Reginald G. Peck v. Hochman Family Partners, L.P., et al.
The employee, Reginald G. Peck, sought benefits for an alleged work-related injury to his lower back. The trial court found for the employer, Hochman Family Partners, L.P., and dismissed the complaint. Mr. Peck has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by entering judgment for the employer, and by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. 1 We affirm the judgment. |
Hamilton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Evelyn Nye, Individually and as Surviving Spouse and Next-of-Kin of Hugh Todd Nye, v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al.
Defendants sold materials containing asbestos to the deceased’s employer, where he was exposed to asbestos and contracted mesothelioma from which he died. Plaintiff’s widow brought this action against the supplier, a jury trial resulted and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which the Trial Court approved. On appeal, we hold that certain jury instructions were error and we reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William C. Brothers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William C. Brothers, pled nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County which was dismissed. On appeal, the petitioner argues: (1) the indictment was defective; (2) he was no protected from double jeopardy; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) the State failed to identify any evidence to prove its allegations. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Joe McNew - Concurring
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Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Joe McNew
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Randy Joe McNew, of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, see T.C.A. § 55-10-616 (2004), violating the vehicle registration law, see id. § 55-5-115, and driving under the influence, see id. § 55-10-401. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, argues that a violation of the rule of sequestration rendered a State’s witness incompetent to testify, claims that the trial court erred by refusing to rule prior to trial on the admissibility of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions, and attacks the sentencing decision of the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Morton v. State of Tennessee
Claimant filed this claim for damages seeking return of bond money he had posted. He alleged a violation of his constitutional rights resulted when the State charged him for the same two crimes in two different counties. The State responded with a motion to dismiss contending that the Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion. Claimant appeals. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Wayne Graves
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Joseph Wayne Graves, was found guilty of aggravated assault,aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued at more than $500 butless than $1000. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-three years. On appeal,Defendant alleges: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence; (2)the evidence presented does not support his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Graves’convictions; however, we conclude that double jeopardy protections require that the convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft be merged. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for purposes of merger and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction. |
Decatur | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William F. Mcneal v. Betty G. Mcneal
This appeal involves the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that the parties would jointly own various retirement accounts after their divorce. Several years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for relief alleging that the husband was using the funds in the retirement accounts for his own benefit and denying her access to the funds. The trial court essentially divided the retirement funds between the parties and ordered the husband to repay the wife one-half of the funds he had withdrawn since the divorce. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Arlene R. Starr v. Paul B. Hill, Sr., AND Paul B. Hill, Jr.
After Plaintiff was injured in a car accident, she filed suit against the minor who was driving the other vehicle and against the minor’s father, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the acts of his son pursuant to the family purpose doctrine. Father moved for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts showed that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable as a matter of law. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the family purpose doctrine was applicable as a matter of law. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Father. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting Plaintiff’s motion, as we find the family purpose doctrine applicable to this case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Landy M. Clemmons
The Defendant, Landy M. Clemmons, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Knox County for two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two aggravated burglary convictions and sentenced the Defendant to nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for the aggravated burglary and to eleven years as a Range I, violent offender for each of the aggravated kidnappings, to be served concurrently, for an effective eleven-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his convictions for both aggravated burglary and aggravated kidnapping violate principles of due process. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In RE: T.D.M.C. and D.M.A.
Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two children. Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his child with Mother. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Iris Kay Snodgrass v. Robert H. Snodgrass - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Snodgrass’s 401(k) account was not transmuted to marital property when he withdrew a portion of its funds for the purchase of a family home, as well as its holding regarding the division of the parties’ pensions. I further agree with the majority’s determination that 401(k) accounts are “retirement . . . benefit rights relating to employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and that the contributions made by Mr. Snodgrass and Mrs. Snodgrass prior to the marriage (the “premarital contributions”) should be classified as separate property because they did not, as the statute requires, “accrue[] during the period of the marriage.” I disagree, however, with the rationale by which the majority concludes that the increase in the value of the premarital contributions qualified as marital property. Instead, I would remand for consideration of whether the increases in value could be traced to the premarital contributions of each to their respective 401(k)s and have not been subjected to commingling (inextricably mingled with marital property) or, in the alternative, whether the increases became marital through the concept of substantial contribution (to the preservation and appreciation of the premarital contributions). |
Supreme Court | ||
Melody Cook Evans, et al. v. April Cook, Executrix of the Estate of David Carl Cook
This appeal involves claims made by a sister against her brother’s estate in addition to a separate dispute between the sister and the brother’s estate regarding how much money the estate was owed from the sale of a house owned by the brother and his siblings. The trial court referred the matters to a special master, who found in favor of the sister on some of the claims. Upon review of the special master’s report, however, the trial court rejected the special master’s findings in favor of the sister and ruled in favor of the brother’s estate. The sister appeals, claiming that the trial court should have deferred to the special master. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Clemmie Rhyan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Clemmie Rhyan, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, is currently serving a twenty-two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: (1) investigate the case and locate witnesses for the defense; and (2) present evidence, including thorough cross-examination of State witnesses supporting the theory of self-defense. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the petition and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allen Jean Stephens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rostis Timoshchuk v. Long of Chattanooga Mecedes-Benz, et al.
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after discovering damage to a Mercedes-Benz that had been represented to them as a new vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim against all defendants and plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims against defendant Mercedes-Benz USA. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jo Taylor v. Wendell Harris and Jo Taylor v. Louie R. Ladd
In this ejectment action, the plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s finding that they did not prove title to the property at issue by adverse possession in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-105 and that they failed to show the boundaries of the property they claimed. Plaintiffs also contend that they were entitled to the presumption of ownership set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109. Finding no basis to reverse the judgment of the trial court, we affirm same. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children Services v. Amber Nicole Bennett
This is an appeal from an order terminating a mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, among others. The trial court found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Conservatorship of Annette H. Cross
Appellant previously acted as co-conservator of respondent’s estate and person. He was removed from this capacity due to difficulties with his co-conservator cousin. Appellant sought to be renamed conservator of respondent’s estate, but the trial court instead appointed an independent conservator citing Appellant’s previous removal as conservator, the distance Appellant lives from respondent, and the fact that Appellant’s mother is currently acting as conservator of respondent’s person. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s appointment of Robert T. Condo as conservator of respondent’s estate, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner - Concurring
I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the nonclaim statutes in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-2- |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of Martha M. Tanner, deceased
The decedent, Martha M. Tanner, died intestate while a resident of a nursing facility. Nineteen months later, the Bureau of TennCare filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking the appointment of an administrator of her estate. The case was transferred to the probate court, and the decedent’s son, Thomas Tanner, was appointed administrator. The Bureau of TennCare then filed a claim seeking recovery of “medical assistance correctly paid” on behalf of the decedent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-116 (1995 & Supp. 2002) and 42 United States Code section 1396p (2003 & Supp. 2009). The probate court dismissed the claim as untimely, and, upon direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted application for permission to appeal in order to consider whether the claim is procedurally barred. Because section 71-5-116 places an obligation on the representative of an estate to obtain a waiver or release from the Bureau, the claim is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the probate court. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Gregory Allen Cathey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gregory Allen Cathey, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Le Tonio Swader v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Le Tonio Swader, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court from his convictions for first degree felony murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense, a Class E felony. The murder convictions were merged. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of life plus two years. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, which is not a proper post-conviction claim, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for which the petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof. He also argues for the first time in this proceeding that his convictions amounted to double jeopardy. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gayle Thomas Crawford
The defendant, Gayle Thomas Crawford, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he raises essentially five issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the rule of sequestration was violated; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer his opinion on the street value of the drugs; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify that an unknown black male listed in the warrant was the defendant; and (5) whether the search warrant was invalid. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana, the rule of sequestration was not violated, the trial court did not err in allowing the officer’s testimony with respect to the street value of drugs and the identity of the unknown black male, and that the defendant has waived the issues with respect to the validity of the search warrant. We further conclude, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and reverse and dismiss the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Jo Patterson v. Clarksville-Montgomery County School System
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee complied with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a) (Supp. 2003). It further found that she had sustained a compensable injury to her lower back and awarded 30% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to provide timely notice and that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. We affirm the judgment. |
Montgomery | Workers Compensation Panel |