Opinions

Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William B. Cain
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2

Gary Reatherford v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.
01S01-9504-CV-00058
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge John K. Byers
Trial Court Judge: Hon. William B. Cain
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff was doing construction work at the Lincoln Brass Works facility, moving the employee break room from one side of the building to another, when a nail flew into his right eye, requiring several surgical procedures and resulting in total permanent loss of vision in the eye. The trial judge found that he was a statutory employee of Lincoln Brass Works and held the company liable for 1 percent permanent disability to plaintiff's right eye. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The only issue before us is the status of the plaintiff for workers' compensation insurance purposes. The plaintiff contends, and the trial judge held, that he was a statutory employee and Lincoln Brass Works was a principal contractor (statutory employer) under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113. Lincoln Brass Works contends plaintiff was either an independent contractor or a casual employee. Under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a), "A principal, or intermediate contractor, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer," (commonly referred to as a "statutory employer"). This court has consistently held that where a business enterprise undertakes to act as its own principal contractor and contracts directly with a subcontractor for various phases of construction on its own premises, the business enterprise is subject to liability imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. Acklie v. Carrier, 785 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 199). Lincoln Brass asserts the construction workers were independent contractors rather than statutory employees under TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-113(a). The factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship to the principal was that of employee or independent contractor include: (1) the right to control the conduct of 2

01A01-9510-CH-00481
01A01-9510-CH-00481
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

01A01-9510-JV-00474
01A01-9510-JV-00474
Trial Court Judge: Andrew J. Shookhoff

01A01-9510-JV-00479
01A01-9510-JV-00479
Trial Court Judge: Andrew J. Shookhoff

01A01-9601-CH-00030
01A01-9601-CH-00030
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

01C01-9506-CC-00166
01C01-9506-CC-00166

02A01-9502-CH-00025
02A01-9502-CH-00025
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton

01A01-9508-CH-00365
01A01-9508-CH-00365
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

01A01-9506-JV-00262
01A01-9506-JV-00262
Trial Court Judge: W. Nowlin Taylor

03A01-9509-CH-00318
03A01-9509-CH-00318

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

03S01-9508-CC-00096
03S01-9508-CC-00096
Trial Court Judge: Leon C. Burns, Jr.

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer

01S01-9503-CC-00035
01S01-9503-CC-00035

01C01-9704-CR-00129
01C01-9704-CR-00129

03S01-9501-CH-00008
03S01-9501-CH-00008

03S01-9502-CH-00018
03S01-9502-CH-00018

03S01-9502-CV-00015
03S01-9502-CV-00015

03S01-9410-CR-00106
03S01-9410-CR-00106

03C01-9505-CR-0
03C01-9505-CR-0
Trial Court Judge: Frank L. Slaughter

03C01-9510-CC-00297
03C01-9510-CC-00297

Charles Steven Denbow, v. Sandra Kay Denbow
02A01-9410-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe C. Morris

This is a domestic relations case with an unusual twist. On May 3, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Chester County seeking a divorce from defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the same time, plaintiff filed a marital dissolution agreement (“agreement”) executed by the parties on May 2, 1994. The agreement provided that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children, then ages 13 and 15, with the children residing with plaintiff. No child support was to be paid by either party. In addition, the agreement did not make any allowances for alimony and purported to divide the real and personal property between the parties. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time the parties executed the agreement, but defendant was not. Shortly thereafter, defendant employed counsel and on June 3, 1994, filed a motion to set aside the agreement. In her motion defendant contended that she was forced to sign the agreement under duress and fear of bodily harm. She also contended that the agreement did not adequately provide for the care and maintenance of the parties’ minor children or make an equitable settlement of the 2 parties’ property as required by T.C.A. § 36-4-103(b) (1991). Defendant’s motion asked the court to set the agreement aside and allow the parties to proceed with the divorce as if the agreement had never been executed.

State of Tennessee vs. Danny R. Morris
01C01-9506-CC-00206
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

The defendant, Danny R. Morris, was convicted at a jury trial of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to a term of confinement of twelve years in the Department of Correction.

State of Tennessee v. Danny R. Morris - Dissenting
01C01-9506-CC-00206
Authoring Judge: Presiding Joe B. Jones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

I respectfully dissent.

The crime committed by the appellant, Danny R. Morris, was despicable. I am sure that the jury, like myself, was enraged as the evidence unfolded. This atrocious crime was committed in the jury’s home county by two inmates who escaped from a prison in an adjoining county. Morris and Barrett were much younger than the victim. They feigned illness and acted as if one of them needed assistance. When the elderly victim stopped to lend assistance, Morris and Barrett took advantage of the victim’s act of kindness. Nevertheless, we as citizens must not lose sight of the fact that ours is a Nation of laws. These laws govern the conduct of every citizen. As this Court said in Hodges v. State, 491 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972), cert. denied (Tenn. 1973): “[O]dious individuals are not governed by one law and the remaining citizens by another; all are protected by the same general law.”