Opinions
Regina Sessel, et al. v. N.J. Ford and Sons Funeral Home, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves allegations of the mishandling of a dead human body by the funeral home and cemetery responsible for its final disposition. The decedent’s mother brought tort and breach of contract claims based on her assertion that the decedent’s body had been cremated rather than buried. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants on all claims. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE LINCOLN S. ET AL.
The trial court denied a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to two minor children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and failure to visit, as well as failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that the petitioners proved no statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Because the petitioners proved no grounds for termination, we need not address the children’s best interests. We affirm the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
DEAN SALEM, ET AL. v. NICK GALBRAITH, ET AL.
This is a dispute over the use of real property in a subdivision. Certain property owners filed this lawsuit seeking to enjoin other property owners in the subdivision from using or allowing the use of their properties as short-term rentals. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint based on interpretation of the restrictive covenants applicable to their properties. The trial court dismissed all causes of action. We affirm in part, and reverse in part. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Goldsberry, Jr.
The Defendant, William Goldsberry, Jr., appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the violation of probation warrant due to a violation of his speedy trial rights and by revoking his probation in full, contending that the evidence was insufficient to establish he committed a non-technical violation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Goldsberry, Jr. - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on two grounds. First, although not addressed by the majority, I find the exceedingly late issuance of the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant to be problematic. A strong argument can be made that the November 19, 2024 warrant, which was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired on June 23, 2002, and decades after the new criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California were allegedly committed, would violate the Defendant’s due process rights under the test for pre-accusatorial delay. Though perhaps not as strong, an argument can also be made that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant, which alleged the Oklahoma and California offenses, because this second warrant was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s probationary sentence expired on June 23, 2002. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a)(1) (stating that “[w]henever it comes to the attention of the trial judge that a defendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty of a breach of the laws of this state or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judge shall have the power to cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand: . . . (A) A warrant for the arrest of the defendant as in any other criminal case; or (B) For a technical violation brought by a probation officer, and subject to the discretion of the judge, a criminal summons.”); see also State v. Moon, No. M2023-01192-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1672885, at *12 n.7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2025) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(a) (reiterating that probation revocation proceedings “may only be commenced within the applicable probationary period”). Because the November 19, 2024 warrant was issued decades after the criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California and more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired, this court could have concluded either that this warrant violated the Defendant’s due process rights or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE ELIAS H. ET AL.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 9, 2025. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until August 11, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Pappas
The Defendant, Kristopher Pappas, was convicted after trial by jury of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury, as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion and entered judgments for a total effective sentence of five years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he acted in self-defense and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We ordered supplemental briefing to address whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that aggravated assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault and remand for a new trial on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter for that count. We affirm the judgment of conviction for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and the denial of judicial diversion as to the remaining count. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Ayzelee G.
Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of mental incompetence and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Adam Reese v. Lynette Erin Reese
The parties sought a divorce from one another and specifically contested who should be |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Thomas B.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the Loudon |
Court of Appeals | ||
Luther Smith v. Foremost Insurance Group, et al.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy J. Hancock
Billy J. Hancock, Defendant, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. State v. Hancock, No. M0212-02307-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 7006969, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 12, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 on January 30, 2025, in which he argued that the trial court committed a clerical error by checking the “T.D.O.C.” box on the judgment form and by ordering his sentence to be served as a “100 percent violent offender.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim. Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julie Buhler, et al. v. Lefkovitz & Lefkovitz, PLLC
This is a legal malpractice action that arises from alleged acts or omissions committed by attorney Steven L. Lefkovitz of Lefkovitz & Lefkovitz, PLLC, (“Defendant”) while representing Julie Buhler in a real estate dispute with Richard and Ellen Davis (“Sellers”) under an installment sales contract. The trial court summarily dismissed the legal malpractice action on the ground that two essential elements of a legal malpractice claim were not proven, specifically that “Plaintiff has failed to prove that Mr. Lefkovitz’s conduct was the cause-in-fact of her damages,” and “Plaintiff has not shown that Mr. Lefkovitz’s conduct was the proximate cause of her damages.” This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jermaine R. Carpenter
Before the court is the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. The State argues that the trial court properly denied the Appellant’s motion for plain error review of his sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36, because no such pleading is contemplated by the rules of criminal procedure. The pro se Appellant has filed a response in opposition to the State’s motion. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Hall
Defendant, Jonathan Hall, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for dismissal of a related domestic violence charge and an effective eight-year sentence with the trial court to determine the manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of confinement, four years for the aggravated assault charge to be served at 100% and eight years for the possession of a firearm charge to be served at 85%. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his request for a suspended sentence. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PEJHMAN EHSANI
This matter is before the Court upon application of the Defendant, Pejhman Ehsani, |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin David Whaley
A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted Defendant, Justin David Whaley, of |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark E. Hatley v. Ann E. Hatley
This is a divorce case following a long-term marriage. Wife appeals the trial court’s: 1) valuation and distribution of marital property and allocation of debt; 2) award of transitional alimony; 3) downward deviation of Husband’s child support obligation; and 4) denial of her request for her attorney’s fees to be paid from the marital estate. We affirm the trial court’s valuation of property; vacate the trial court’s division of marital debt, in part; vacate the alimony award; and reverse the court’s downward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Wygant, et al. v. Bill Lee, Governor, et al. (Concur in Part/Dissent in Part)
I join in the majority’s insightful analysis of Tennessee’s constitutional standing doctrine building upon the principles articulated in Case v. Wilmington Trust, N.A., 703 S.W.3d 274, 286–92 (Tenn. 2024). I quite agree with the majority that the claims we decide today are “quintessential” public rights cases and the three-part test of City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013), applies to the standing issues in both cases. I agree that Ms. Hunt does not meet this test and has no constitutional standing to pursue her claims. I also agree that Mr. Wygant’s challenge to the House map does not present a nonjusticiable political question and that he has no standing to challenge the entire House map. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gary Wygant, et al. v. Bill Lee, Governor, et al.
In this case, two Tennessee voters challenge the state House and Senate redistricting maps the General Assembly passed after the 2020 census. Gary Wygant, a Gibson County voter, alleges that the House redistricting map violates Article II, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution because it splits more counties than needed to comply with federal law. Francie Hunt, a Davidson County voter, alleges that the Senate redistricting map violates Article II, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution because it fails to consecutively number one of the four Senate districts in Davidson County. We hold that Wygant has standing to challenge only the split of Gibson County, not the entire House map. But his challenge fails on the merits: Wygant did not prove—as he must to establish a violation of Article II, Section 5—that the split was unnecessary to comply with federal law and lacked a rational or legitimate basis. We further hold that Hunt lacks standing to challenge the Senate map because she did not suffer an injury in fact from the misnumbering of Davidson County’s Senate districts. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment rejecting Wygant’s district-specific challenge on the merits, reverse the judgment concluding that Hunt has standing, and vacate the judgment holding the Senate map unconstitutional. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Kinsinger, Jr.
In 2021, the Defendant, Richard Kinsinger, Jr., pleaded guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve six months in confinement and five years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kentavis Antwon Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kentavis Antwon Jones, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed the petition for not being in the proper form without giving him reasonable opportunity to correct the petition with the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling due to the negligence of his trial counsel. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition as untimely and that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Wygant, et al. v. Bill Lee, Governor, et al. (Concur in Part/Dissent in Part)
I agree with most of the majority’s excellent opinion, including its conclusions concerning Mr. Wygant’s claim. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion on Ms. Hunt’s standing. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re Madison B.
This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B. (“Father”) to their Child, Madison B. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison and Madison’s older sister, Kaylee B., in two separate petitions filed in the Sevier County Juvenile Court (“trial court”).1 The trial court conducted a joint hearing on both petitions and entered two separate orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to each child.2 The trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Madison after finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based upon the ground of mental incompetence. The trial court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in Madison’s best interest. Father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Kaylee B.
This case focuses on the termination of parental rights of Violet B. (“Mother”) and Coy B. |
Court of Appeals |