State vs. William Dozier
W1999-00243-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
The defendant entered guilty pleas to three charges of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction on each charge. The court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years and fined the defendant $2,000. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court, arguing that the court erred by denying him an alternative method of punishment. We conclude that the trial court considered all relevant factors needed to reach an appropriate sentence and that its findings are adequately supported by the record. The defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the sentence was improper, and, accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Carolyn L. Curry
W1999-00688-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley

State of Tennessee, Department of Children Services, v. MR
E1999-02703-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Schulty

The Trial Judge granted the Department's petition to terminate parental rights of the mother to her ten year old child on numerous grounds. The mother has appealed, and we affirm termination.

Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et al
E1999-02752-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
This is the second time that this case has been before us on appeal. On the first appeal, which was filed with respect to an order entered pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, we affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the primary issue raised by the original complaint for declaratory judgment. While that case was pending on appeal, the original plaintiff, Carl O. Koella, Jr., died, and, on motion of his counsel, we entered an order substituting his widow, Maribel Koella, in his place. On remand, the plaintiff -- not otherwise identified in the pleading -- filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the defendants' still-pending counterclaim. That motion was based on the failure of the defendants, in their capacity as counter-plaintiffs, to file a motion "to substitute the proper party for [Mr. Koella] in the trial court." The trial court granted the motion. We reverse.

Byron Lowell Mitts vs. Virginia Ann Jones Mitts
E2000-00374-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
The trial court dissolved a marriage of over 26 years. Wife appeals, arguing (1) that the increase in value of Husband's separate property interest in two stock holdings is, in each instance, marital property; (2) that the trial court erred in its award of alimony; (3) that the trial court erred in calculating Husband's child support obligation; and (4) that she is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, both at the trial level and on appeal. We affirm the trial court's classification of the increase in value of Husband's Rivermont stock as his separate property. We also affirm the trial court's finding that no portion of the value of the Coca-Cola stock is marital property. We modify the award of rehabilitative alimony so as to provide for a monthly payment of $2,000 for a period of four years beginning with the first full month after the entry of the divorce judgment below. We find that Wife is entitled to her attorney's fees at both stages of this proceeding. We remand this case for the trial court to determine if the child support obligation should be increased due to Husband's lack of standard visitation.

State vs. Wayne Michael Fuller
E1999-01676-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Ray L. Jenkins
The defendant appeals from his sentence imposed for seven counts of statutory rape, a Class E felony, in the Knox County Criminal Court. The trial court imposed a sentence of two years for each count to be served in the Department of Correction. The trial court imposed consecutive sentencing on five counts and concurrent sentencing was imposed on two counts, for an effective sentence of ten years. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the length of the sentence and consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Stanley Bridges v. Liberty Insurance Company of
E1999-01775-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor ruled that the plaintiff suffered from pneumoconiosis and that the two physicians who testified the plaintiff had the condition were more credible than the physician who testified he did not. However, the judge found the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing he was totally and permanently disabled from the pneumoconiosis; therefore, an award could not be made under the guidelines as expressed in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-32 et. seq. However, the chancellor ruled that even though the evidence and circumstances did not support an award of one hundred percent permanent total disability under the coal worker's pneumoconiosis provisions, the court could still award permanent partial disability under the general occupational diseases provisions of the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 31. The court then found the plaintiff suffered from coal miner's pneumoconiosis arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant and also found the condition causally linked to the plaintiff's exposure to conditions and hazards of his employment. The plaintiff was found to be one hundred percent disabled from a combination of his arthritic condition and pneumoconiosis; however, the disabilityattributable to pneumoconiosis was found much less significant than the non- compensable arthritic disability, resulting in an award of fifteen percent permanent partial disability to the bodyas a whole. We affirm the chancellor's finding that the plaintiff's pneumoconiosis is not totally disabling but reverse the award of permanent partial disability benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Dismissed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tennessee for the appellant, Security Insurance Company of Hartford David H. Dunaway and Frank Q. Vettori, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Stanley Bridges MEMORANDUM OPINION The review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). Facts The plaintiff, forty-seven years of age at the time of trial, has a high school diploma. His work history consists of coal mining and work at the mines as a night watchman. His duties in these positions required him to shovel coal dust, pick rock, sweep, and, when in the mines, be exposed to mine effluence. He has also operated a variety of equipment and loaded supplies to take into the deep mine; when working at strip mining he would shoot powder and also work as a drill operator. The plaintiff last worked in the mines in the fall of 1989. In 1986 the plaintiff was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. As a result, the plaintiff was off work for part of 1986 and all of 1987. During that time, the plaintiff was under medical treatment in which he received gold shots and steroids. He returned to the mine as a night watchman but eventually became unable to perform those duties, and he has not been able to work since leaving his last position with the defendant. The plaintiff admitted he quit working for the defendant because of his rheumatoid arthritis, not because of his breathing difficulties. The plaintiff's wife, who testified at trial, also stated he quit working in the mines because of the rheumatoid arthritis symptoms. The plaintiff testified he does not currently know of any work he could do because of his breathing problems and his arthritis_he gets out of breath very easily and coughs and spits up sputum often; he has painfullyswollen joints on his hands and painful knots on his feet. He mainly watches television, goes for short walks and washes dishes sometimes. He testified the arthritis from which he suffers keeps him from doing just about anything, including at times such everyday tasks as holding a coffee cup, brushing his hair, buttoning his clothes and getting out of the bathtub. He cannot engage in any hobbies or activities that involve reaching overhead or behind. -2-

Steven Leach vs. State
M1999-00774-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: James O. Bond
On November 19, 1995, a Smith County Grand Jury indicted Steven Edward Leach, the defendant and appellant, for first-degree murder, felony murder, two counts of rape of a child, and attempted rape of a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to first-degree murder and rape of a child and the trial court sentenced him to serve life without parole for the murder consecutively to twenty-five years for the rape. The defendant filed a post-conviction petition, and, following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that he was denied his right to counsel of his choice; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) that he was denied his due process right to be present at a hearing; and (4) that the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors violated his due process rights. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm its judgment.

State vs. Anthony E. Collier
M1999-01408-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
On March 31, 1998, Metropolitan Nashville Police Officers executed a search warrant on the residence and person of Anthony E. Collier, the defendant and appellee. Police searched the defendant, his vehicle and his residence and seized drugs, drug paraphernalia and weapons. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, and, following a suppression hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion. On appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred. We hold that the search of the defendant was not supported by probable cause and any evidence seized from the defendant's person was thus properly suppressed. However, we also find that the failure of the trial court to make findings of fact with respect to the question of whether the contraband was in plain view and thus subject to seizure requires us to remand this case for entry of such findings pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(e). Finally, the search of the defendant's residence was supported by the warrant; thus any evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle or residence should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

State vs. Christopher Karvey
M1999-02590-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to DUI, and attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). The defendant contends that the stop of his vehicle by police was illegal and that all evidence obtained as a result thereof must be suppressed. Because the defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

State vs. Jason Norton
M2000-00074-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: John H. Gasaway, III
In April of 1999, the Robertson County grand jury indicted the defendant for hindering a secured creditor and for failure to appear in court on charges related to a third offense. Thereafter, the trial court appointed the defendant counsel, and this attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges of hindering a secured creditor. Through this motion the defendant essentially averred that the facts would not support a conviction for the offense. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled in the defendant's favor, and the State subsequently brought this appeal asserting that the trial court improperly invaded the province of the jury by ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence. After analyzing relevant caselaw and the record, we find that the State's position has merit and, therefore, reverse the trial court's ruling.

State vs. Michael E. Wallace
M1999-02187-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
On August 25, 1998, a Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Michael E. Wallace, the defendant and appellant, of one count each of the following: possession of cocaine with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of a weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia and evading arrest. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted for possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a lesser included offense of count one. The defendant was also convicted of all other counts as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to serve ten years for possession of cocaine with intent to sell consecutively to two years for possession of a weapon. For the remaining counts, the court ordered the defendant to serve two eleven month and twenty-nine day sentences concurrently to each other and the other counts. On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erroneously allowed a police officer to offer expert opinion testimony; (3) that the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial after a witness testified to prior bad acts of the defendant; (4) that the court erroneously refused to instruct the jury to consider lesser-included offenses; and (5) that the court erroneously ordered consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Shannon Hagewood
M2000-00972-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace
On November 16, 1999, Shannon Hagewood, the defendant and appellant, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary in a Dickson County Criminal Court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple, Range II offender to six years for the first count, six years for the second count, and eight years for the third count. The court also ordered the defendant to serve the eight-year sentence consecutively to the two six-year sentences, which were to be served concurrently to each other. On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that he did not receive notice, as required by statute, that he would be sentenced as a multiple offender, (2) that the trial court's imposition of an eight-year sentence was erroneous; and (3) that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was erroneous. After a thorough review of the record, we find that, although the trial court did not place its findings in the record, this court's de novo review supports the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State vs. Ronald Fielding
M2003-01055-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
The Defendant, Ronald Fielding, pled guilty to three counts of rape of a child, one count of rape of an incapacitated victim and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifty years in prison to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering that his sentences run consecutively; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Union Planters vs. Island Management
W1999-00541-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This is a dispute regarding the repayment of a $350,000.00 loan that Union Planters National Bank ("Union Planters") made to Island Management Authority, Inc. ("Island Management") in 1989. The trial court found that Mr. Criss, Mr. Tigrett, and Mr. Richards, each of whom had executed a guaranty in favor of Union Planters, are jointly and severally liable to Union Planters for the outstanding balance of this loan. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Emmanuel Page vs. Doctor R. Crants
W1999-02127-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
An inmate sentenced in Wisconsin and transferred to Tennessee, where he is presently incarcerated, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

Lisa Alfaro Munday vs. William Mark Munday
E1999-02605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court designated William Mark Munday ("Father") as the primary residential custodian of two of the parties' children. He had been awarded primary residential custody of the parties' third child at an earlier time. Lisa Alfaro Munday ("Mother") appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the custodial arrangement and (2) that there had not been a material change of circumstances to warrant a change in custody. We affirm.

Alvin Herring vs. Interstate Hotels
W1999-01055-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a dispute between Plaintiff Alvin O. Herring, Jr. and Defendant Interstate Hotels, Inc. d/b/a Memphis Marriott ("Memphis Marriott") regarding the theft of Mr. Herring's property from the Memphis Marriott's premises. The Memphis Marriott argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motion for an extension of time to file an answer to Mr. Herring's complaint, in granting Mr. Herring's motion for a default judgment, and in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

J.C.Bradford vs. Southern Realty
W1999-01617-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This cause came to be considered by the Court upon a claim for misrepresentation arising from a real estate transaction. This is the second occasion that the Court has had to address this case. Initially, this cause was set for trial, and following opening statements, the Chancellor ruled from the bench in the defendants' favor. On appeal, this Court remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, renewed a previously filed motion to dismiss and filed a counterclaim for attorneys fees. The trial court granted the defendants the requested relief. This appeal followed. Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that the trial court's orders granting summary judgment, dismissing the complaint and awarding attorneys' fees should be vacated and that the cause should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Daniel Ray Stanfill vs. Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill
E1999-01878-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court modified the judgment of divorce by changing the custody of Christopher Stanfill (DOB: February 12, 1993) from Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill ("Mother") to Daniel Ray Stanfill ("Father"). The trial court also established Mother's visitation rights with her son. We affirm.

Kenneth L. Storey vs. Randall Nichols, et al
E1998-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: David H. Cate
An accused awaiting trial on a charge of aggravated rape filed an action in the Chancery Court of Knox County against the district attorney general and two of his assistants. The complaint sought an injunction preventing the defendants from proceeding with his prosecution, a money judgment to compensate him for his mental and physical suffering, and the loss of over two years of valuable time. The complaint also sought to disbar the defendants. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

Margaret Elizabeth Butler v. Txas Boot,
M1999-00674-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wooten, Jr., Judge
The appellant contends the trial judge erred (1) in determining the employee's condition arose out of the employment and (2) in applying Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-242, and (3) that the award is excessive.

James David Ramsey, Jr. v. Crockett-Phillips Construction, et al
M1999-01008-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
The employer and its insurer have appealed, contending the trial court's award of permanent disability benefits based on the functional equivalent of one hundred percent to both legs is excessive.

State vs. Ronald Jerome Butler
M1999-01034-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman
Ronald Jerome Butler was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated robbery, both class B felonies. For the offense of aggravated kidnapping, the trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, requiring him to serve one hundred percent of his sentence in confinement. For the offense of aggravated robbery, the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, requiring him to serve thirty percent of his sentence in confinement. The trial court further ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether his conviction of aggravated kidnapping violates principles of due process; and (2) whether the trial court erred in sentencing him. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William P. Henderson, et al vs. Henry Clay Hart, Jr.
E1999-01446-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
This appeal arises from an executory contract for the sale of real property. Henry Clay Hart, Jr., the Appellant, appeals the judgment from the Knox County Circuit Court in favor of William P. Henderson and Lillian R. Henderson, the Appellees. Mr. Hart raises the issues of whether the Trial Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and whether the Court erred in finding that the executory sales contract was no longer in effect. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of appeal against Henry Clay Hart, Jr. and his surety.