Opinions

State of Tennessee v. Ronnie D. Denson
M2000-02583-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

he defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed four-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant any alternative sentence and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment denying him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Mitchell Anderson vs. Dr. Ken Warren
W2000-02649-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
Buyers of home sued sellers for damages resulting from numerous defects in home not disclosed to buyers and in direct contradiction of the representations made about the property. The trial court found sellers had fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the property and awarded damages. Sellers appeal. We affirm.

Mitzi Lyne vs. George Price
W2000-00870-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is an intentional interference with employment case. An at-will employee worked as a secretary for a university's athletic department. The employee was discharged when she allegedly refused to cooperate with her supervisor and remain silent about conduct she believed was illegal and in violation of the university's policies. The employee filed a lawsuit against, among others, her former supervisor in both his individual and his official capacities for intentional interference with her employment with the university. The trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The employee appeals the dismissal of the claims against the former supervisor in his individual capacity. We reverse, finding that the employee's complaint states a cause of action based on the allegations that the employee's supervisor procured her discharge to further his own personal interests and for reasons unrelated to furthering the interests of the university.

Joan Schmitt vs. James Smith
W2000-01726-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This dispute arises from an action to enforce an attorney's lien in a divorce action. Appellant contends that a separate suit is required to enforce the lien, and, further, that the lien was lost through the attorney's failure to have it noted in the final judgment. Appellant also submits that the trial court erred in issuing injunctive relief without notice, hearing or bond against proceeds of marital property against which the lien was filed. We hold that the attorney's lien was lost due to failure to note it in the final judgment or by a timely Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. We further hold that the Rule 65.07 exception to the requirements of injunctive relief in some domestic relations cases does not apply to the case at bar, where, although the original suit was a divorce action, the issue presented for resolution is essentially based on contract.

April Price vs. Kenneth Price
W2000-01471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This appeal follows a divorce action in which the trial court awarded custody of the parties' two minor children to the father. The mother appeals only the award of custody. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Robert Morrow
E2000-02796-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant entered a best-interest guilty plea in the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the criminal exposure to HIV conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for one of the aggravated rape convictions, and as a multiple rapist to 24 years incarceration for the other aggravated rape conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences for an effective sentence of 78 years incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the length of the sentences and the consecutive service imposed. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentences imposed.

Roger Wayne Braden v. State of Tennessee
E2000-03072-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

On April 29, 1999, the petitioner's status on community corrections was revoked and he was resentenced. On May 15, 2000, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition. The issue is whether the petition is time-barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Because the revocation and resentencing became final thirty days after its entry, which was May 29, 1999, as the State concedes, and we agree, the petition was timely filed. We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CH-00-1635-3
CH-00-1635-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

State of Tennessee v. Daniel Paul Batchelor
E2000-02264-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of hindering a secured creditor, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tracy Gober
E2001-00296-CCA-R9-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The issue is how to compute the number of prior offenses available for consideration in determining multiple offender status pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(3). We conclude to compute the number of prior convictions available for consideration, the court must first determine whether the defendant has any prior convictions occurring within ten years of the date of the instant conviction. If so, all prior convictions shall be counted occurring within twenty years of the date of the instant conviction provided no period greater than ten years has elapsed between any two preceding prior convictions. An example is contained in the opinion. We reverse the trial court’s order amending the indictment to charge third offense and reinstate the original indictment charging ninth offense driving under the influence.

Harold Lee Jackson v. Jim Rout, Mayor of Shelby County,
CH-00-0776-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Eugene L. Tindell v. Travelers Insurance Company
E2000-01488-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance, Judge
The trial judge found the plaintiff had failed to show he had suffered a compensable injury and dismissed the petition.

Tn Farmers Mutual vs. Ford Motor
W2001-00046-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This is a consolidated appeal of three products liability cases. Three vehicles manufactured by the defendant automobile company were destroyed by spontaneous combustion, allegedly caused by a defective steering column. No personal injuries resulted from the fires, and no other property was damaged. The plaintiff insurance company, which insured the cars, paid the owners the value of the vehicles. The insurance company, as subrogee for the insureds, then filed the actions below, seeking to recoup the payments from the defendant automobile manufacturer to the insureds on a theory of products liability. The trial court dismissed the actions, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded recovery in tort, because the product damaged only itself in each case. The plaintiff insurance company now appeals. The appeals were consolidated for purposes of our review. We affirm the trial court in all respects, finding that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery in these cases.

William Eaton vs. Elnora Eaton
W2001-00576-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This case involves the sale of the plaintiff's land to the defendant. The plaintiff's attorney in fact, pursuant to a valid durable power of attorney, sold the land to the defendant. The trial court held that the transaction between the attorney in fact and the defendant was fair, valid and binding as to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, by next friend, appeals the ruling of the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Health Cost Controls vs. Ronald Gifford
W2001-02267-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: W. Michael Maloan
This is an insurance case on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court has directed us "to reconsider the case on its merits in accordance with . . . York v. Sevier County Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W.3d 616 (Tenn. 1999)," which was decided after the appellate briefs were filed in the initial appeal. In York, the Supreme Court established that the "made whole" doctrine, applicable in cases involving an insurer's subrogation rights, is also applicable in cases involving an insurer's right to reimbursement for amounts paid to the insured from another source. After careful consideration, we find that York does not affect our original disposition of this case, and, therefore, on remand, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Donna Harris vs. Rulon Harris/Paige Williams vs. F. Beach Jr.
W2001-00502-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This appeal involves a realtor's commission for a failed sale of real property that was jointly owned by parties to a divorce. Upon the divorce of the property owners, the court ordered that their residence be sold. Having a listing agreement with a realtor in place, a contract for the purchase of the property was signed. After difficulty consummating the sale, the realtor and the purchaser intervened in the divorce and were granted specific performance of the contract. The court's order set a closing date and an alternative divestiture closing date in case the parties again refused to cooperate. As contemplated by the court, the divorcing property owners failed to attend the closing and a date for the divestiture closing was set. A foreclosure was to occur, however, before the divestiture closing. One hour before the foreclosure, the purchaser under the contract acquired the note and allowed the foreclosure to proceed. The purchaser then acquired the remaining interest in the property at the foreclosure. The chancery court ordered the purchaser to pay to the realtor a commission on the amount paid for the note. The purchaser appealed, and for the following reasons, we reverse.

Eddie McPeak vs. Mufflers Inc.
W2001-00471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Roger A. Page
This appeal concerns the proper amount of damages due to the Plaintiff after the Defendant damaged the engine in the Plaintiff's 1970 Dodge Challenger. Three witnesses provided testimony on the proper amount of damages that should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The trial court utilized the testimony of the Defendant's expert witness in assessing damages. The Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment, asserting that the Defendant's witness relied on untrustworthy information in forming his expert opinion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wright Medical Tech. vs. Bernard Grisoni & Biogeneration Inc.
W2000-01302-COA-R7-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This case involves the alleged use of confidential information by an ex-employee. The defendant employee worked for the plaintiff employer developing a medical product. The employee signed an agreement prohibiting the use of confidential information after his employment ended, but did not sign a non-competition agreement. The employee was terminated and thereafter began manufacturing a competing medical product. The plaintiff employer sued and obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting the ex-employee from manufacturing the product. The trial court later dissolved the injunction. Subsequently, it found the defendant employer liable for malicious prosecution and punitive damages, awarding damages of over $9 million. The employer appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part and modify. We reverse the finding of malicious prosecution, holding that the evidence is insufficient to establish malice or lack of probable cause. We also reverse the award of punitive damages. We affirm the trial court's dissolution of the injunction against the former employee, and find that the compensatory damages are limited by the amount of the injunction bond. Consequently, the award of compensatory damages is modified to this amount.

Elvis Wayne Ivey v. Long Hollow Leasing, Inc.,
M2000-02112-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr. Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
In this appeal, the defendant-employer contends the trial court abused its discretion by (1) awarding the plaintiff-employee a default judgment after the defendant failed to obey an order compelling discovery, and by (2) denying its motion for a new trial. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Adrian S. Lennox
M2000-02869-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The defendant, Adrian S. Lennox, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, vandalism, felony evading arrest and driving on a revoked license. The defendant was then sentenced as a Range II offender to nine years on the aggravated burglary conviction, three years on the vandalism conviction, five years on the felony evading arrest conviction, and six months on the conviction for driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered that the aggravated burglary and the felony evading sentences run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant's convictions, (2) the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion for the preparation of trial transcripts prior to his motion for new trial hearing, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jon Robert Goodale
M2000-02140-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

The defendant, Jon Goodale, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The first conviction was merged into the felony murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life. The trial court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a twenty-five year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery to be served consecutive to the life sentence. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning accessory after the fact as a lesser-included offense to all charges, and (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Quincy Bledsoe v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02701-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The appellant, Quincy Bledsoe, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Fayette County Circuit Court. In 1997, Bledsoe pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping and attempted felony escape and received an effective nine-year Department of Correction sentence as a violent offender. On appeal, Bledsoe seeks to set aside his convictions upon grounds that his pleas were "based upon an uncounseled statement that was not knowingly and voluntarily given." Finding this issue without merit, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Karl Hamilton, a.k.a. R. Prewitt v. State of Tennessee
W2000-02240-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

Petitioner appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court held that the petition was time-barred by the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was filed timely, and reverse the decision of the post-conviction court.

State of Tennessee v. Doney D. Miles
W2000-02587-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris B. Craft

The defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery and sentence of eight years and six months, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay into evidence under the excited utterance exception; (3) the trial court erroneously failed to charge the jury on lesser-included offenses; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Marcus J. Turco
W2001-01085-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

This is an appeal by the State of Tennessee from an order granting the defendant judicial diversion for the offense of sexual battery. This order was the result of a Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35 motion to reduce a previously ordered sentence of one year in the county jail with all time suspended and supervised probation for one year. Although the Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35 motion was timely filed, the trial court did not act upon the motion until after the original probated sentence had been fully served and expired. Two issues of first impression are presented in this appeal. We conclude that (1) judicial diversion is not a “sentence” and, therefore, may not be granted as Rule 35 relief; and (2) a trial court may not modify a sentence under Rule 35 after the sentence has been fully served and expired. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.