Eddie Ainsworth v. Iwash One, LLC
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Gardner
The defendant, Terrence Gardner, was convicted of first degree (felony) murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder, to ten years for the Class B felony, and to four years for the Class C felony. The convictions for the murder and aggravated robbery were set to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the aggravated assault, for a total effective sentence of life plus four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in not permitting him to present a witness to be impeached. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis G. Lohmann v. Ronald D. Lohmann, et al.
This is a suit between siblings over their mother's Estate. Plaintiff sued his brother, defendant, alleging the defendant had a confidential relationship with the parties' mother and sought a judgment declaring that certain transactions made by the defendant on behalf of the mother were void. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Court held the evidence established a presumption of undue influence and the defendant did not rebut the presumption. The Court ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the annuity contracts and bank contracts, that the defendant had caused the plaintiff's name to be deleted as a beneficiary of those contracts, and the Court entered Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $211,830.86 against defendant and placed a lien upon the defendants' real property until the Judgment is paid. Defendant has appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
LaFollette Medical Center, et al., v. CIty of LaFollette, et al.
In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had entered an Agreed Order for disbursement of the funds which stated the parties had determined that the purpose of the constructive trust would best be shared out by transferring the funds to a newly created non-profit corporation known as the Lafollette Medical Foundation (the funds had been held by the Clerk of the Court). The Court directed that the trust fund would be placed in the foundation with the monies retained for potential liabilities, and the charter of the LaFollette Medical Foundation, Inc., was filed with the Court, as well as its by-laws. The City of LaFollette filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., along with affidavits. The Court conducted a hearing and filed a Memorandum Opinion finding that its order was not void because the City had been found to have no interest in the fund and the City had actual knowledge of the Foundation and its rules, and transferring the money to the Foundation best served the interest of the public rather than the money being held by the Court. The City of LaFollette appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Latonya Yvonne Taylor v. State of Tennessee
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without parole plus twenty years. The Petitioner then timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis J. Rountree, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dennis J. Rountree, Jr., appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because it found the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for a hearing on the merits of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William J. Johnson
The defendant, William J. Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentences for violation of habitual motor vehicle offender status, driving under the influence fifth offense, and driving while license revoked fourth offense. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support hisconvictions and that his effective twelve-year sentence was excessive. We affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mathews Partners, LLC, d/b/a NAI Nashville v. Lucianna Lemme
Commercial real estate broker brought action against seller of property seeking commission following the sale of the property to buyers allegedly introduced to the seller by the broker during the term of the listing agreement. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the seller finding the listing agreement was unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds and a lack of mutual assent to the terms of the agreement. Broker appeals and finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Tierney
The Defendant, Travis Tierney, was charged with one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -102(d)(1), -16-503(b). He was found guilty as charged following a jury trial and sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder, six years for each aggravated assault, and six years for tampering with evidence, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of second degree murder; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Wallace v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Brandon Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is presently serving an effective sentence of forty years after being found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we conclude that the petitioner’s sentencing claim was previously determined and that he failed in carrying his burden of proving that trial counsel was ineffective. The judgment from the post-conviction court denying relief is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lori Ann Patton v. Hartco Flooring Company, a Division of Armstrong Products, Inc., et al.
This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue raised on appeal is whether the Employee, who suffered a neck, arm and shoulder injury in the course and scope of her employment, made a meaningful return to work after her injury. The trial court ruled that the Employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that, therefore, the cap on benefits of one and one-half times the impairment rating provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply. The trial court applied a multiplier of four times the impairment rating. The Employer appealed. We agree with the trial court that the Employee did not have a meaningful return to work, and thus the benefits cap does not apply. Moreover, the multiplier of four times the impairment rating was not excessive. We affirm the judgment. |
Scott | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Calvin R. Cannon v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Calvin R. Cannon, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his four petitions for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins v. Lynn Lampton Deakins - Concurring
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Randloph Deakins vs. Lynn Lampton Deakins
In this divorce case, the trial court granted Nancy Randolph Deakins (“Wife”) a divorce from Lynn Lampton Deakins (“Husband”) thereby ending the parties’ 24-year marriage. Upon dissolving the marriage, the court valued and divided the marital estate, declined Husband’s request for alimony, and awarded Wife discretionary costs, her attorney’s fees and court costs. Husband challenges each of these determinations as well as an evidentiary ruling and the court’s finding that Husband dissipated assets. We reverse the awards to Wife of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett v. Bradley-Polk, OB/GYN Services, P.C.
This is a medical malpractice action filed by Sarah Elizabeth Plunkett and her husband Robert Plunkett (“the Plaintiffs”) as the natural parents and next of kin of their stillborn child. The complaint alleges that Michelle Perry, M.D., and Bradley-Polk OB/GYN Services, P.C. (collectively “the Bradley-Polk Defendants”), negligently failed to diagnose, manage and treat complications during Sarah’s pregnancy and that those failures resulted in the stillbirth delivery of the Plaintiffs’ infant. The Plaintiffs secured only one medical expert, Michael A. Ross, M.D., to present testimony that the Bradley-Polk Defendants violated the standard of care applicable in Bradley County at the time of treatment in early 2004. Doctor Ross was licensed in Virginia and practiced primarily in Fairfax, Virginia, and the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. To satisfy the “locality rule” followed in Tennessee, Dr. Ross testified that Bradley County was similar to two communities where he practiced in Virginia, both of which are within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., but both of which are distinct communities situated about 40 to 50 miles from Washington, D.C. The Bradley-Polk Defendants first challenged Dr. Ross’s qualifications to testify with a motion in limine, and the trial court denied the motion approximately one month before trial. The Bradley-Polk Defendants renewed their challenge to Dr. Ross’s qualifications on the first day of trial. The trial court allowed a voir dire of Dr. Ross out of the presence of the jury and held that Dr. Ross was not qualified because the large metropolitan area where he practiced was not similar to Bradley County. Upon a stipulation of the parties that there was no proof available other than through Dr. Ross to establish a violation of the standard of care in Bradley County, the trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ oral motion for continuance and granted the Bradley-Polk Defendants’ motion for directed verdict. The Plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Gary E. Aldridge v. James Fortner, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gary E. Aldridge, was convicted in 1997 of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault, all perpetrated upon his estranged wife. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years, with a sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days to be served consecutively. The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. Gary Eugene Aldridge, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00075, 1999 WL 632299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 1999), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2000). Subsequently, the petitioner began a series of post-conviction filings. This appeal resulted from the dismissal of his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. We agree and dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
I acknowledge that the majority opinion does not grant error coram nobis relief to this defendant but merely remands the case to the trial court for the purpose of the trial court applying the proper standard of review. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion; therefore, I dissent. The State argues that the one-year statute of limitations bars proceeding with the petitioner’s claims. The majority is unsure as to what date the statute began running under the facts of this case but has concluded, in any event, that due process requires the tolling of the statute. I conclude that the statute began to run thirty days after the judgment of conviction was entered on June 27, 1985. Our supreme court has specifically held that, as to a petition for writ of error coram nobis, “[a] judgment becomes final in the trial court thirty days after its entry if no post-motions are filed” and that “[i]f a post-trial motion is timely filed, the judgment becomes final upon entry of an order disposing of the post-trial motion.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996)). The petitioner did not file his petition for writ of error coram nobis until April 22, 2005. Because I agree with the State that the so-called new information either could or should have been discovered during the first trial, I disagree with the majority that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, I would dismiss the petitioner’s claim as time barred. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Shelby County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition on the basis that the petitioner was at fault for timely failing to discover the evidence. The petitioner appeals, maintaining that the newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also argues that the coram nobis court applied the incorrect standard in denying his petition for coram nobis relief, that the court did not address all of the evidence in denying his petition, and that a review of all the evidence shows he should receive a new trial. The State argues that the coram nobis court should have dismissed the petition because it was untimely filed and that, in any event, the court properly denied the petition. Based upon our review, we conclude that due process required tolling the statute of limitations in this case and agree with the petitioner that the coram nobis court denied the petition based upon the incorrect standard. Therefore, the court’s denial of the petition is reversed, and the case is remanded to the coram nobis court for reconsideration of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lois Brasfield
Appellant, Lois Brasfield, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of felony reckless endangerment and misdemeanor assault. As a result, she was sentenced to eighteen months in incarceration. The trial court ordered her to spend 90 days in jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction to the jury at trial. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to show that the instruction was warranted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gerald Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief in which he argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also argues on appeal that the post-conviction court improperly excluded evidence at the post-conviction hearing related to his diminished mental capacity. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher v. Ashley Revell - Concurring
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Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Julia Fisher, et al. v. Ashley Revell, et al.
This is a summary judgment case, arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs/Appellants, the two injured parties, filed suit and served a copy of the summons on their insurance provider, the Appellee herein. In interpreting the policy, the trial court concluded that the policy limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence limited Plaintiffs/Appellants’ coverage to $200,000 (or $100,000 per person). Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal, asserting that they are entitled to recover the policy limit of $300,000 per occurrence. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy Collins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company Consolidated, et al.
Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his lower back as a result of his work as a route salesman for a soft drink company. He was treated by several doctors, to whom he gave differing histories concerning how his injury occurred. The trial court found that he had sustained a compensable injury and awarded 70% permanent partial disability apportioned between Employer and the Second Injury Fund. Employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Larry Eugene Douglas v. Dura-Craft Millwork, Inc., et al.
Employee injured his neck in the course of his employment. While he was receiving treatment for that injury, his doctors discovered that he had a serious spinal condition. The treating doctors testified that this condition was unrelated to his work injury. After receiving treatment, Employee returned to work at his previous job. Several months later, his position was eliminated. He declined an offer of alternate employment. The trial court found that he did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded 65% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by adopting the impairment rating of an evaluating physician and by finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.1 |
Benton | Workers Compensation Panel |