Opinions

02C01-9509-CC-00262
02C01-9509-CC-00262

Trial Court Judge: Joe G. Riley. Jr.

02C01-9505-CC-00147
02C01-9505-CC-00147

Trial Court Judge: Dick Jerman, Jr.

02C01-9505-CC-00147
02C01-9505-CC-00147

Trial Court Judge: Dick Jerman, Jr.

02C01-9506-CC-00172
02C01-9506-CC-00172

Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

02C01-9403-CC-00044
02C01-9403-CC-00044

02C01-9503-CC-00256
02C01-9503-CC-00256

02C01-9503-CC-00065
02C01-9503-CC-00065

Michael Eugene Sample v. State of Tennessee
02C01-9505-CR-00131
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

After a thorough review of the record and authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitions. The trial court’s judgments are reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

02C01-9506-CC-00170
02C01-9506-CC-00170

Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn

02C01-9601-CC-00028
02C01-9601-CC-00028

Cooksey vs. Shelley
01A01-9708-CV-00378

Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers

01C01-9507-CC-00242
01C01-9507-CC-00242

Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

01C01-9507-CC-00242
01C01-9507-CC-00242

Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

01C01-9506-CR-00184
01C01-9506-CR-00184

Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9512-CC-00420
01C01-9512-CC-00420

Trial Court Judge: Henry Denmark Bell

01C01-9512-CC-00420
01C01-9512-CC-00420

Trial Court Judge: Henry Denmark Bell

01C01-9512-CR-00399
01C01-9512-CR-00399

01C01-9512-CR-00399
01C01-9512-CR-00399

01C01-9510-CC-00342
01C01-9510-CC-00342

Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

01C01-9510-CC-00342
01C01-9510-CC-00342

Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX

Lisa Hughes v. Mtd Products, Inc., Cub Cadet Division
02S01-9602-CH-00019
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supeme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lisa Hughes, ("plaintiff") has appeal ed from the judgment of the trial court denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that she failed to carry her burden of proof as to any permanent partial disability. On appeal, the only issue presented by plaintiff is whether the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court. For the reasons hereafter stated, we find that it does not. Plaintiff was employed as an assembly line worker for MTD Products, Inc. ("defendant"), which were engaged primarily in building lawnmowers. In December 1992 she injured her neck and shoulder while lifting a lawnmower deck onto an assembly line. She was initially seen by Dr. White and then by Dr. Joseph P. Rowland, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Rowland found that her problems were muscular in origin and returned her to work with no restrictions and no permanent impairment on February 15, 1993. In April 1993, plaintiff claimed to have sustained a work-related injury to her low back while lifting a l awnmower frame onto a motor. At that time, plaintiff received outpatient treatment by Dr. Jack Pettigrew, who also referred her to Dr. Larry David Johnson, a local orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Johnson treated her as an outpatient, performing among other things x-rays, a CT scan, and myelogram, all of which were normal. On June 21, 1993, Dr. Johnson released her to return to work and confirmed that plaintiff could return to work for full duty with no permanent impairment on July 22, 1993. 2

Lisa Hughes v. Mtd Products, Inc., Cub Cadet Division
02S01-9602-CH-00019
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George Ellis, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supeme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Lisa Hughes, ("plaintiff") has appeal ed from the judgment of the trial court denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that she failed to carry her burden of proof as to any permanent partial disability. On appeal, the only issue presented by plaintiff is whether the evidence preponderates against the judgment of the trial court. For the reasons hereafter stated, we find that it does not. Plaintiff was employed as an assembly line worker for MTD Products, Inc. ("defendant"), which were engaged primarily in building lawnmowers. In December 1992 she injured her neck and shoulder while lifting a lawnmower deck onto an assembly line. She was initially seen by Dr. White and then by Dr. Joseph P. Rowland, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Rowland found that her problems were muscular in origin and returned her to work with no restrictions and no permanent impairment on February 15, 1993. In April 1993, plaintiff claimed to have sustained a work-related injury to her low back while lifting a l awnmower frame onto a motor. At that time, plaintiff received outpatient treatment by Dr. Jack Pettigrew, who also referred her to Dr. Larry David Johnson, a local orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Johnson treated her as an outpatient, performing among other things x-rays, a CT scan, and myelogram, all of which were normal. On June 21, 1993, Dr. Johnson released her to return to work and confirmed that plaintiff could return to work for full duty with no permanent impairment on July 22, 1993. 2

Patty Utley, Widow of Joe Henry Utley, Deceased v. Chester County Highway Department
02S01-9602-CH-00020
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The only issue on appeal is whether the chancellor abused his discretion by commuting a portion of the permanent partial disability award to a lump sum. The panel finds the judgment should be affirmed. Joe Henry Utley died as a result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Chester County Highway Department. He left a widow, Patty Utley, and four dependent children. The widow and children were awarded dependents' benefits totaling $19,2., payable at the rate of $137.17 per week. The claimant and four children - and another child of hers - were living in a 6 square foot home. She applied to the trial court for a commutation of the award for the purpose of purchasing a larger home. The proof shows and the chancellor found that she is able to wisely manage her money. The trial court ordered $45,2. paid in a lump sum and the balance periodically, as provided by statute. The chancellor found further that moving into a larger home would be in the best interest of both the claimant and the dependent children and directed that the deed be drafted in such a way as would protect the interest of all the beneficiaries. The evidence does not preponderate against that finding. Upon application by a party and approval by a proper court, benefits which are payable periodically may be commuted to one or more lump sum payment(s), if the court finds such commutation to be in the best interest of the dependents of the deceased employee and that the party seeking a lump sum payment has the ability to wisely manage and control the commuted award. Ponder v. Manchester Housing Authority, 87 S.W.2d 282 (Tenn. 1994). Such applications are not granted as a matter of course. Forkum v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company, 852 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1993). The claimant has the burden of establishing, first, that a lump sum is in his or her best interest and, second, that he or she is capable of wisely managing and controlling a lump sum, but the decision whether to commute to a lump sum is within the discretion of the trial court. Bailey v. Colonial Freight Systems, Inc., 836 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1992). We have independently examined the record and find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in allowing the partial commutation in this case. The judgment is accordingly affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendant-appellant. 2