Opinions

William Wesley Goad v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CR-00169
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Fred A. Kelly, III

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner, William Wesley Goad, was afforded his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his capital trial.
 

State of Tennessee v. John Michael Denton and William Douglas Brown v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9509-CC-00152
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry D. Bell

We granted review and consolidated these cases in order to consider the circumstances under which imposition of two convictions resulting from a "single" criminal act may violate the double jeopardy and du process clause of the state and federal constitutions in light of State v. Anthony, 817S.W. 2d299 (Tenn. 1991).

Janice Holder v.Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission and George T. Lewis, III, Esq. in his official capacity as Chairperson of the Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission
01S01-9610-CH-00211
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

The petition to rehear is denied. ENTER this the 2nd day of December, 1996.
 

03C01-9601-CR-00001
03C01-9601-CR-00001
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

03C01-9604-CC-00153
03C01-9604-CC-00153

03C01-9512-CC-00385
03C01-9512-CC-00385
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

03C01-9512-CC-00398
03C01-9512-CC-00398
Trial Court Judge: Frank L. Slaughter

Mary A. Marshall v. Bc/Bs of Memphis, et al
02S01-9606-CV-00058
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irma Merrill,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court inaccordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee contends it was error to summarily dismiss her claim as being barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23, a statute of limitation. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial of all issues raised by the pleadings. The action was commenced by the filing of a complaint and summons on February 24, 1995 seeking workers' compensation benefits for injuries and disabilities arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment with the defendant, Blue Cross / Blue Shield of Memphis. In particular, the employee claims that she has become permanently disabled from the repetitive trauma of operating a key punch machine. By their responsive pleading, the defendants deny the existence of the injury and deny that they received timely notice, but do not assert the affirmative defense that the claim is barred by any statute of limitations. The defendants then took the claimant's discovery deposition and interrogated her concerning, among other things, when she first knew her work was causing pain. Her deposition reveals that her pain began in 1992 and was reported to the employer. The employer, however, chose to treat her claim not as one for workers' compensation benefits, but for group health benefits. On January 18, 1996, the defendants served a pre-trial "Motion to Dismiss" the claimant's claim "pursuant to Rule 41.2 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure" for "failure to file such cause of action within the time prescribed by Section 5-6-23 of the Tennessee Code Annotated." The motion was, according to the trial judge's order of dismissal, "supported by" the claimant's discovery deposition. The trial judge treated the motion as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment, found from the deposition that the claimant "was told in 1992 that she was suffering work related injuries to her wrists, shoulders, neck and back by her physicians (sic) statement to her employer so stating and was told by her employer she did not have a workers' compensation claim," and dismissed the claim as being time-barred. By Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.3, summary judgment will lie if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases; however, when there is no dispute over the evidence establishing thefacts 2

01A01-9510-CV-00456
01A01-9510-CV-00456
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

01A01-9605-CH-00204
01A01-9605-CH-00204
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

01A01-9606-CH-00254
01A01-9606-CH-00254
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

01A01-9606-CH-00285
01A01-9606-CH-00285
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

01C01-9506-CC-00178
01C01-9506-CC-00178
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

Conviction. Our Supreme Court, In State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2D 888 (Tenn.
01C01-9506-CC-00178
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

01C01-9506-CC-00178lerk
01C01-9506-CC-00178lerk
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

01C01-9510-CR-00328
01C01-9510-CR-00328
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

01C01-9510-CR-00344
01C01-9510-CR-00344
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

01C01-9511-CC-00357
01C01-9511-CC-00357
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond

01A01-9606-CV-00270
01A01-9606-CV-00270
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

01C01-9509-CC-00285
01C01-9509-CC-00285

01A01-9603-CH-00128
01A01-9603-CH-00128
Trial Court Judge: William B. Cain

01A01-9608-CH-00363
01A01-9608-CH-00363

01A01-9608-CH-00365
01A01-9608-CH-00365

Doris Tabor v. Crossville Ceramics
03S01-9510-CV-00117
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John J. Maddux, Jr.,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 1994 she sustained injuries to her arms and hands during the course of her employment owing to their repetitive use; that she returned to work as a polisher for the Crossville Ceramics Company and that on March 23, 1994 she injured her neck or back while pushing a box of tiles. The defendants admitted that the plaintiff suffered a temporary injury but denied that she sustained a permanent disability. Thereafter, on May 24, 1995, an approved Order was entered whereby the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed "her cause of action as to her March 23, 1994 injuries" pursuant to Rule 41, Tenn. R. Civ. P. This procedure is unchallenged, and we will treat the complaint as having been amended to allege a compensable injury by accident which occurred on March 7, 1994. The plaintiff testified that she worked as a sorter in the polishing department of the ceramics manufacturer, the kind of work that required repetitive motions of both arms. On March 7, 1994 numbness and tingling developed in both arms which she reported to her supervisor and for which she received conservative medical treatment. She continued at her job for more than one year, leaving employment in April 1995 after allegedly suffering a neck injury. During the thirteen months between March 1994 and April 1995 the plaintiff was seen by a procession of physicians practicing various disciplines. Dr. Simpson, the orthopedic physician selected by the plaintiff, treated her over a period of months and concluded that she exaggerated her symptoms which were not anatomic. He testified that she suffered no impairment. His findings are supported by those of the Knoxville Neurology Clinic and the East Tennessee Orthopedic Clinic. The plaintiff was referred by her attorney to Dr. Gorman, an orthopedic surgeon practicing in Johnson City, who testified that she had a five (5) percent impairment in each arm, and recommended avoidance of "repetitive factory work." 2

Brenda Bailey Loyd, v. Wendell Ray Loyd
02A01-9504-CH-00084
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

This case involves contempt proceedings brought against Wendell Ray Loyd (“Husband”) by Brenda Bailey Loyd (“Ex-Wife”) for failure to pay alimony. The trial court found that Husband did not have the present ability to pay and therefore could not be incarcerated for contempt. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.