(6), which the trial court granted. The trial court also awarded the defendants their attorneys' fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(c). The plaintiff appealed, and we find the plaintiff properly stated a claim for tortious interference with business relationships and civil conspiracy; the plaintiff did not state a claim for tortious interference with contracts; and the defendants are not entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees at this stage of the proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Estelle Elliott
A Campbell County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Lisa Estelle Elliott, on one count of second degree murder as the result of the shooting and death of her fiancé. Following trial, a jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, for which she received a four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred when denying her motion for mistrial due to a prejudicial narrative objection made by the State. The defendant further contends that due to her lack of a criminal history, strong educational background, and continuous work history, the trial court erred in denying her request for an alternative sentence. Based on our review of the record, submissions of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Gray v. Vision Hospitality Group, Inc., et al
Tony Gray (“Employee”) sustained a back injury on August 6, 2013 while working as a chief engineer at the Hyatt Place Hotel Airport in Nashville, Tennessee (“Employer”). Employee’s injury occurred while lifting and moving thirty rolls of carpet padding. After notifying Employer of his back injury, Employee was referred to Concentra Medical Clinic, where he was subsequently diagnosed with a back sprain and prescribed physical therapy. Employee experienced a slight improvement in his condition and was released in September 2013 to full-time work for a trial period in a light duty capacity. Upon his return to Employer, Employee was terminated for several issues relating to his job performance. Employee’s symptoms worsened, and he eventually required lower back surgery. He did not return to work for any employer thereafter. Based on Employee’s physical injuries, the trial court determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of permanent and total disability. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Shirley M. Lurks, et al. v. The City of Newbern, Tennessee, et al.
This is a premises liability case filed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Appellant was walking down a sidewalk when she fell and sustained injuries. She and her husband brought suit alleging that she fell because the sidewalk was in a dangerous and defective condition due to the negligence of the City of Newbern. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the sidewalk in question was in a defective condition and that the upkeep of the sidewalk was the responsibility of the City of Newbern. However, the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that the sidewalk was the cause of the fall. The trial court issued a memorandum opinion and final judgment order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tedrik Woods
The Petitioner, Tedrik Woods, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s three-year sentence for employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is illegal, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pinnacle Towers Acquisition, LLC, et al. v. Boris Penchion, et al.
A landowner granted a perpetual easement over a portion of her real property to a telecommunications tower company. According to the contracting parties’ agreement, the landowner agreed to have the property subject to the easement (“Easement Property”) separately assessed for real property taxes so that the tax obligations could be paid by the company. After the landowner’s real property was separately assessed as two tax parcels, the company timely paid all real property taxes due on the Easement Property, but the landowner failed to pay real property taxes on the remainder of the tract. As a result, the larger parcel was sold to the county at a tax sale and later transferred to a third-party purchaser. Said purchaser thereafter refused to allow the telecommunications company access to the Easement Property. The company filed the instant action, seeking to have its easement declared valid and requesting an injunction to prevent the third-party purchaser from interfering with the easement. The company subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, determining that the easement was valid but declaring the third-party purchaser to be the owner of the Easement Property. The third-party purchaser timely appealed. Determining the underlying tax sale to be invalid, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the company and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |