State of Tennessee v. Brandon D. Forbes
Aggrieved of his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of aggravated assault, the defendant, Brandon D. Forbes, appeals, challenging the admission of his prior conviction of aggravated robbery for impeachment purposes, the admission of certain testimony from a State’s witness, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandra Lee Westberry v. Steve Allen Westberry
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion to recuse filed by Steve Allen Westberry ("Former Husband") in the parties' post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court's ruling, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Randall Thompson v. Herbert Hamm
Plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action against defendant. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon S. Massengill v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brandon S. Massengill, appeals the Claiborne County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for resisting arrest or stop and his six-month suspended sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition on the ground that he was not in custody for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Brian Santora
The defendant, Andrew Brian Santora, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the revocation and that the trial court should have imposed an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Hope A.
This appeal concerns a father's parental rights to his daughter. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the father's parental rights on the statutory ground of abandonment when he willfully failed to visit the child for the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found termination of the father's rights was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Hall v. Gaylord Entertainment Company, et al.
This is a negligence action. While attending a holiday-themed ice exhibit, the plaintiff slipped and fell at the top of an ice slide attraction that was a feature of the exhibit and sustained injuries to his arm. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the company that constructed the ice slide asserting various theories of negligence. After the company filed a motion for summary judgment in which it demonstrated that the plaintiff had not presented any evidence to support his claims, the plaintiff conceded that the company was entitled to summary judgment on all of his claims except those related to negligent design of the ice slide. In support of his assertion that the company breached a standard of care in designing the ice slide, the plaintiff relied solely on American Society of Testing Materials safety standards for children’s playground equipment. The trial court determined that because the standards were not applicable to the ice slide, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the company was negligent in designing the ice slide. The trial court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Thomas T.
This appeal involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his seven-year-old son. In 2011, the son was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his parents' substance abuse and was placed in the custody of his paternal great-aunt and great-uncle. In 2013, the same great-aunt and great-uncle filed a petition, as prospective adoptive parents, seeking to terminate the father's parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions. The trial court found that the grounds of abandonment and persistent conditions were proved by clear and convincing evidence. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Marino v. Board of Administration City of Memphis Retirement System
We granted an application for an interlocutory appeal in this case to consider whether the Board of Administration of the City of Memphis Retirement System is exempt from the contested case procedures of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act because the City of Memphis is organized as a home rule charter form of government. We hold that the Board is not exempt from the contested case procedures and therefore affirm the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to the petitioner. This matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton et al.
This case involves a challenge by a candidate for circuit judge to the qualifications of the winning candidate. William Thomas McFarland and Michael S. Pemberton were the only candidates in the August 7, 2014 election for Ninth Judicial District Circuit Judge.2 In March 2014, an eligible voter in the Ninth District, who is not a party to this suit, filed a complaint with the local election commission challenging Pemberton's eligibility to run for circuit judge, alleging he did not meet the residency requirement. The local election commission held a public hearing, and ultimately determined that Pemberton was eligible. Accordingly, his name was reflected on the ballot. He won the election. McFarland, who had knowledge of the March 2014 complaint and subsequent actions by the local election commission, then filed this election challenge, seeking to void the election results on the ground that Pemberton failed to satisfy the residency requirement. The trial court dismissed McFarland's claim as an untimely review of a quasi-judicial determination under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 (Supp. 2015). McFarland appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Oneida Farms Development, Inc. v. Town of Huntsville
This case involves a quo warranto action challenging the validity and reasonableness of an annexation ordinance. The trial court determined that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-58-111, the plaintiff failed to prove that (1) the annexation ordinance was unreasonable for the overall well-being of the communities involved or (2) the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and territory would not be materially retarded in the absence of such annexation. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff timely appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Pursuant to an issue raised by the defendant, we also determine the plaintiff’s complaint to have been timely and properly filed. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Austin Wells
Defendant, Austin Wells, appeals his conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and reckless driving, arguing that his warrantless arrest for the offenses was not supported by probable cause and that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We conclude that Defendant has waived both of these issues and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gunnar C. Skarbrevik, et al v. Personal Representative of Estate of Carolyn E. Brown
An employee, who was injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist while on company business and while driving an automobile owned by his wife, sought to recover for his injuries through the uninsured motorist provision of his employer's business automobile policy. The insurer denied coverage, asserting that the policy only provided coverage for automobiles owned by the company. The trial court granted the employee's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that an endorsement to the policy which added employees using non-company vehicles on company business to the liability coverage operated to make those employees “insured” for purposes of the uninsured motorist coverage. Insurer appeals; finding no error in the trial court's interpretation of the policy, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re S. S.-G.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights on grounds of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4) and persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). The child was found to be dependent and neglected by order of the Juvenile Court, and Appellant appealed the dependency and neglect finding to the Circuit Court. The ground of persistence of conditions requires a prior finding of dependency and neglect. However, our record does not reflect the status of Appellant’s appeal of the dependency and neglect order. In the absence of proof of full adjudication of the dependency and neglect appeal, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the ground of persistence of conditions. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. Concerning the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, the trial court’s order states only that Appellant “has sexually abused the child . . . pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-602 and that this sexual abuse constitutes severe abuse pursuant to T.C.A. § 37-1-102(b)(2[1]).” Because the code sections that the trial court relies upon contain numerous definitions of “child sexual abuse” and “severe child abuse,” in the absence of specific citation to the exact definition(s) relied upon, we cannot make a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and remand with instructions for the trial court to make specific findings as required under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(k). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Eugene Harris
The Petitioner, Tracy Eugene Harris, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order denying his motion for pretrial jail credit pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion for pretrial jail credit. The State responds that the Petitioner's argument is waived for failure to file a timely notice of appeal and that the trial court properly denied the Petitioner's motion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tapo T. Tabb and Douglas Ingram
The Defendant-Appellants, Tapo T. Tabb and Douglas Ingram, were convicted by a Williamson County jury of burglary and theft of property valued over $60,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendants to 12 years’ confinement for their burglary convictions and 25 years’ confinement for their theft of property convictions, to be served consecutively for effective sentences of 37 years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by (1) denying their motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants; (2) failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser-included offense of burglary; and (3) sentencing the Defendants to 37 years’ confinement. In addition, Defendant Ingram argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Drew Freeman v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Drew Freeman, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for White County. He was convicted of second degree murder of his mother and sentenced to seventeen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to locate and call a witness. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan T. Deal
The defendant, Jonathan T. Deal, appeals the dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct his illegal sentence. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by declaring his motion moot because his sentence had been served and had expired and that the court erred by concluding that the illegal sentence alignment was not a bargained-for element of his plea agreement. Because, under the circumstances of this case, Rule 36.1 cannot avail the defendant of meaningful relief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court declaring the motion moot. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Davison
The Petitioner, Travis Davison, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan T. Deal - concurring
I concur with the results of the majority, but I believe the trial court properly dismissed Defendant’s 36.1 request for exactly the right reason—Defendant’s sentence has long since expired. I respectfully disagree that a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursued via Rule 36.1 may not be dismissed soley because the sentence has been served and has expired. See Philander Butler v. State, W2014-01366-CCA-R3-CO, 2015 WL 4240256, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2015), perm. app. filed. I would have dissented from the orginal holding remanding the matter back to the trial court after the original trial judge summarily dismissed Defendant’s motion without conducting a hearing.1 See State v. Jonathan T. Deal, No. E2013-02623-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 2802910 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2014), no perm. app. filed. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristi L. Boren v. Daniel P. Rousos
Mother filed a petition seeking to have Father held in criminal contempt for violating the parties’ parenting plan and mutual restraining order. The trial court found Father guilty of two of ten counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him accordingly. Father appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Brookside Homeowners Association v. Stan Vaught
A party who failed to file a de novo appeal of a general sessions judgment filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court dismissed the writ on the grounds that the petitioner had a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-727(b), a de novo appeal. We agree and affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adrian Antonio Jones
The Defendant, Adrian Antonio Jones, pleaded guilty to several drug and other offenses occurring between 1992 and 1994. According to plea agreements, he was granted concurrent sentencing. In 2014, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 alleging that his concurrent sentencing for two of his pleas was illegal and that, since any subsequent sentencing was based upon his illegal sentence that those sentences are also “illegal.” The trial court agreed that one of his convictions was statutorily required to run consecutively, and it granted his Rule 36.1 relief as to case number 8775. The trial court held, however, that the other sentences were not illegal as they did not violate any statute. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mildred S. Draper v. Donald Mark Draper
This is a divorce action in which the husband appeals the trial court's classification of separate property and the division of marital property. We affirm the court's classification of property and reverse the court's division of marital property. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Twain Demario Vaughn v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Twain Demario Vaughn, of one count of reckless homicide, one count of first-degree felony murder, one count of aggravated robbery, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the reckless homicide conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of life in prison. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Twain Demario Vaughn, No. M2006-01659-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 110094, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 9, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time barred. It then reversed its ruling, appointed counsel, and held a hearing after which it dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) introduce the victim’s toxicology report; (2) request more time to review videotaped statements that called into question the eye witnesses’ credibility; and (3) have the Petitioner’s competency evaluated. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner’s petition was not filed within the statute of limitations and that he has not shown a statutory or due process ground for the tolling of the statute of limitations. As such, we dismiss the petition as time barred. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |