Opinions

Adolph C. Lavin and Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, Deceased, and Adolph C. Lavin, in his capacity as Administrator of the estate of Troy James Lavin, v. Ross Jordon, Susan Jordon, and Sean Jordon
01A01-9709-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows:

Adolph C. Lavin and Jean Lavin, Surviving Parents of Troy James Lavin, Deceased, and Adolph C. Lavin, in his capacity as Administrator of the estated of Troy James Lavin, v. Ross Jordon, Susan Jordon, and Sean Jordon
01A01-9709-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara Haynes

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows:

Spooner vs. State
03C01-9608-CR-00283

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: Wyeth Chandler

David F. Summers v. K.U.B and Larry Brinton, et al
03S01-9703-CH-00029
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated, the issues referred to the panel for findings and conclusions are (1) whether the chancellor erred in computing the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits based upon a percentage of benefits payable to the employee up to age 65, (2) whether the chancellor erred in holding the employer liable for all benefits payable until the time of the employee's death, from a cause other than the compensable injury, on September 8, 1996, and (3) whether the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to order the claimant's counsel to remit a portion of his fee because the claimant died before the expiration of 4 weeks. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed as to all three issues. The employee or claimant, Summers, was fifty-four years old at the time of the trial. He had worked for the employer, Knoxville Utilities District, since 1965. On June 2, 1993, he suffered a compensable neck injury, which injury was superimposed upon three prior disabilities, none of which entitled him to an award of workers' compensation benefits. As a result of the compensable injury, for which the chancellor found him to be thirty percent permanently disabled, combined with the pre-existing physical disabilities, the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. The trial judge so found and, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-28(a)(1)1, apportioned the award thirty percent to the employer and seventy percent to the Second Injury Fund, to age 65. The employer contends, by its first issue, that its liability should be limited to thirty percent the first 4 weeks of benefits. 1 5-6-28(a)(1) If an employee has previously sustained a permanent physical disability from any cause or origin and becomes permanently and totally disabled through a subsequent injury, such employee shall be entitled to compensation from such employee's employer or the employer's insurance company only for the disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury, and such previous injury shall not be considered in estimating the compensation to which such employee may be entitled under this chapter from the employer or the employer's insurance company; provided, that in addition to such compensation for a subsequent injury, and after completion of the payments therefor, then such employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for the permanenttotal disability out of a special fund to be known as the "second injury fund" therein created.

Sarah Taylor v. Harman Automotive, Inc.
02S01-9708-CH-00074
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issue raised in this case is whether the trial judge erroneously set aside a previously approved settlement of the plaintiff's workers' compensation case against the defendant. We find it was error to set this judgment approving the settlement aside. We reverse the judgment which did so and reinstate the judgment approving the settlement. Prior to April 17, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant reached an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The parties filed a joint petition seeking court approval of the agreement. On April 17, 1995, the petition was heard by Chancellor Morris, sitting by interchange for Judge Whitenton in Hardeman County. After hearing the plaintiff and other statements, Chancellor Morris found the settlement was proper, was understood by the plaintiff, and gave her substantially what she was entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act. On May 4, 1995, the plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the settlement because "her workers' compensation settlement was procured by fraud, or in the alternative, the settlement did not secure to her in a substantial manner the benefits under the workers' compensation law of the State of Tennessee." 2

Henry Mitchell Brummitt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems
03S01-9707-CV-00089
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he became totally disabled on account of anxiety and depression caused by several specific, acute and sudden stressful job-related incidents, all of which were denied by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff's mental problems were the result of a "gradual build-up of stress caused by the plaintiff's overreaction to his work," and hence not compensable. The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). I The plaintiff is 58 years old. In June 1976 he was employed by the defendant's predecessor as a fire truck driver. Promotions came his way and in 1984 he was named maintenance officer of all the fire and guard facilities at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge. 2

City of Fulton vs. Hickman-Fulton
01S01-9710-FD-00215

James Jackson vs. State
01C01-9609-CR-00387

State vs. Carolyn Pickett
01C01-9710-CC-00472
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith

State vs. Andre Chamberlain
01C01-9710-CR-00490

State vs. Samuel Howard
02C01-9707-CR-00274

Memphis Publishing Co. vs. TN. Petroleum Underground
01S01-9710-CH-00232

Barbara White vs. William H. Lawrence, M.D.
02S01-9701-CV-00007

State vs. Gary Russell
02C01-9712-CC-00475

Longworth vs. Nunez
03A01-9709-CV-00388

Harden vs. Danek
03A01-9801-CV-00020

State vs. Drexell Ridley
01C01-9705-CC-00171
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee

State vs. Charles Treadwell
01C01-9705-CR-00166

Walter Kendrick vs. State
01C01-9703-CR-00107
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Alan Head vs. State
01C01-9802-CR-00082
Trial Court Judge: Jerry L. Smith

01C01-9707-CR-00237
01C01-9707-CR-00237
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

In State v. King, ____ S.W.2D ____ (Tenn. 1998), Our Supreme Court
01C01-9707-CR-00237
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver

01C01-9710-CR-00460
01C01-9710-CR-00460

State vs. Timothy Casterlow
W2001-03112-CCA-R3-CD
The defendant was convicted by a jury of the offense of rape of a child. He was sentenced to serve a term of 20 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and he alleges reversible error resulting from a allegation that prospective trial jurors were told that they could donate their compensation for jury service to the Victims of Crime Compensation Fund. We find the evidence of the defendant's guilt to be more than sufficient to sustain the verdict. Moreover, the defendant has failed to raise by proper proceeding the issue of what the jury was told regarding donating its compensation. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.