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Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman

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Milburn L. Edwards v. State of Tennessee
W2000-00043-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Arthur T. Bennett

In 1982, the Petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County to two counts of rape, three counts of robbery, one count of robbery with a deadly weapon, four counts of burglary, one count of attempted burglary, one count of first degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, and one count of a crime against nature. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of ten years. In 1991, the Petitioner was convicted in Davidson County of twenty-one counts of rape, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of first-degree burglary, one count of second-degree burglary, two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of assault with intent to commit rape. In 1997, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition challenging his 1982 convictions and sentence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's ruling. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tyrone Pierce
W2000-00571-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bernie Weinman

The defendant pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement he agreed to a three-year sentence as a Range I Standard Offender, with the manner of service to be determined after a hearing by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 270 days in the workhouse on weekends ("day for day") from 7:00 p.m. on Fridays to 7:00 p.m. on Sundays and five years probation with a 10:00 p.m. curfew on weekdays. The defendant contends he should have received full probation or some other less restrictive form of alternative sentencing. We affirm the trial court's denial of full probation but modify the time of service in the workhouse on weekends to 104 days.

Kristin Huntley vs. William Huntley
E2000-01718-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
In this child support modification action, the Trial Court held that a significant variance existed between William Sidney Huntley's ("Defendant") child support obligation set by the parties' Marital Dissolution Agreement ("MDA") and the amount mandated by the Child Support Guidelines ("Guidelines"). The Trial Court ordered an increase in child support consistent with the Guidelines. Because the Guidelines' flat percentage amount of child support totaled approximately $6,600 per month, the Trial Court ordered it be divided between child support payments of $3,100 and payments to a non-educational trust ("Trust") in the amount of $3,500. Defendant appeals and primarily contends that his child support obligation should not be increased to the Guidelines' flat percentage amount because that amount exceeds a reasonable amount of child support and because the MDA controls his child support obligation despite any increases in his income. Kristin B. Huntley ("Plaintiff") also raises issues on appeal, primarily regarding the Trust. We affirm.

Craig Tatman vsl. Fort Sanders Medical Center
E2000-02163-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Wheeler A. Rosenbalm
Craig Tatman ("Plaintiff"), a devout Jehovah's Witness, underwent heart surgery at Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center ("Defendant"). Prior to the surgery, the attending physician and Defendant were specifically informed that Plaintiff was not to receive any blood or blood products. While Plaintiff was recovering from the surgery, he experienced a dramatic decrease in blood pressure. The attending critical care nurse forgot that Plaintiff was a Jehovah's Witness and administered Protenate, a protein fraction derived from human plasma. This was contrary to Plaintiff's religious tenets. At trial, Defendant admitted that a medical battery had taken place. The only issue presented to the jury was compensatory damages resulting from the medical battery. No jury instruction was requested or given regarding nominal damages. The jury awarded no compensatory damages. Plaintiff filed a motion requesting an additur or a new trial. Plaintiff's motion was denied, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Leon William G.C. vs. D.F. Shoffner Inc.
E2000-01877-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
This is a suit by a general contractor against a sub-contractor for breach of contract and negligence in installing heating, ventilation and air conditioning equipment. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of the sub-contractor, resulting in this appeal. We find in light of the Supreme Court case of Harris v. Chern, which was delivered after the Trial Court ruled on the motion to alter or amend, that the order overruling the motion should be vacated and the Trial Court should reconsider it in light of Harris. We accordingly vacate the order overruling the motion to alter or amend, and remand.

Deborah Davis vs. Jerry Davis
E1999-02737-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
This appeal from the Hamilton County Circuit Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in failing to approve Ms. Davis's Statement of the Evidence, in retroactively modifying child support, in determining the amount of Mr. Davis's mortgage obligation to Ms. Davis, and in determining the amount of attorney's fees Mr. Davis was ordered to pay Ms. Davis. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified and remand with directions.

Kenneth Weston vs. State
E1998-02620-SC-R11-PC
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
We granted review in this cause to determine whether the trial court exceeded the authority granted upon remand when it permitted Kenneth Lee Weston to amend his post-conviction petition and when it ruled on the amended petition. Because we find that the trial court was without authority to allow the amendment, we vacate all orders pertaining to the amended petition and remand the cause to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a first-tier review of the trial court's denial of the original unamended petition for post-conviction relief.

George Thurman Haynie, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01522-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

Petitioner, George Thurman Haynie, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking a felony conviction for passing a worthless check and a misdemeanor conviction for passing a worthless check. The Circuit Court of Williamson County dismissed the petition and Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record, the pro se brief filed by the Appellant, the brief filed by the State, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Daniel Lowe vs. Faytella Lowe
E2000-01456-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
In this divorce case, the trial court dissolved a childless marriage of 5 1/2 years. Daniel Ed Lowe ("Husband") appeals, arguing that the trial court erred (1) in declaring the parties' antenuptial agreement void and (2) in granting Faytella D. Lowe ("Wife") half of the increase in value of Husband's retirement benefits accrued during the marriage. We affirm.

Roy Schrimsher vs. Sherry Schrimsher
E2000-02169-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: John B. Hagler, Jr.
This is a post divorce custody dispute. Mother seeks custody of the two minor children because she believes the children are dependent and neglected. Father seeks an increase in child support for the children. Mother requested the Trial Judge to hear the testimony of the children who were 12 and 11 at the time. The children were the witnesses to the acts complained of in the petition to change custody. Mother could only present hearsay evidence from the children. The Trial Judge refused to hear the testimony of the children and continued custody with Father and increased Mother's child support. Mother then filed this appeal. We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for the purpose hereinafter set out.

In Re: Estate of Martha Woodard
E2000-02219-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert G. Lincoln
This declaratory judgment action focuses on a dispute among three adult children concerning the ownership of certain funds in their mother's estate. In earlier litigation relating to the administration of the estate of the children's father, a chancellor found the same funds had been owned by the children's parents as tenants by the entireties and directed that the funds be transferred out of the father's estate, and "deposited to [the mother's] account." The children's mother died approximately four months after the entry of the chancellor's order. At the time of her death, the funds were still in the father's estate due to the fact that the executrix of his estate, who was also the mother's attorney-in-fact, had failed to transfer the funds into her mother's name. The mother's will made several specific bequests, including a bequest, to the petitioner in the instant case, of "all of [sic] money deposited in the First Tennessee Bank." The petitioner filed this suit seeking a declaration that the funds should be treated as constructively having been placed in the mother's checking account at First Tennessee Bank. The trial court granted such relief, and the respondents, the other two children, now appeal. We reverse.

Brenda Tipton vs. Richard Jones, et al
E2000-01860-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Samuel H. Payne
Brenda L. Tipton ("Plaintiff") filed this lawsuit seeking damages for personal injury. Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), Plaintiff's uninsured motorist carrier, filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude portions of the testimony of Plaintiff's treating physician because it was not based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Allstate also claimed that the jury verdict was excessive and it was entitled to a remittitur or a new trial. We affirm the Trial Court's evidentiary rulings and its refusal to grant a remittitur or new trial.

Margaret Akins vs. Pauline Clark, et al
E2000-02337-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Lawrence H. Puckett
Margaret Akins ("Plaintiff") stood to inherit a farm and stock from her close friend, Josephine A. Notgrass ("Notgrass"), through specific bequests ("Bequests") in Notgrass' will. After Notgrass' will ("Will") was executed, Notgrass and Plaintiff formed a limited partnership ("Limited Partnership") in an effort to save estate taxes. Notgrass held a substantially higher interest in the Limited Partnership than Plaintiff and was the sole general partner. Notgrass transferred to the Limited Partnership the farm and stock which were the subject of the Bequests. After Notgrass' death, Plaintiff, who also is the personal representative of Notgrass' estate, filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking an order from the Trial Court regarding how to distribute the assets of the Limited Partnership. The Trial Court held that the transfer of the farm and stock to the Limited Partnership did not materially change or alter those assets, and, therefore, the transfer did not result in an ademption by extinction of the Bequests. As a result, the Trial Court held that Plaintiff was entitled to inherit the farm and stock pursuant to the Bequests. Fourteen of the twenty one named residuary beneficiaries ("Defendants") appeal. We reverse.

William H. Davis vs. Daira F. Davis
E2000-02678-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
This appeal from the Cocke County Circuit Court questions whether the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate. Mr. Davis appeals the trial court's valuation of his closely held corporation, the payment of some debt by Mr. Davis, and the award of permanent periodic alimony to Ms. Davis. We affirm the decision of the trial court as modified and remand for such further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against the Appellant, William H. Davis and his surety.

2000-02174-COA-R3-CV
2000-02174-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Thomas J. Seeley, Jr.

Gaf Building Materials v. Bobby R. George
M2000-00951-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy, Chancellor
In this appeal, the employer insists the trial court erred in the finding that the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome is causally related to the employment and that the award of permanent partial disability benefits is excessive. The employee insists the trial court erred in not awarding medical expenses. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be modified and, as modified, affirmed.

Robert Fahey vs. Fabien Eldridge & Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc.
M1999-00500-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
The primary issue presented in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the defendants waived all issues on appeal by failing to specifically state these issues in their motions for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). The defendants were found liable by a jury for the assault and battery of the plaintiff, and they were ordered to pay compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $1.75 million. The defendants filed motions for a new trial, which were denied by the trial court, in part, because the alleged errors were not specifically enumerated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the alleged errors were not stated with sufficient specificity in the motions so as to preserve them for appeal, and it dismissed all issues before it. The defendants then requested permission to appeal to this Court. We hold that the defendants' motions for a new trial did set forth several issues for review in compliance with Rule 3(e), and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for a determination of these issues on their merits.

Patrick E. Simpson v. State of Tennessee
M2001-02021-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier
The petitioner originally pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to two counts of aggravated assault for agreed sentences of three years on each count, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to a parole violation. The petitioner over two years later filed a "Petition for Review of Sentence" with the trial court alleging the judgment form omitted mention of the agreed upon pretrial jail credits. The trial court dismissed the petition finding it was without jurisdiction since the petitioner was "serving his sentence with TDOC for his parole violation." The petitioner challenges this ruling in this appeal, and additionally alleges he is serving his sentence in the Department of Correction, rather than at the Davidson County Workhouse, in contravention of his written plea agreement. We dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Stephen Lester Thomas
M2000-02440-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald P. Harris

The defendant was charged in the Williamson County Circuit Court with DUI, first offense, after a police officer observed him operating his vehicle in an erratic fashion. A videotape was made and admitted into evidence of the defendant's taking field sobriety tests, upon which the officer testified that he did poorly. Following his conviction for this offense, the defendant timely appealed. In his appeal, he raised several issues, including the refusal of the trial court to instruct as to a lesser-included offense, complaints about the admission of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and rulings of the trial court. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Donnie Wheeler, et al. v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
M1999-02453-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr.

I join the court's opinion and agree with its holding in affirming dismissal of the petition; however, because I do so for different reasons, I write separately.

Donnie Wheeler, et al. v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
M1999-02453-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr.

I concur in the results reached by the majority on all of the issues and in the rationales employed to reach the results in all but one issue, that being the ineffectiveness of counsel regarding the failure to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of facilitation. I respectfully would have taken a different approach in resolving this issue.

Donnie Wheeler, et al. v. State of Tennessee
M1999-02453-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr.

ThePetitioners filed pro-se petitions for post-conviction relief on September 25, 1997, in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-101. Amended petitions were subsequently filed by court appointed counsel on November 14, 1997. The Petitioners’ petitions were later dismissed and this appeal followed. In this appeal, the Petitioners set forth several grounds upon which they claim that post-conviction relief should have been granted. Specifically, the Petitioners allege ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that counsel: failed to file a motion for judgment of acquittal; failed to appeal the judgment of conviction for second degree murder; failed to dismiss two jurors who were alleged to be biased against the Petitioners, which resulted in a denial of their right to a fair and impartial jury; failed to interview and cross-examine a witness of the State’s; and failed to file a motion to suppress photographs that were entered into evidence.  Petitioner Donnie Wheeler also contends that post-conviction relief should have been granted because counsel failed to request an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of a felony, and because the trial court failed to charge the jury with the same lesser-included offense. After careful examination of the issues set forth herein, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief to the Petitioners.

State of Tennessee v. Pharez N. Price
M2000-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The defendant was convicted by a Lewis County jury of criminal responsibility for facilitation of a felony and possession of drug paraphernalia. The underlying felony conviction was for possession of cocaine in an amount of .5 gram or more with intent to sell or deliver. The defendant's brother pled guilty to this felony, a Class B felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in continuous confinement on the facilitation conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days in the workhouse on the drug paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of nine years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that his sentence on the facilitation conviction was inappropriate both as to length and manner of service. Having reviewed the limited record, we conclude that the sentence is appropriate and therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.