State vs. Keough
W1997-00201-SC-DDT-DD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: L. Terry Lafferty

Shelby Supreme Court

State vs. Fitz
W1997-00186-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Tipton Supreme Court

State vs. Blackstock
E1994-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

Hamilton Supreme Court

Farmers & Merchants Bank, a Tennessee Corporation, v. Midway Supply Company, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation
M1999-00147-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Walton

This appeal involves a suit to recover money advanced by a construction lender to a building supply company to pay for building supplies which the bank mistakenly thought had been delivered to the bank’s debtor. Plaintiff, Farmers & Merchants Bank (Bank) sued defendant, Midway Supply Company, Inc., (Midway) to recover the sums advanced after Midway failed to deliver the supplies and applied the advanced funds to pay other accounts of the Bank’s debtor. From the judgment of the Circuit Court awarding judgment to Bank for the advanced funds less certain credit, Midway has appealed.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Gary Lamar McBride
M1999-00319-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The defendant/appellant, Gary Lamar McBride, appeals as of right from a conviction for murder second degree by a Davidson County jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court imposed a sentence of sixteen (16) years in the Department of Correction. The defendant presents three appellate issues:

1.     Whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s statement to be read to the jury and not suppressing the same.

2.     Whether the trial court erred in not finding that the proof adduced at trial by the State is in conflict with the physical facts rule applicable to criminal cases.

3.     Whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder second degree.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Steven D. Pittman
M1999-00320-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

A Davidson County jury convicted the appellant, Steven D. Pittman, of one (1) count of possession with the intent to sell over 0.5 grams of cocaine, one (1) count of felonious possession of a weapon and one (1) count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of eleven (11) years for possession with the intent to sell cocaine, two (2) years for felonious possession of a weapon and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for marijuana possession. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to support the appellant’s convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Karuna T. Soni, et al., v. Kenneth P. Tully, et al.
M2000-00594-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This extraordinary appeal involves an automobile collision. The driver of the automobile that was struck from behind and her husband filed a negligence action in the Circuit Court for Davidson
County against the driver and record owner of the automobile that struck her. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the driver’s liability. The defendants applied for an extraordinary appeal after the trial court declined to grant them an interlocutory appeal. We have determined this is a proper case for an extraordinary appeal and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a partial summary judgment because of the existence of material factual disputes regarding liability. Accordingly, pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b),1 we reverse the partial summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed.
 

Davidson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Arcenta Van Harrison
M1999-01184-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The appellant, Arcenta Van Harrison, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three (3) counts of theft of property over $500 and two (2) counts of theft of property over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of four (4) years for the theft over $500 counts as a Range II offender and eight (8) years for the theft over $1,000 counts as a Range III offender.  The trial court ordered that the appellant serve his sentence on community corrections. A warrant was subsequently issued alleging that the appellant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked community corrections and re-sentenced the appellant to an effective term of nine (9) years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections; (2) the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence to nine (9) years; and (3) the trial court imposed illegal sentences for three (3) of his convictions. After a review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the trial court did not err in revoking the appellant’s community corrections sentence; and we affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment. However, because the trial court did not conduct an appropriate sentencing hearing, before increasing the appellant’s sentence, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for re-sentencing.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mell Thomas Bruton
M1999-00956-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

In June 1998, the appellant, Mell Thomas Bruton,1 pled guilty to one (1) count of aggravated assault and received a sentence of six (6) years as a Range II offender.2 The trial court ordered that the appellant be placed on community corrections after serving six (6) months of his sentence. In July, a warrant was filed against the appellant alleging that he had violated two conditions of his community corrections sentence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant’s community corrections sentence and re-sentenced him as a Range II offender to nine (9) years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence and in increasing his sentence to nine (9) years. Because we find that the appellant was not eligible for community corrections in the first instance, and further that, in any event, ample reason exists to revoke the appellant’s community corrections placement and increase his sentence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Everett D. Robinson
W1999-01348-CCA-RE-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The Defendant was indicted by the Henry County Grand Jury for (1) driving under the influence (fourth offense); (2) driving while license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked; (3) violation of the “light law”; and (4) failure to appear. He pleaded guilty to driving while license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked and to violation of the “light law.”1 He was then tried on the remaining offenses, found guilty of DUI, and acquitted of failure to appear.

Henry Court of Criminal Appeals

Winstead vs. Goodlark Reg. Med. Ctr.
M1997-00209-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

Dickson Court of Appeals

Ronald C. Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
W1999-01097-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Ronald C. Mitchell appeals from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief from a conviction for felonious possession of cocaine because (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, (3) the convicting trial court’s admission of a pager and money violated his right to due process, and (4) the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the position of grand jury foreperson violated his right to equal protection. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Jeffery L. Vaughn v. State of Tennessee
W1999-01490-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Moore

Jeffery L. Vaughn appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial because jurors allegedly overheard a bench conference  egarding his prior criminal record. He also contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to his counsels’ failure to inform him of the correct sentencing range, to have the cocaine independently weighed, to present the testimony of his drug counselor, and to move for an acquittal at the end of the proof. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Dyer Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Robert H. Harper, Jr.
W1999-00492-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, Robert H. Harper, Jr. appeals upon a certified question of law his conviction in the Hardin County Circuit Court for felonious possession of marijuana for which he received a three year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and a fine of five thousand dollars. The defendant asserts that the stop of his vehicle was not based upon reasonable suspicion and that the subsequent warrantless search was unlawful. We conclude that the stop and search were improper, and we reverse the judgment of conviction and dismiss the case.

Hardin Court of Criminal Appeals

Cecilia Nault v. Mootz, Inc., d/b/a Seasons Restaurant & Ohio Casualty Group
03S01-9903-CH-0003O
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank Brown,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial court denied the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits and dismissed the complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. Jeremy M. Batey
M1999-00245-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

A Davidson County jury convicted the appellant, Jeremy M. Batey, of one count of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to three years incarceration in the local workhouse. On appeal the appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence solely on the basis that the crime involved a death. We hold that where the legislature has provided for alternative sentencing in certain homicide offenses, the denial of an alternative sentence solely on the basis of the victim’s death is erroneous. However, in the instant case the circumstances of the offense, including illegal drug and alcohol use which contributed to the offense, and the appellant’s history of alcohol and drug abuse, including the use of marijuana 2 ½ years after the offense and approximately four months prior to his trial justify the denial of alternative sentencing.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

In re: Estate of Marguerite Mongold Cranor
M1997-00231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

This appeal involves a dispute over a sizeable estate. After learning that they had been excluded from their relative’s will, thirteen of the testatrix’s heirs challenged the will in the Chancery Court for Sumner County on the grounds of improper execution, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The proponents of the will asserted that the contestants lacked standing because their challenge, even if successful, would only revive an earlier will from which they had likewise been excluded. The trial court found that the contestants had standing but, following a bench trial, determined that the contestants had failed to prove their improper execution, lack of testamentary capacity, or undue influence claims. On this appeal, the contestants take issue with the decision to uphold the will; while the proponents take issue with the conclusion that the contestants had standing to challenge the will. We have determined that the contestants had standing to challenge the will and that the trial court properly determined that the will should be admitted to probate in solemn form. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded.
 

Sumner Court of Appeals

Donnie Shawn Julian v. Lisa Carol Julian
M1997-00236-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Melton

This appeal involves a custody dispute over twin daughters born after their parents separated following a brief marriage. The father filed for divorce in the Putnam County General Sessions Court shortly after learning that the mother was pregnant, and the mother counterclaimed for divorce and for sole custody of the unborn children. Following a bench trial, the general sessions court granted the father a divorce based on the mother’s inappropriate marital conduct, awarded the father sole custody of the children, and directed the mother to pay child support. On this appeal, the mother asserts that the general sessions court’s decision interferes with her constitutional right to make primary care-taking decisions for her children, that she is comparatively more fit than the father to be the custodial parent, and that the general sessions court should have awarded joint custody. We have determined that the custody arrangement does not impermissibly interfere with the mother’s parental rights and that the evidence fully supports the general sessions court’s custody decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment awarding sole custody to the children’s father. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court Affirmed and Remanded
 

Putnam Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Eric Flemming
M1997-0073-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

We granted the appeal in this case to decide (1) whether fists and feet are deadly weapons
under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery was reversible error. We conclude that fists and feet are not deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B). In addition, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed
 

Davidson Supreme Court

Federated Insurance Company v. Francis I. Lethcoe, et al.
E1997-00048-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Earl H. Henley

This is an appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County which, pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 60.02(5), modified a judgment that was previously entered in accord with a
settlement agreement between the parties. The appellants appealed and contended that the trial court improperly modified the judgment and reduced the benefits they were to receive according to the agreement. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the appellants filed a motion for full review by this Court to determine whether a party can seek modification of a workers’ compensation judgment for a fixed sum to be paid periodically almost two years after entry of judgment. We hold that where a party agrees to settle a workers’ compensation claim, and the trial court approves the settlement, the settling party is generally not entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60.02(5). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals panel and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

McMinn Supreme Court

Venessa Lynn Totty v. Michael Alan Totty - Concurring
W1999-02426-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

I concur with the results reached by the majority in this case. With respect to the issue of counseling, I agree with the majority that the statute has become inapplicable in the present case due to the child having reached majority. I write separately because of my concern that the majority
opinion might be interpreted as limiting a trial court’s discretion to order counseling to that specifically set forth in T.C.A. § 36-6-101(e)(1), the text of which is set forth in the majority opinion. I interpret the statute to be permissive rather than prohibitive. For example, I can envision a trial court ordering a non-custodial parent to undergo counseling for anger management as a condition of exercising visitation rights. I do not believe the aforementioned statute prohibits this.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State vs. Michael A. Daniel
M1998-00092-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

M1998-00323-CCA-R3-CD
M1998-00323-CCA-R3-CD

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

Davis, et al vs. Eubanks and DHS
M1999-00066-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Crowell vs. Brown
M1999-00505-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney

Humphreys Court of Appeals